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THE 
CONFLICT  OF  EAST  AND  WEST 


IN 


EGYPT 


BY 


JOHN  ELIOT  BOWEN,  Ph.D. 


NEW  YORK  &  LONDON 

G.    P.    PUTNAM'S    SONS 

®^e  JmichcrbochEr  ^res« 
1887 


^lO" 


■^^^ 


COPYRIGHT    BY 

JOHN  ELIOT  BOWEN 


Press  of 

G.  P.  Putnam's  Sons 

New  York 


This  work  is  inscribed  to  the  Faculty  of  the 
School  of  Political  Science,  Columbia  College,  to 
whom  it  was  presented,  in  its  original  form,  as  a 
"dissertation  in  part  fulfillment  of  the  conditions 
necessary  for  the  attainment  of  the  degree  of  doctor 
of  philosophy." 


269463 


CONTENTS. 


CHAPTER  PAGE 

I — From  Mehemet  Ali  to  Ismail i 

II — Ismail's  Ambitious  Designs i8 

III — The  Road  to  Ruin 33 

IV — Mehemet  Tewfik,  Khedive 67 

V — Egypt  for  the  Egyptians 91 

VI — Arabi's  Rebellion  and  the  Reforms  that  Followed   .  113 

VII — The  St>DAN  and  the  Mahdi 135 

VIII — The  Mission  of  Gordon — Operations   in  the   Eastern  151 

SCtdan . 

IX — Gordon  at  KhartOm  and  the  Government  in  London,  163 

X — Wolseley's  Expedition. — Conclusion        .        ,        .        .177 

Books  and  Periodicals  Consulted 203 


THE    CONFLICT   OF   EAST   AND   WEST 
IN    EGYPT. 


I. 


FROM    MEHEMET    ALI    TO    ISMAIL. 

IT  was  not  until  the  purchase  of  the  Suez  canal 
shares  by  Great  Britain,  in  1875,  that  the  con- 
flict to  be  described  was  waged  with  spirit.  The 
influences  and  interests  of  the  East  and  West, 
however,  had  clashed  for  many  years.  Long  be- 
fore the  dawn  of  the  nineteenth  century  the  atten- 
tion of  England  had  been  directed  through  Egypt 
to  the  far  away  Indian  empire,  that  El  Dorado  that 
lured  the  British  merchant-men  to  brave  the  storms 
of  the  southern  seas.  But  the  voyage  around  the 
Cape  was  a  hazardous  one  and  a  long  one  ;  and 
the  growth  of  commerce  demanded  that  the  East- 
ern empire  should  be  made  more  accessible.  Eng- 
land knew,  and  the  world  knew,  that  the  direct 
route  to  India  lay  through  the  land  of  the  ancient 
Pharaohs.  England  thought  the  way  through 
Egypt  should  be  overland  ;  but  Trance  thought  it 


2'^tkE   CdNP^LlCT^OF  EAST  AND    WEST  IN  EGYPT. 

should  be  by  a  canal  that  would  one  day  connect 
the  Mediterranean  and  the  Red  Seas. 

France  was  interested  in  the  valley  of  the  Nile. 
She  had  put  her  foot  there  before  England.  The 
great  Napoleon  knew  the  value  of  Egypt.  ''  By 
seizing  and  holding  Egypt,"  he  said,  ''  I  retain  and 
command  the  destinies  of  the  civilized  world." 
And  so,  in  i  798,  he  seized  Egypt  ;  but  he  did  not 
hold  it.  The  English,  under  Abercrombie,  com- 
pelled the  French  to  retire  by  the  battle  of  Alex- 
andria, in  1 80 1.  And  now,  for  a  short  time,  the 
influence  of  England  was  felt  in  Egypt.  But  it  did 
not  last  long  ;  for,  after  the  accession  of  Mehemet 
Ali  in  1805,  Egypt  was  able  to  stand  by  herself. 
This  event  marks  the  starting-point  from  which  it 
will  be  necessary  to  trace  in  brief  the  history  and 
development  of  Egypt,  in  order  to  appreciate  the 
government  and  condition  of  the  country  a  decade 
ago,  when  England  purchased  the  canal  shares. 

When  the  firman  of  the  Sublime  Porte  made  Me- 
hemet Ali  the  governor  of  Egypt,  in  1805,  the  coun- 
try was  in  a  state  of  feudalism.  The  pasha  appointed 
by  the  Porte  had  been  only  the  nominal  ruler,  the 
real  government  of  the  country  being  in  the  hands 
of  the  petty  lords,  or  beys,  known  as  the  memliiks. 
They  had  deference  neither  for  pasha  nor  for 
sultan.  It  is  true  that  a  small  tribute  was  promised 
the  Porte  every  time  a  new  pasha  was  appointed ; 


FROM  MEHEMET  ALI   TO  ISMAIL,  3 

but  it  was  almost  never  paid.  The  governors  had 
been  many  since  the  beginning  of  the  century. 
'*  Indeed,"  says  Mr.  Patton,  in  his  history  of  the 
Egyptian  Revolution,  "■  all  the  pashas  that  inter- 
vene between  the  French  rule  and  that  of  Mehemet 
AH  are  a  will-o'-the  wisp  to  the  historian.  A  pasha 
of  some  sort  flies  before  the  eyes,  but  when  we 
attempt  to  grasp  him  he  is  gone.  .  .  .  Thus 
successively  rose  and  fell  Mehemet  Khusuf  Pasha, 
Tahir  Pasha,  Ali  Pasha  Gezairli,  and  Khurshid 
Pasha.  Mehemet  Ali  alone  stands  out  the  distinct 
historical  figure  in  the  foreground."  ' 

The  obscure  Albanian  owed  his  elevation  to  the 
pashalic  to  his  success,  while  a  Turkish  commander, 
in  quelling  the  dissensions  among  the  memluk  beys. 
Once  at  the  head  of  the  government,  he  set  to 
work  in  earnest  to  deprive  them  of  their  power, 
knowing  full  well  that  his  position  as  the  sultan's 
pasha  would  be  at  best  both  insignificant  and  inse- 
cure, so  long  as  these  feudal  lords  played  fast  and 
loose  with  the  resources  of  the  land.  Until  1811, 
therefore,  Mehemet  Ali  devoted  himself  to  the 
suppression  of  the  memluks.  Against  this  grasping 
for  power  England  entered  a  feeble  protest  ;  not 
indeed  because  she  sympathized  with  Egyptian 
feudalism,  but  because  she  happened,  at  that  time, 

1  A.  A.  Patton,  F.R.G.S.,  A  History  of  Egyptian  Revolution  to  the 
Death  of  Mehemet  Ali,  vol,  ii.,  p.  14. 


4      THE   CONFLICT  OF  EAST  AND    WEST  IN  EGYPT. 

to  fall  out  with  the  Porte,  and  desired,  therefore, 
to  help  the  sultan's  enemies.  She  even  sent  troops 
to  Egypt  and  took  possession  of  Alexandria.  But 
the  occupation  was  brief ;  for  Mehemet  Ali  de- 
scended from  Upper  Egypt,  where  he  had  been 
administering  such  correction  to  the  memluks  as 
few  absolute  monarchs  ever  dared  employ,  and, 
proclaiming  himself  the  champion  of  Islamism,  he 
forced  the  infidels  to  retire  to  Sicily.  It  now  re- 
mained for  the  vigorous  pasha  to  perform  the  two 
acts  that  consolidated  his  power  throughout  the 
valley  of  the  Nile  :  the  first  was  the  revolutionary 
transfer  to  his  own  possession  of  the  landed 
property  of  the  entire  country,  and  the  second  was 
the  total  extinction  of  the  memluks  by  massacre  in 
the  citadel  of  Cairo.  The  period  of  destruction 
was  succeeded  by  one  of  development.  The  abso- 
lute ruler  introduced  modern  military  tactics  and 
established  a  naval  arsenal  in  Alexandria  ;  he  built 
canals  ;  he  introduced  the  culture  of  cotton,  a 
product  that  was  destined  one  day  to  become  the 
source  of  enormous  revenues  ;  he  imported  also 
indigo,  forest  trees,  fruits,  spices,  etc,  for  repro- 
duction ;  he  founded  medical  and  educational  insti- 
tutions ;  he  improved  the  police  and  rendered  tra- 
vel safe,  so  that  now,  for  the  first  time,  passengers 
and  letters  bound  for  India  were  conveyed  with 
perfect  safety  through  Egypt  overland  to  Suez. 


FROM  MEHEMET  A  LI  TO  ISMAIL.  5 

But  Mehemet  Ali  was  not  content  with  these 
undertakings  and  improvements,  important  and 
difficult  as  they  were  ;  he  longed  for  greater  power. 
He  made  war  against  the  Wahabees  of  Arabia  and 
he  conquered  the  peoples  of  the  Sudan.  And  all 
the  time  he  chafed  under  his  subjection  to  the 
Porte.  Finally  he  sent  his  warlike  son,  Ibrahim,  to 
pick  a  quarrel  in  Syria ;  and  Ibrahim  captured 
Acre  and  was  soon  fighting  against  the  troops  of 
his  father's  suzerain  and  carrying  all  before  him. 
It  seemed  as  if  Mehemet  Ali  was  about  to  become 
the  sultan  of  Egypt  and  Syria. 

This  was  in  1832,  a  time  when  England  was 
keeping  a  very  watchful  and  a  very  jealous  eye  on 
Russia,  ready  at  any  moment  to  claim  a  foothold 
in  Turkey.  England  thought  that  Egypt,  being 
against  Turkey,  must  be  for  Russia.  From  self- 
interest  England  could  not  allow  her  "  ancient 
ally  "  to  remain  between  two  such  fires  ;  this  Syrian 
flame  must  be  quenched.  England  hesitated, 
however,  to  act,  and  in  1833  the  Porte  recognized 
the  feudal  sovereignty  of  Mehemet  Ali  over 
Egypt,  Crete,  Syria,  and  Adana,  exacting  only  a 
small  tribute.  The  peace  did  not  last  long,  and  in 
1839  ^he  Turks  were  again  fleeing  before  the  vic- 
torious Ibrahim.  It  seemed  as  if  Asia  Minor  and 
Constantinople  must  soon  succumb  to  him.  But 
now  England  intervened  with  an  energy  that  was 


6      THE   CONFLICT  OF  EAST  AND    WEST  IN  EGYPT. 

wanting  in  1832.  Her  fleet  joined  those  of  Turkey 
and  Austria  off  the  coast  of  Syria,  and  confronted 
by  British  commanders  on  land  and  sea  the  troops 
of  Ibrahim  were  forced  to  yield.  The  hopes  of 
Mehemet  Ali  were  blasted.  His  son  had  been 
overcome  by  England  and  he  had  been  duped  by 
France.  Thiers  promised  an  assistance  that  was 
never  rendered. 

The  war  at  an  end,  the  Powers  endeavored  to 
negotiate  a  treaty.  After  the  usual  diplomatic 
formalities  and  delays  it  was  finally  agreed  that 
Mehemet  Ali  should  evacuate  Syria,  Arabia,  and 
Candia,  and  should  receive  the  hereditary  govern- 
ment of  Egypt,  acknowledging  the  sultan  as  his 
suzerain.  The  terms  of  this  agreement  were  em- 
bodied in  a  firman  issued  by  the  Sublime  Porte 
in  1841. 

Mehemet  Ali  was  now  an  old  man,  and  during 
the  remainder  of  his  life  the  influences  of  his  youth 
and  early  manhood,  as  is  usually  the  case  with 
those  who  have  witnessed  and  participated  in  great 
governmental  and  social  revolutions,  predominated 
over  the  progressive  spirit  of  his  most  vigorous 
and  potent  years.  He  became  more  of  a  despot 
than  ever  ;  and  his  severity  had  few  of  its  former 
excuses.  He  did,  however,  permit  an  association 
of  British  merchants  to  organize  a  transportation 
service  to  India,  through   Egypt,  via  Cairo  and 


FROM  MEHEMET  A  LI   TO  ISMAIL,  7 

Suez,    by   means    of    which    communication     with 
India  was  made  in  weeks  instead  of  months.' 

In  1847  Mehemet  AH's  intellect  began  to  weaken, 
and  within  a  year  his  dotage  had  so  increased  that 
his  son  Ibrahim  was  installed  pasha  of  Egypt  in  his 
place.  But  Ibrahim's  rule  was  cut  short  by  death 
two  months  later,  and  in  December  of  1848  Abbas 
was  invested  with  the  pashalic.  In  the  summer  of 
1849  Mehemet  AH  died,  spent  in  mind  and  body. 
A  good  idea  of  the  character  and  work  of  this 
*'  Napoleon  of  Egypt,"  as  he  has  so  often  been 
called,  may  be  gathered  from  the  following  quota- 
tion from  Mr.  Patton's  history  : 

There  is  much  to  be  said  in  abatement  of  his  merits. 
Although  superior  to  a  thirst  for  blood,  from  mere  ven- 
geance and  resentment,  and  an  easy  pardoner  of  those  who 
were  no  longer  able  to  injure  him,  no  compunction  ever 
deterred  him  from  removing  the  obstacles  to  his  lawless 
ambition  by  fraud  or  force — most  frequently  by  a  com- 
pound of  both.  Nor  was  he  able,  with  all  his  perseverance, 
to  conquer  his  aboriginal  want  of  education.  Anxious  to 
introduce  European  civilization  into  Egypt,  he  remained 
to  the  end  of  his  life  in  utter  ignorance  of  the  economical 
principles  upon  which  the  prosperity  of  a  state  reposes. 
Greedy  of  the  praise  of  Europeans,  and,  in  the  latter  part 
of  his  career,  anxious  to  count  for  something  in  the  bal- 
ance of  military  power,  his  allusions  on  this  head  showed 

^  William  Holt  Yates,  M.D.,  The  Modern  History  and  Condition  of 
Egypt,  from  i8oi  to  1846. 


8       THE   CONFLICT  OF  EAST  AND    WEST  IN  EGYPT. 

to  himself  and  to  others  the  wide  interval  that  separates 
the  scientific  organization  of  European  military  and  polit- 
ical establishments  from  the  Egyption  imitations  which 
cost  him  efforts  so  lengthened  and  persevering.  But 
although  unable  to  resist  the  dictation  of  any  European 
power,  he  was — within  Egypt — all-potent  in  establishing 
an  order  that  had  never  existed  before,  so  as  to  afford 
those  facilities  that  have  proved  so  valuable  to  the  Indian 
transit.  He  found  Egypt  in  anarchy  :  and  long  before  he 
had  terminated  his  career  the  journey  from  the  Mediter- 
ranean to  Nubia  was  as  secure  as  that  from  London  to 
Liverpool.  He  learned  to  read,  and  attempted  to  write, 
after  he  had  attained  his  fortieth  year ;  and  when  we  add 
that  the  practical  result  of  his  efforts  was  to  leave  his 
family  in  the  hereditary  government  of  Egypt,  Mehemet 
Ali  must  be  admitted  to  have  been,  without  exception, 
the  most  remarkable  character  in  the  modern  history  of 
the  Ottoman  Empire.' 

Abbas  Pasha  succeeded  Mehemet  Ali.  He  pre 
ceded  his  uncle  Said  ;  for,  by  the  then  existing  law 
of  succession,  the  reins  of  government  fell  to  the 
''eldest  male  of  the  blood  of  Mehemet  Ali."  Abbas 
possessed  neither  the  warlike  impetuosity  of  his 
father  Ibrahim,  nor  the  ambition  of  his  grandfather 
Mehemet  Ali.  He  did  not  look  beyond  the  bounds 
of  Egypt  for  territory  to  acquire  or  for  customs  to 
imitate.  It  was  enough  for  him  that  he  was  a  good 
Mohammedan  ;  that  the  wheat  and  millet  fields 
throughout    the   valley  of    the   Nile   yielded   their 

^  Patton,  vol.  ii.,  pp.  17  and  19. 


FROM  ME  HE  MET  A  LI   TO  ISMAIL.  9 

yearly  increase  ;  that  the  fallahin  prospered  and 
paid  their  taxes  without  the  application  of  kurbash 
and  bastinado,  and  that  there  was  peace  among 
the  people  who  acknowledged  him  their  master. 
Though  he  did  not  court  the  favor  of  foreigners,  he 
allowed  an  English  company  to  begin  the  construc- 
tion of  a  railway  from  Alexandria  to  Cairo,  which 
was  to  be  continued  across  the  desert  to  Suez.  But 
he  himself  undertook  no  great  works,  built  no  new 
canals,  and  did  not  even  carry  out  the  schemes  and 
plans  of  his  predecessors.  Abbas  has  been  called  a 
bigot  and  a  miser.  He  certainly  was  neither  liberal 
in  mind  nor  lavish  with  money.'     It  is  not  surpris- 

*  Abbas  has  had  few  defenders.  Henry  C.  Kay,  in  The  Contemporary 
Reviezv  for  March,  1883,  says  of  him  :  "  It  is  not  my  purpose  to  attempt 
the  impossible  task  of  justifying  every  act  of  his  government.  But,  as  a 
matter  of  justice  and  a  fact  of  history,  it  ought  to  be  stated  that  he  was 
probably,  though  without  the  advantage  of  European  education,  the  most 
able  and  the  most  efficient  administrator  the  country  has  seen  since  the  death 
of  Mehemet  AH.  He  has  met  with  the  misfortune  of  having  his  reputation 
sacrificed  for  political  reasons.  French  influence  was  supreme  and  practi- 
cally unchallenged  throughout  the  reign  of  Mehemet  Ali.  Abbas  Pasha,  on 
his  accession,  manifested  a  disposition  to  seek  some  measure  of  support 
from  England,  He  added  an  Englishman  to  the  French  officials  employed 
at  his  Foreign  Office.  He  set  about  the  construction,  under  the  superintend- 
ence of  English  engineers,  of  a  railway  destined  to  connect  Alexandria  with 
Suez,  an  undertaking  until  then  successfully  opposed  by  France.  He, 
moreover,  placed  his  son  under  the  care  of  an  English  tutor.  The  conse- 
quences may  easily  be  understood.  But  the  curious  part  of  the  matter  is,  that 
English  writers,  by  constant  repetition,  one  after  the  other,  have  done  more 
to  propagate  erroneous  views  of  Abbas  Pasha's  reign  than  those  of  any  other 
nation,  the  French  probably  included.  It  is  not  my  object  to  defend  Abbas 
Pasha's  private  character,  further  than  by  adding  that  the  generality  of  the 
stories  told  about  him  rest  upon  no  better  foundation  than  the  merest  gossip." 


lO      THE   CONFLICT  OF  EAST  AND    WEST  IN  EGYPT. 

ing,  therefore,  that  at  his  death  he  left  a  large  sum 
of  ready  money  in  the  Egyptian  treasury.  Perhaps 
this  was  known  to  those  who  are  said  to  have 
strangled  him.  At  all  events,  the  money  and  the 
government  passed  to  Said  in  1854. 

Said  Pasha  was  a  very  different  man  from  his 
nephew  Abbas.  Their  tastes,  their  habits,  their 
dispositions,  their  lives,  and,  consequently,  their 
governments,  were  diametrically  opposite.  In  fact, 
Said  was  everything  that  his  predecessor  was  not. 
Sociable,  witty,  extravagant,  sensual,  and  fond  of 
all  the  delights  of  life,  he  seemed  rather  the  gay 
French  courtier  than  the  imperturbable  Moslem 
ruler.  He  set  up  a  court  not  unlike  that  of  Louis 
XIV.  He  welcomed  foreigners  and  entertained 
most  lavishly.  He  forgot  the  sobriety  enjoined  by 
the  Prophet,  so  that  his  dinners  and  his  wines  be- 
came famed  for  their  richness  and  excellence.  He 
accepted  the  suggestions  of  his  foreign  parasites, 
and  hastened  to  adopt  this  scheme  or  that  scheme, 
according  as  the  whim  of  the  hour  or  the  per- 
suasive agreeableness  of  the  schemer  might  move 
him. 

Among  the  foreigners  attracted  to  Egypt  at  the 
beginning  of  Said's  reign  was  a  man  of  larger  and 
nobler  purpose  than  these  grasping  tricksters  knew. 
Ferdinand  de  Lesseps  had  formed  an  early  friend- 
ship with  Said,  while  acting  as  diplomatic  attache 


FROM  ME  HE  MET  A  LI   TO   ISMAIL.  II 

in  Egypt  years  before.  At  that  time,  also,  he  had 
conceived  a  plan  destined  to  revolutionize  the 
commerce  of  the  world.  It  was  not  a  new  plan, 
however.  The  scheme  of  constructing  a  waterway 
between  the  Mediterranean  and  Red  Seas  had 
been  suggested  to  all  the  great  rulers  of  Egypt, 
the  Pharaohs,  the  Persian,  Greek,  and  Roman  con- 
querors, and  the  Arab  caliphs.  Also,  according  to 
recent  discoveries  in  the  archives  of  Venice,  it 
seems  that  the  project  of  cutting  the  isthmus  was 
considered  by  the  mariners  of  the  fifteenth  century.' 
A  canal  between  the  two  seas  via  the  river  Nile 
actually  existed  for  an  unknown  period  in  the 
dynasties  of  the  Pharaohs,  and  again  for  a  period 
of  more  than  four  hundred  years  under  the 
Romans,  and  lastly  for  a  period  of  more  than  a 
century  after  the  Arab  conquest.  But  Mehemet 
Ali,  though  he  had  considered,  had  not  favored  the 
great  canal  scheme,  and  Ferdinand  de  Lesseps  was 
obliged,  therefore,  to  await  a  more  opportune  time 
for  broaching  his  plan.  He  brooded  over  his  idea 
of  a  waterway  while  England  secured  the  construc- 
tion of  a  railway. 

With  the  accession,  now,  of  his  old  friend  Said, 
the  cherished  hopes  of  de  Lesseps  were  kindled  to 
expectation.      Nor  was    he    deceived    in  believing 

'  Robert  Routledge,  Discoveries  and  Inventions  of  the  Nineteenth 
Century,  p.  163. 


12       THE   CONFLICT  OF  EAST  AND    WEST  IN  EGYPT, 

that  the  opportune  time  had  arrived.  He  went 
at  once  to  Egypt  and  laid  his  plan  before  the 
viceroy.  It  was  accepted  by  him  on  the  15th  of 
November,  1854,  in  these  words:  "I  am  con- 
vinced. I  accept  your  plan.  We  will  talk  about 
the  means  of  its  execution  during  the  rest  of 
the  journey.  [They  were  taking  a  Nile  trip 
together.]  Consider  the  matter  settled.  You 
may  rely  on  me." ' 

The  concession  had  no  sooner  been  announced 
than  English  influence  was  brought  to  bear  against 
the  canal  scheme.  Mr.  Bruce,  the  English  consul 
in  Egypt,  told  the  viceroy  that  he  was  acting  too 
hastily  in  the  matter.  At  Constantinople  Lord 
Stratford  de  Redcliffe  threw  obstacles  in  the  way 
of  the  scheme,  while  in  England  the  general  atti- 
tude toward  the  canal  was  unfavorable,  and  even 
hostile.  In  January,  1855,  the  London  Times  de- 
clared against  the  proposed  canal  as  an  absolute 
impossibility.  Lord  Palmerston  opposed  the 
scheme  from  first  to  last.  He  held  that  the  Porte 
must  give  its  consent  before  the  viceroy  could 
allow  the  canal,  forgetting  that  the  English  gov- 
ernment had  informed  a  former  viceroy  that  he 
might  construct  a  railway  from  Alexandria  to  Suez 
without  the  consent  of  his  suzerain. 

In  February  the  sultan's  cxauncil  was  on  the  point 

'  Ferdinand  de  Lesseps,  The  Suez  Canal,  p.  13. 


FROM  MEHEMET  A  LI  TO  ISMAIL,  1 3 

of  granting  the  necessary  permission,  when  Lord 
Stratford  interposed  his  influence  to  produce  delay. 
His  lordship  urged  that  the  railway  ought  to  be 
enough  without  any  canal.  He  hinted  to  the  Porte 
that  a  canal  might  so  increase  the  importance  of 
Egypt  that  the  child  would  break  with  its  parental 
authority.  An  influence  also  was  brought  to  bear 
upon  the  viceroy,  but  probably  not  of  so  intense  a 
kind  as  de  Lesseps  imagined  ;  for  he  wrote  at  the 
time  :  *'  He  [the  viceroy]  is  even  threatened  with 
the  displeasure  of  England,  whose  fleets  might 
attack  him  when  the  business  on  the  Black  Sea  is 
ended." 

The  whole  matter  had  by  this  time  assumed  an 
international  importance,  with  France  at  the  head 
of  the  nations  who  favored  the  canal,  and  with 
England  leading  the  opposition.  Lord  Clarendon, 
in  communication  with  the  French  government, 
said  that  Her  Majesty  foresaw  inconvenience  in 
leaving  the  matter  to  be  decided  between  the  sul- 
tan and  his  viceroy.  He  submitted  the  following 
objections  to  the  scheme  :  i.  The  canal  is  physi- 
cally impossible.  2.  The  project  would  require  a 
long  time  for  completion  ;  it  would  therefore  retard 
the  projected  railway  and  injure  Indian  interests. 
3.  Her  Majesty's  ministers  consider  the  scheme 
to  be  founded  on  an  antagonistical  policy  on  the 
part  of  France  toward  Egypt.     The  same  objec- 


14      THE   CONFLICT  OF  EAST  AND    WEST  IN  EGYPT. 

tions  and  arguments  were  repeated  by  Lord 
Palmerston.' 

All  this  time  Said  Pasha  was  harassed  by  doubts 
and  fears  ;  but  at  last,  without  receivinor  the  author- 
ity  of  the  Porte,  and  disregarding  the  attitude  of 
England,  he  signed  the  final  concession  for  the 
canal  on  January  5,  1856.  It  is  said  that  he  was 
influenced  by  the  assurance  that  the  canal  would 
redound  to  his  immortal  honor  and  glory.  Be  that 
as  it  may,  it  is,  in  a  measure,  a  monument  to  the 
generosity  of  the  good-natured  viceroy,  whose 
name,  at  least,  is  perpetuated  by  the  port  at  the 
Mediterranean  terminus. 

In    1858    de    Lesseps    launched    his     Compagnie 

'  The  whole  policy  of  opposition,  as  manifested  by  England,  is  thus 
humorously,  but  faithfully  summed  up  by  Mr.  D.  Mackenzie  Wallace,  in 
his  Egypt  and  the  Egyptian  Question  :  "  The  consular  representative  of 
England  does  not  approve  the  scheme,  and  warns  his  Highness  against  the 
insidious  counsels  of  the  plausible  Frenchman.  The  cutting  of  a  canal  may 
be  advantageous  for  humanity,  or  rather  for  that  portion  of  humanity  which 
happens  to  have  a  commercial  fleet  and  seaports  on  the  northern  shores  of 
the  Mediterranean  ;  but  it  would  be  ruinous  for  Egypt,  because  it  would 
entirely  destroy  the  lucrative  transit  trade,  which  might,  on  the  contrary,  be 
increased  by  continuing  to  Suez  the  Alexandria-Cairo  railway.  Then  his 
Highness  must  remember  that  Lord  Palmerston — terrible  name  in  those 
days  ! — is  opposed  to  the  scheme,  not  from  selfish  motives,  but  because  he 
fears  that  it  is  merely  a  first  step  to  a  French  occupation,  by  which,  of 
course,  his  Highness  would  be  the  principal  loser.  Lastly,  there  is  the  little 
matter  of  physical  impossibility.  The  most  competent  English  engineers — 
and  his  Highness  is  too  well-informed  a  man  not  to  know  that  English 
engineers  are  much  more  practical  and  trustworthy  than  French  ones — have 
declared  with  one  accord  that  the  proposed  canal,  if  ever  made,  will  remain 
merely  a  dry  ditch."— (P.  308.) 


FROM  MEHEMET  A  LI   TO  ISMAIL.  1 5 

Universelle  du  Canal  Maritifne  de  Suez,  with  a 
capital  of  ^8,000,000.  More  than  half  of  this 
amount  was  subscribed  for — the  greater  part  being 
taken  in  France — and  in  i860  Said  took  up  the  re- 
mainder, amounting  to  ;^3, 500,000.  De  Lesseps 
began  the  work  in  the  spring  of  1859,  although  the 
consent  of  the  Porte  was  not  given  until  1866. 

The  attitude  of  England  toward  the  canal  re- 
mained unfriendly.  When  the  engineering  ques- 
tion had  been  settled,  and  the  feasibility  of 
constructing  the  canal  proved,  the  English  began 
to  assert  that  it  could  not  be  made  to  pay.  The 
policy  of  opposition  has  been  kept  up  even  to  the 
present  day.  As  the  question  of  the  canal  is  to  be 
dismissed  now,  and  to  be  taken  up  again  only  inci- 
dentally, as  in  its  financial  bearings  upon  the  rela- 
tion of  England  to  Egypt,  it  may  be  well  to  notice 
how  England  has  persisted  in  what  appears  a  jeal- 
ous opposition  toward  the  Compagnie  Universelle. 
A  single  quotation  will  show  how  the  London 
papers  sought  to  bring  the  canal  into  discredit  at 
a  time  when  its  success  was  still  a  matter  of  doubt  : 
*'The  Peninsular  and  Oriental  Company's  steamer 
'  Poonah,'  with  the  Indian  and  China  mails,  which 
arrived  at  Southampton  yesterday,  experienced, 
while  in  the  Suez  canal,  a  severe  sand-storm^  which 
coTumenced  at  sunrise  and  continued^  more  or  less 
furious,   until  Jive  in  the  afternoon.      During  the 


1 6      THE   CONFLICT  OF  EAST  AND    WEST  IN  EGYPT 

storm  she  laid  [!]  right  across  the  canal  powerless. 
Tons  of  sand  were  thrown  on  the  deck  ^  and  the  masts 
and  gear  were  covered  with  a  thick  coating."  ^ 

Of  late  years  the  British  ship-owners  have  come 
to  wish  for  a  canal  of  their  own,  and  they  are  in- 
clined to  dispute  the  claim  of  the  Compagnie  Unt- 
verselle  that  it  has  the  sole  right  to  control  the 
canal  question  until  the  ninety-nine  years  of  the 
concession  are  up.  The  British  government,  how- 
ever, advised  by  the  lord  chancellor  and  the  law 
officers  of  the  crown,  has  been  forced  to  declare 
that  the  company's  claim  Is  well  grounded.  It  is 
to  England's  credit  that  the  opinions  of  such  men 
as  R.  T.  Reid,  Q.  C,  M.  R,  prevailed.  This 
honorable  gentleman  said : 

The  claim  of  M.  de  Lesseps  and  his  company  to  equita- 
ble treatment  is  well  known,  and  is  more  creditable  to  him 
than  to  the  intelligence  of  our  past  rulers.  The  Suez  canal 
is  the  work  of  his  lifetime.  He  undertook  it  under  circum- 
stances of  great  discouragement.  He  completed  it  in  spite 
of  the  disapproval  of  the  British  government.  And  when 
it  has  proved  an  immense  success,  and  the  navies  of  the 
world  are  reaping  the  benefit  of  his  speculation,  we  are 
invited  to  find  a  flaw  in  his  title,  to  chop  logic  as  to  the 
meaning  of  his  concession,  and  to  creep  out  of  a  dif^culty 
which  is  a  mere  matter  of  pounds,  shillings,  and  pence,  by 
refining  upon  words  in  defiance  of  the  intention.  Such 
conduct  would  be  unworthy  of  the  British  government. 

^  Quoted  from  the  London  papers  of  May  i,  1876,  by  Edward  De  Leon, 
in  his  The  Khedive's  Egypt,  p.  36. 


FROM  MEHEMET  A  LI   TO  ISMAIL.  1/ 

.  .  .  The  canal  is  of  enormous  value  to  our  shipping 
interests.  It  has  saved  us  millions  upon  millions  of 
pounds  by  halving  or  nearly  halving  the  route  to  India, 
and  greatly  reducing  the  distance  by  water  between  us 
and  our  entire  Eastern  dominions.  It  is  admittedly  of 
the  utmost  political  advantage  to  us  with  reference  to 
India.  This  vast  profit,  infinitely  exceeding  anything 
gained  by  the  canal  company,  has  been  acquired  without 
risk  of  any  kind  to  the  British  government,  and,  indeed, 
has  been  forced  upon  us  against  our  will  by  the  enterprise 
of  M.  de  Lesseps.  When  the  company  who  bore  the 
brunt  of  the  outlay  ask  for  an  infinitesimal  part  of  the 
profit  conferred  upon  England,  and  ask  it  in  the  form  of 
dues  stipulated  before  the  outlay  was  incurred,  we  are  in- 
vited to  beat  them  down  by  the  threat  of  a  rival  canal. 
This  would  not  be  creditable  in  an  individual.  It  would 
be  wholly  unworthy  of  a  great  nation.  * 

And  so  the  great  nation  decided. 

But  to  return  to  Said  Pasha.  Having  described 
his  relations  to  the  Suez  canal,  it  only  remains  to 
record  that  he  died  in  1863.  But,  in  passing,  it 
must  be  noticed  that  a  financial  cloud,  that  was 
destined  to  blacken  the  Egyptian  sky,  and  to  let 
loose  its  bolts  of  distress  and  bankruptcy  on  the 
land  of  the  Nile,  was  already  discernible  on  the 
horizon.  Said  had  exhausted  the  surplus  accumu- 
lated by  Abbas,  and  had  left  a  debt  of  more  than 
three  millions  sterling.  How  this  was  doubled, 
quadrupled,  and  doubled  again  under  his  successor, 
the  sequel  will  show. 

'  The  Cojitemporary  Review,  August,  1883. 


II. 


ISMAIL  S    AMBITIOUS    DESIGNS. 

ISMAIL,  the  son  of  Ibrahim,  the  son  of  Mehemet 
Ali,  succeeded  Said.  It  is  said  that  Abbas,  long 
before,  had  been  very  jealous  of  him.  He  must,  at 
least,  have  disliked  him  heartily  ;  for  the  two  men 
had  nothing  in  common,  and  everything  that  the 
one  shunned  the  other  courted.  While  Abbas 
was  ruling  Egypt  with  a  rigorous  economy,  Ismail 
sought  the  more  congenial  atmosphere  of  Paris. 
He  obtained,  in  one  capital  and  another,  an  inti- 
mate acquaintance  with  the  civilization  of  the 
West,  and  stored  his  mind  with  all  those  pictures 
of  European  development  that,  though  the  result 
of  centuries  in  Europe,  he  thought  might  be 
reproduced  in  Egypt  within  his  lifetime.  Having 
secured  thus  *'  a  European  education,"  Ismail  re- 
turned to  Egypt,  after  the  accession  of  Said,  and 
received  from  him  a  governmental  portfolio.  He 
seems  to  have  had  the  entire  confidence  of  the 
viceroy,  for  twice  he  acted  as  regent.  He  com- 
manded,  also,    the   year  before   Said's   death,   an 

i8 


ISMAIL'S  AMBITIOUS  DESIGNS,  I9 

expedition  to  the  Sudan.  On  his  accession  in 
1863,  therefore,  Ismail  was  a  man  of  experience — 
such  experience  as  should  have  given  him  excep- 
tional qualification  for  a  ruler.  But  greater  than 
all  the  wisdom,  was  the  ambition  that  his  observa- 
tion had  begotten. 

It  seemed  as  if  Ismail's  dreams  of  wealth  and 
power  were  to  be  realized  immediately  upon  his 
accession.  Our  Civil  War  was  to  furnish  the 
means  to  this  end.  Europe  had  depended  upon 
our  Southern  States  for  cotton,  and  when,  by  the 
war,  the  supply  was  cut  off,  there  followed  through- 
out Europe  what  has  been  called  ''  a  cotton 
famine."  Especially  in  England  the  want  threat- 
ened to  become  a  great  distress.  The  factories 
were  closing,  and  legislators  and  economists  were 
puzzled  to  find  a  way  out  of  the  danger.  The 
shrewd  Ismail,  at  this  juncture,  was  not  slow  to 
perceive  that  the  seed  introduced  into  Egypt  by 
his  grandfather  might  bring  him  the  coveted 
wealth,  and  he  bent  his  entire  energies  to  the  pro- 
duction of  cotton,  borrowing  money  to  buy  the 
implements  and  tools,  to  secure  the  proper  irriga- 
tion, and  planning  for  work  on  a  grander  scale 
than  the  fellah  at  his  shaduf  had  ever  dreamed  of. 
Ismail's  success  was  greater  than  he  could  have  ex- 
pected in  his  most  visionary  moments.  The  soil 
of  the  Nile  valley  seemed  admirably  suited  to  the 


20      THE   CONFLICT  OF  EAST  AND    WEST  IN  EGYPT. 

,  new  industry,  and  every  yield  was  enormous.  The 
fellahin,  the  most  conservative  people  under  the 
sun,  forsook  their  lentils,  their  millet,  and  their 
wheat,  and  hastened,  in  their  humble  way,  to 
acquire  wealth  after  the  manner  of  their  lord  and 
ruler.  And  they  prospered  as  their  race  has  never 
been  known  to  prosper  from  the  time  when  their 
remote  ancestors  were  the  pyramid-builders  of  the 
Pharaohs,  down  to  the  present  day.  It  was  the 
Golden  Age  of  modern  Egypt.  In  three  years 
the  exports  rose  from  four  and  a  half  millions  to 
more  than  thirteen  millions  sterling.  As  is  usually 
the  case  with  those  who  enjoy  unaccustomed  and 
unexpected  affluence,  neither  the  viceroy,  nor  the 
great  pashas,  nor  the  lowly  fellahin,  made  wise 
use  of  their  prosperity.  Their  extravagances  in- 
creased with  their  wealth.  The  viceroy  thought 
that  the  influx  of  gold  would  be  permanent,  and  he 
spent  and  wasted  accordingly  ;  the  pashas  believed 
that  the  vast  estates  that  favoritism  had  bestowed 
upon  them  would  continue  to  produce  in  luxuriance 
the  white  flower  that  was  so  easily  convertible  into 
yellow  gold,  and  they  lived  their  voluptuous  life  of 

pParisian  and  Oriental  excess  in  their  daira  palaces ; 
and  the  fellahin  thought  not  and  cared  not,  so  long 
as  their  burdens  were  light  and  they  could  enjoy 
the  sensual  life  that  the  Prophet  Mohammed 
allowed  them. 


ISMAIL'S  AMBITIOUS  DESIGNS.  21 

They  all  counted  in  vain.  Our  Civil  War  had 
come  to  an  end,  and  the  Southern  states  were 
again  supplying  the  markets  of  Europe  ;  the  natu- 
rally fertile  valley  of  the  Nile,  denied  the  necessary 
rotation  of  crops  or  the  chemical  fertilizers  that  the 
agricultural  science  of  to-day  substitutes,  had  been 
ruinously  exhausted  ;  and  as  a  consequence  the 
CGolden  Age^  was  ended.  All  the  extravagances 
reacted  upon  the  fellahin.  The  viceroy  could  not 
or  w^ould  not  contract  his  expenses,  and,  of  neces- 
sity, he  turned  to  the  money-lenders  and  the  task- 
masters. The  latter  ground  down  the  fellahin  to 
a  life  that  was  nothing  more  than  existence.  Ex- 
orbitant taxes  were  forced  from  them  with  the  aid 
of  the  kurbash,  and  their  condition  was  more  misera- 
ble than  before  their  recent  prosperity.  At  this  time 
the  cattle  murrain  made  its  appearance  in  the  Nile 
valley,  and  the  loss  was  overwhelming,  and,  of  it- 
self, sufficient  to  impoverish  the  people  for  a  time. 
The  Egyptian  government,  slow  usually  to  give 
such  assistance,  was  ob'^ged  to  expend  ;^5, 000,000 
to  aid  the  suffering  fSlJaft^n.  But,  to  offset  the  gift 
and  in  lieu  of  unpaid  taxes,  the  land  of  the  unfortu- 
nates was  appropriated,  not  by  the  government,  but 
by  the  viceroy  himself.  In  the  years  that  followed 
he  became  master,  in  this  fraudulent  manner,  of  one- 
fifth  of  the  cultivable  land  of  Egypt. 

As  the  condition  of  the  fellahin  grew  worse,  the 


22       THE   CONFLICT  OF  EAST  AND    WEST  IN  EGYPT. 

extravagances  of  Ismail  seemed  to  Increase.  In 
1866,  at  a  time  when  he  should  have  economized 
to  the  last  degree,  not  only  to  relieve  his  country 
but  to  pay  his  own  debts,  which  were  already  of  a 
threatening  size,  Ismail,  yielding,  as  ever,  to  his 
inordinate  ambition,  purchased  the  title  and  rank 
of  khediv-el-misr  (king  of  Egypt)  from  the  sultan. 
The  firman  that  granted  these  honors  and  raised 
the  limit  of  the  Egyptian  army  from  eighteen  thou- 
sand to  thirty  thousand  men,  cost  Egypt  the  in- 
crease from  three  hundred  and  seventy-six  thousand 
to  six  hundred  and  seventy-five  thousand  pounds  of 
yearly  tribute  to  the  Porte.  From  this  time  on  the 
Khedive  Ismail,  through  the  most  prodigal  use  of 
money-bribes  and  presents,  secured  a  succession  of 
firmans  from  the  Porte.  A  firman  of  1867  empow- 
ered him  *'  to_^make  laws  for  the  internal  govern- 
ment of  Egypt,  and  to  conclude  conventions  with 
foreign  powers  as  to  customs,  duties,  and  the 
police,  postal,  and  transit  services.  A  firman  of 
1872  conceded  to  the  khedive  the  power  of  con- 
tracting loans  without  the  sultan's  authorization  " ' 
— a  power  how  used  and  abused  ! — and  established 
the  law  of  primogeniture  in  his  family. "^     A  firman 

^  John  Westlake,  Q.C.,  LL.D..  England's  Duty  in  Egypt,  The  Con- 
temporary  Review,  December,  1882. 

^  This  part  of  the  firman,  as  it  reads,  "  establishes  the  line  of  succession 
by  order  of  primogeniture  in  Ismail's  family — his  eldest  living  brother,  or 
this  brother's  eldest  son,  succeeding  in  case  of  failure  of  direct  male  issue, 


ISMAIL'S  AMBITIOUS  DESIGNS,  23 

of  1873,  ''  which  Ismail  obtained  by  bribery  at  Con- 
stantinople on  a  more  than  ordinary  scale,  removed 
all  limit  from  the  numbers  of  his  army,  and  empow- 
ered him  to  conclude  conventions  with  foreign  states 
concerning  all  internal  and  other  affairs  of  Egypt  in 
which  foreigners  might  be  concerned."  '  So  much 
for  Ismail's  expensive  relations  with  his  suzerain. 
They  had  brought  him,  it  is  true,  a  power  such  as 
Mehemet  Ali  had  dreamed  of  after  the  fall  of 
Acre,  but  they  had  helped  drag  him  deeper 
into  the  meshes  of  a  financial  snare,  from  which 
he  was  destined  to  escape  only  with  the  loss  of 
all  the  powers  he  had  inherited  or  so  dearly 
purchased. 

to  the  exclusion  always  of  the  female  line.  In  the  case  of  the  heir  being  a 
minor  {i.  e.,  under  eighteen)  on  the  khedive's  death,  he  is  at  once  to  assume 
the  vice-regal  title  under  a  council  of  regency.  If,  in  his  v/ill,  the  late 
khedive  have  not  nominated  this  council,  the  ministers  of  the  interior,  of 
v/ar,  of  foreign  affairs,  of  justice,  the  commander-in-chief  of  the  army,  the 
inspector-general  of  the  provinces,  in  power  at  his  death,  will  form  the 
council  of  regency,  and  v/ill  elect  a  regent  from  their  body.  Should  the 
votes  be  equally  divided  in  favor  of  two  names,  the  regency  falls  to  the 
minister  holding  the  more  important  department,  who  will  govern  v/ith  the 
council  of  his  colleagues,  when  their  pov/ers  have  been  confirmed  at  Con- 
stantinople by  an  imperial  firman.  The  regent  and  the  council  of  regency 
are  immovable  before  the  legal  expiration  of  their  powers,  i.  e. ,  before  the 
majority  of  the  khedive.  Should  one  of  the  council  die,  the  survivors  have 
power  to  elect  a  successor.  Should  the  regent  die,  the  council  will  elect 
another  from  their  body  and  a  successor  to  the  place  he  will  leave  vacant 
in  the  council."  (Egypt  under  Ismail  Pasha,  edited  by  Bianchard  Jerrold, 
PP-  71.  72.)  This  law  reads  well,  and  remains  unchanged  to-day.  It  did 
not  provide,  however,  for  such  a  forced  abdication  as  occurred  in  1879. 

'  Westlake,  England's  Duty  in  Egypt,  The  Contemporary  Review^  De- 
cember, 1882. 


24      THE   CONFLICT  OF  EAST  AND    WEST  IN  EGYPT. 

Ismail's  extravagances  at  home  were  equally 
enormous.  When  cotton  was  no  longer  recog- 
nized as  king  in  the  Nile  valley,  the  khedive 
quickly  proposed  to  substitute  the  culture  of  sugar. 
Not  only  did  he  proceed  to  cultivate  the  cane,  but 

|he  planned   to  manufacture  the  sugar.      For  this 

(purpose  he  built  nineteen  factories  and  refineries, 
'and  imported  the  best  of  machinery  from  Europe. 
This  attempt  to  convert  agricultural  Egypt  into  a 
manufacturing  country  must  always  be  regarded  as 

J:he  crowning  farce  of  Ismail's  reign.  The  country 
may  be  said  to  be  absolutely  without  fuel  ;  for 
there  are  no  coal  mines,  and  the  tax-paying  trees 
are  too  few  and  far  too  valuable  to  serve  as 
fire-wood.  With  all  his  advanced  ideas,  the  khe- 
dive seems  not  to  have  learned  the  first  principles 
of  political  economy.  Besides  the  building  of  the 
factories,  a  railroad  was  required  to  make  them 
accessible.  This  was  constructed  from  Cairo  to 
Assiut  at  vast  expense.  Canals,  also,  were  needed 
for  the  proper  irrigation  ;  and  they,  of  course,  in- 
volved another  great  outlay.  But  there  was  never 
any  hesitancy  on  account  of    expense  ;    and,   the 

i  money  being  borrowed,  the   works   were   pushed 

'  ahead. 

It  would  not  be  right,  however,  to  attribute  all 
the  debts  of  Egypt,  incurred  during  Ismail's  reign, 
to  his  inordinate  extravagance.       The  cattle  mur- 


ISM  A IV  S  A  MB  I  no  US  DESIGNS.  2  5 

rain,  for  example,  cost  the  government  and  people 
dear,  as  has  been  seen,  but  not  through  any  fault 
of  Ismail.  In  another  matter  the  khedive  laid 
a  heavy  burden  on  the  government,  but  at  the 
same  time  he  won,  and  deservedly,  the  gratitude 
of  his  people  and  the  applause  of  civilized  nations. 
Said  Pasha  had  promised  to  furnish  the  Suez  canal 
company  with  a  large  amount  of  labor  each  year 
for  the  construction  of  the  canal,  and  this  labor 
was  to  be  provided  by  the  corvee,  a  system  of  forced 
service,  in  use  as  far  back  certainly  as  the  age  of 
the  pyramid-builders.  But  it  was  disastrous  to  the 
agriculture  of  the  country  to  have  twenty  thousand 
of  the  fellahin  torn  from  their  homes  each  month 
and  forced  to  work  on  the  canal.  Ismail  recognized 
this  fact  and  abolished  the  corvee.  It  is  generally 
admitted  that  he  was  influenced  by  humanitarian 
motives.  And  well  he  might  have  been  !  Our 
own  most  dreadful  tales  of  slavery  could  be  paral- 
leled with  the  sufferings  and  tortures  of  those 
miserable  mortals  who  were  wrested  from  what 
little  they  had  to  make  them  happy  in  the  fertile 
valley  to  endure  the  privations  and  almost  certain 
death  of  that  desert  highway.  Whatever  the 
motive  here,  Ismail  must  always  be  credited  with 
having  performed  a  noble  action.  The  canal  com- 
pany, deprived  of  the  promised  assistance,  naturally 
demurred.     This  and  a  few  other  disputed  ques- 


26       THE  CONFLICT  OF  EAST  AND   WEST  IN  EGYPT 

tions  were  finally  referred  to  the  Emperor  Napoleon 
for  arbitration,  and  he  awarded  the  company  the 
somewhat  exorbitant  indemnity  of  ;^3, 360,000, 
This  was  in  1864.  In  1866  Egypt  re-purchased 
for  the  sum  of  ^400,000  a  domain  that  had  been 
sold  to  the  canal  company  five  years  before  for 
;^74,ooo.  It  was  a  modest  advance  !  Of  course 
such  extraordinary  expenses  as  these  necessitated 
new  loans.  All  the  loans  that  Ismail  raised  are 
themselves  so  extraordinary  that  their  details  must 
be  noticed  as  well  as  the  methods  that  the  khedive 
employed  in  his  endeavors  to  bear  the  burden  of 
his  obligations. 

Before  proceeding  to  the  loans  it  will  be  well  to 
form  an  idea  of  the  revenue  of  Egypt  under  Ismail. 
To  do  this  it  will  be  necessary  to  consider  the 
taxes  somewhat  in  detail,  although  it  is  impossible, 
as  Mr,  Cave  and  Messrs.  Goschen  and  Joubert 
found,  to  get  perfectly  accurate  and  trustworthy 
statistics  on  the  subject,  owing  to  the  unsystematic 
and  dishonest  methods  of  a  treasury  system  that 
was  nothing  more  nor  less  than  a  hierarchy  of 
swindlers,  in  which  each  officer  got  as  much  from 
the  one  below  him  and  gave  as  little  to  the  one 
above  as  was  possible.  What  the  amount  of  the 
taxes  was  before  Ismail's  time,  one  can  only  guess ; 
but  we  may  be  sure  that  they  never  varied  much 
from  the  utmost  that  kurbash  and  extortion  could 


ISM  Airs  AMBITIOUS  DESIGNS.  2'J 

raise.'  The  land  tax,  immediately  after  his  acces- 
sion, was  increased  by  twenty-five  per  cent.  This 
tax  was  again  and  again  increased,  until,  in  1871, 
the  famous  mickabala''  was  invented.  This  was  a 
voluntary  additional  tax  of  fifty  per  cent,  for  six 
years,  which,  being  paid,  would  free  the  land  of  the 
one  assuming  the  self-imposed  obligation  from  half 
the  grain  tax  in  perpetuity.  The  mukabala  was 
found  to  yield  so  readily  to  the  demands  of  the 
moment — and  Ismail  lived  in  the  present,  borrow- 
ing no  trouble  from  the  thought  of  obligations  to 
be  met  in  the  future — that  it  was  enforced  m  1876, 
and  the  period,  at  the  end  of  which  exemption 
should  take  place,  was  increased  to  twelve  years. 
No  tax  ever  met  with  such  bitter  denunciation  as 
the  mukabala  did   from  its  inception   to   the   day 

^  That  the  condition  of  the  tax-payer  has  not  changed  much  in  three 
thousand  years  may  be  gathered  from  a  papyrus  in  the  British  Museum, 
containing  a  part  of  the  correspondence  between  Ameneman,  the  chief 
librarian  of  Rameses  the  Great,  and  the  poet  Pentaur.  Ameneman  writes  : 
"  Have  you  ever  represented  to  yourself,  in  imagination,  the  estate  of  the 
rustic  who  tills  the  ground  ?  Before  he  has  put  the  sickle  to  his  crop,  the 
locusts  have  blasted  part  thereof  ;  then  come  the  rats  and  birds.  If  he  is 
slack  in  housing  his  crops,  the  thieves  are  on  him.  The  horse  dies 
of  weariness  as  it  drags  the  wain.  The  tax-collector  arrives  ;  his  agents  are 
armed  with  clubs  ;  he  has  negroes  with  him  who  carry  whips  of  palm- 
branches.  They  all  cry  ;  *  Give  us  your  grain  ! '  and  he  has  no  way 
of  avoiding  their  extortionate  demands.  Next,  the  wretch  is  caught, 
bound,  and  sent  off  to  work,  without  wage,  at  the  canals  ;  his  wife  is  taken 
and  chained,  his  children  are  stripped  and  plundered."  —  Quoted  by 
Blan chard  Jerrold,  Egypt  Under  Ismail  Pasha,  p.  164. 
'  Mdkabala  =  compensation. 


28       THE  CONFLICT  OF  EAST  AND   WEST  IN  EGYPT. 

of  its  abolition.  It  was  bad  for  the  payer  and  bad 
for  the  payee.  ''  A  ruinous  financial  device,"  says 
Blanchard  Jerrold,  ''  seeing  that  for  a  sum  of  in  all 
less  than  twenty-seven  million  pounds,  spread  over 
a  dozen  years,  is  thence  afterward  surrendered  for 
all  time  nearly  two  million  five  hundred  thousand 
pounds  of  its  [Egypt's]  surest  and  most  easily 
collected  revenue."  ' 

In  order  to  form  an  idea  of  what  the  yearly 
revenue  of  Egypt  was  from  1870  to  1875,  i^  is 
necessary  to  consult  the  reports  that  were  made 
after  that  time  ;  for  up  to  1875  there  had  been  no 
attempt  to  estimate  the  revenue  in  detail.  As  the 
agricultural  conditions  did  not  vary  much  from 
year  to  year,  the  revenue  during  1877,  for  example, 
would  be  approximately  equal  to  the  revenue 
during  1872  or  1873.  This  analogical  reasoning 
is  allowable,  but  not  very  satisfactory  ;  for,  unfor- 
tunately, even  the  official  estimates  of  Europeans 
appointed  for  the  purpose  are  found  to  vary 
greatly.  The  official  estimate  of  Mr.  Goschen, 
made  in  December,  1876,  placed  the  year's  revenue 
at  ;^ 1 0,804, 300.  Mr.  Cave's  estimate  for  the  same 
year  was  a  little  over  ten  and  a  half  millions.  Mr. 
Romaine  gives  the  official  revenue,  month  by 
month,  for  1877,  reaching  a  total  of  ^9,350, 2 74  for 
the  year.     The  Cairene  committee,  in  1878,  placed 

'  Egypt  Under  Ismail  Pasha. 


ISMAIL'S  AMBITIOUS  DESIGNS.  29 

the  total  income  of  the  khedive's  government  at 
about  eleven  and  a  half  millions  ;  but  they  consid- 
ered this  estimate  low,  and  thought  that,  if  it  had 
been  possible  to  count  all  revenues,  the  sum  total 
would  not  have  been  less  than  thirteen  millions 
sterling.  This  may  readily  be  believed,  if  we  may 
trust,  approximately,  the  statement  of  Ismail  Sadyk 
(the  muffetisJi,  or  "  lord  high  treasurer "  of  the 
khedive,  and  one  of  the  most  notorious  rascals 
that  ever  plundered  a  state  and  people),  that  he 
had  raised  by  taxation  in  one  year  the  sum  of 
fifteen  million  pounds.  But  some  estimates  varied 
as  widely  in  the  other  direction,  and  placed  the 
revenue  even  as  low  as  seven  and  a  half  millions. 
The  extremes  are  far  apart. 

It  will  be  interesting  to  separate  one  of  the  total 
estimates  into  its  constituent  parts  ;  and  for  this 
purpose  we  may  take  the  report  of  the  Cairene 
committee.     They  placed 


The  land  tax       . 

at 

.    ;^£"7,346,2i9 

The  date  palm  tax      . 

ii. 

211,046 

The  house,  shop,  and  mill  taxes 

n 

28,195 

The  poll  tax  ^     . 

u 

630,204 

Licenses  and  patents  "^ 

ii 

798,253 

'  This  tax  was  divided  into  three  classes  :  viz.,  40,  30,  and  15  piasters. 
The  collectors,  however,  were  instructed  to  produce  an  average  of  30 
piasters  ($1.50)  a  head. 

'  These  were  imposed  on  all  servants,  operatives,  tradesmen,  and  mer- 
chants. 


30       THE  CONFLICT  OF  EAST  AND   WEST  IN  EGYPT 


Miscellaneous  Taxes. 

1.  Succession    or    transfer    duties    on    legacies, 

mortgages,  etc.    . 

2.  Stamp  tax  (no  statistics) 

3.  Salt  tax ' 

4.  Octroi  and  road  duties  on  produce,  fodder, 

and  building  materials  "... 

5.  Customs 

6.  Navigation  dues     . 

7.  Duties  on  fisheries 
8..  Law  taxes 
9.  Tobacco  tax  . 

10.  Tax  on  cattle  sales 

11.  Sheep  slaughtered  for  food    . 

12.  Animal  tax     ..... 

13.  Stamp  tax  on  manufactured  goods 

14.  Payments  of  railways  into  Public  Debt  De- 

partment  

Total 


;£io3,685 

400,000 

328,872 

639,000 

110,185 

33,548 

44,392 

106,777 

45,402 

14,769 

8,479 
18,000 

602,990 

^af  11,470,016 


From  the  foregoing  notes  and  figures  It  will  be 
seen  that  It  Is  almost  Impossible  to  exaggerate  the 
extortionate  character  of  taxation  in  Egypt  a  dec- 


'  Nine  piasters  imposed  on  every  man,  woman,  and  child  over  seven  years 
of  age, 

"  This  figure  the  committee  considered  small,  since  irregular  government 
expenses  were  taken  out  of  the  octroi  receipts,  as,  for  example,  the  salaries 
of  a  corps  de  ballet !  When,  later,  Egypt  came  under  European  control, 
the  comptroller  general  encountered  much  opposition  by  his  refusal  to  pay 
such  salaries  from  such  a  fund. 

^  Other  taxes,  as  on  fire  engines,  ferries,  jewelry,  burials,  marriages,  tolls 
on  bridges,  and  exemption  from  military  service,  were  not  counted,  owing 
to  absence  of  trustworthy  statistics. 


ISMAIL'S  AMBITIOUS  DESIGNS.  3 1 

ade  ago.  But  it  should  be  noticed  in  passing  that 
the  land  of  the  natives  only  was  taxed  ;  by  a  mon- 
strous injustice — an  injustice  that  continues  to  the 
present  day,  though  there  is  just  now  a  prospect  of 
its  being  remedied — the  European  property-holders 
have  never  paid  so  much  as  a  brass  farthing  into 
the  state  treasury  on  the  land  they  have  held. 

Whether,  now,  we  place  the  yearly  revenue  at 
the  lowest  estimate,  seven  millions  sterling,  or  at 
the  highest,  thirteen  millions,  or  midway  between 
the  two,  the  fact  always  remain^  the  same — that 
Ismail  was  unable  to  live  within  his  income.  With 
the  same  revenue  Mehemet  AH  would  have  made 
Egypt  independent  of  Turkey,  and  himself  the 
champion  of  all  Islam.  Even  the  gay  Said  would 
have  been  at  a  loss  for  ways  to  squander  such  un- 
dreamed-of means.  But  with  Ismail  it  was  different. 
As  we  have  seen,  he  could  not  forget  the  splendors 
of  European  courts,  nor  cease  to  envy  the  civiliza- 
tion of  western  countries  ;  nor  could  he  contract 
the  extravagances  he  had  learned  in  the  days  when 
'* cotton  was  king"  in  Egypt.  If  he  could  not  live 
and  flourish  and  build  and  spend  on  the  strength 
of  his  internal  resources,  he  knew  that  there  were 
bankers  and  money-lenders  in  Europe  who  would 
consider  the  yearly  overflow  of  the  Nile  the  best  of 
security.  The  story  of  his  transactions  with  these 
unbelievers  forms  the  most   important   chapter  in 


32       THE  CONFLICT  OF  EAST  AND   WEST  IN  EGYPT. 

the  modern  history  of  Egypt ;  but  the  story  is  de- 
void of  romance ;  it  is  as  bold  and  bald  and  true  as 
the  working  of  a  natural  law.  For  the  state,  as 
for  the  individual,  when  debts  are  contracted  to 
pay  other  debts,  when  further  sums  are  borrowed 
to  pay  those,  and  when  this  system  of  discharging 
obligations  is  continued,  the  end  is  ruin.  In  the 
case  of  Egypt,  the  ever  impending  ruin  has  been 
long  averted,  owing  as  much  (or  more)  to  the  po- 
litical importance  of  the  country  as  to  its  inherent 
wealth  ;  but  the  burning  question  of  that  land  to- 
day is  the  question  of  finance ;  for  the  debts  that 
are  due  to  the  follies  of  Ismail  still  stand,  an 
unmanageable  burden.  And  this  is  how  the  first 
khedive  brought  about  the  financial  disaster,  and 
his  own  downfall. 


III. 


THE    ROAD    TO    RUIN. 


IT  will  be  remembered  that  Said  left  a  debt  of 
about  three  millions  sterling.  To  be  exact,  he 
had  effected  in  1862  a  seven  per  cent,  loan  in  the 
European  market  of  ^3,292,800.'     Of  course  he 


'  For  facts  and  figures  I  depend  chiefly  upon  J.  C.  McCoan's  Egypt  As 
It  Is,  and  upon  Mr.  Cave's  Report  of  1876,  from  which  the  following 
concise  table  is  taken  : 


T3 

p 

Nominal 

amount  of 

loan,  but  real 

debt  of  state. 

Charge  on 
nominal  amount. 

Amount 
realized. 

Real  charges  on 
amount  realized. 

LOAN  OF 

Int. 

Sink- 
ing 
fund. 

Total. 

Int. 

Sink- 
ing 
fund. 

Total. 

1862 
.        iL--l864 
^          —1866 

"         Daira  taken 

1892 

1879 
1874 
1898 
1903 

I88I 
I88I 

1890 

£ 

3,292,800 

5,704,200 

3,000,000 

11,890,000 

32,000,000 

pr.  C. 
7 

7 

7 
7 
7 

9 
9 

7 

pr.  c. 
3.87 
I 

3-27 
3.4 

2.35 

P..C. 

10.87 

V ' 

8 

12.27 
12.4 

9.35 

4,864,063 
2,640,000  (d) 

7,193,334 
20,740,077 

pr.  C. 

'8!2 

8 
11.56 
10.8 

10 

pr.  c. 

4-5 
18.9 
1.68 
1.56 

•  •  • 

3.36 

pr.  c. 

12.7 
26.9 
13.24 
12.36 

55,887,000 

35,437,474 

over    by    the 
state. 

/     1866 

V    1867 

3,000,000 
2,080,000 

7,142,860 

3,000,000  (c) 

2,080,000  (V) 

12.27 
17.04 

Daira   loan 

5,080,000 

of  Ismail. 
1870 

5,000,000 

13-36 

(a)  No  particulars  of  amount  realized. 

(d)  Railway  loan  repaid  by  six  annual  payments  of  ;£5oo,ooo,  equivalent  to  a  sinking  fund  of 
18.9  per  cent. 

(c)  No  particulars  of  amounts  realized,  but  probably  the  whole. 

33 


34       THE  CONFLICT  OF  EAST  AND   WEST  IN  EGYPT. 

did  not  receive  this  amount  entire,  for  the  commis- 
sion rate  of  issue,  etc.,  .reduced  the  sum  paid  into 
the  Egyptian  treasury  to  ^2,500,000.  But  this 
loan  did  not  prevent  Said  from  leaving  a  further 
legacy  of  liabilities,  which  necessitated  a  second 
loan  within  a  year  after  his  death.  The  amount 
of  this  one,  which  was  raised  in  England,  was 
;^5,704,200.  It  yielded  to  the  treasury  only 
;^4,864,o63.  And  still  the  indebtedness  was  not 
covered.  Up  to  this  time  the  financial  troubles 
had  come  through  no  fault  of  Ismail's.  But  in 
1866  he  had  begun  to  push  the  sugar  industry; 
and,  not  having  laid  by  any  of  the  enormous  reve- 
nues from  cotton,  he  was  forced,  in  order  to  carry 
out  his  railroad  scheme,  to  contract  a  seven  per 
cent,  loan  of  ^3,000,000,  which  netted  him  £2,- 
640,000.  The  cattle  murrain,  the  abolition  of  the 
corvee,  and  his  extravagances  called  for  another 
loan  only  two  years  later.  The  nominal  amount 
of  this  loan  was  ^11,890,000;  but  heavier  terms 
had  to  be  made  ;  for,  though  a  seven  per  cent, 
stock,  it  was  issued  at  seventy-five,  and  yielded, 
after  the  usual  deductions,  only  ;^7, 193,334.  In 
other  words,  the  total  annual  cost  of  this  loan  was 
more  than  thirteen  per  cent.  *'  The  khedive,  by 
this  time,"  as  Mr.  McCoan  remarks,'  ''was  fairly 
on  the  road  to  ruin."     But  the  national  credit  was 

'  McCoan,  Egypt  As  It  Is,  p.  142. 


THE  ROAD  TO  RUIN.  35 

Still  good,  since  the  floating  debt  had  been  covered 
by  this  last  loan. 

Ismail  seems  not  to  have  suspected  the  perils 
ahead.  It  was  his  aim  to  make  a  civilized  country 
even  out  of  uncivilized  materials,  and  to  develop 
trade  even  where  natural  resources  were  wanting, 
let  the  cost  be  what  it  might.  It  certainly  was 
great ;  it  was  enormous.  The  outlay,  even  if  the 
revenue  of  the  country  had  permitted  it,  would 
have  been  foolish  extravagance  ;  but  in  view  of 
Egypt's  financial  condition,  it  was  nothing  less 
than  reckless  robbery.  The  fellahin — the  people 
of  Egypt — were  the  sufferers.  The  kurbash  ex- 
acted more  extortionate  payments  than  ever ;  but 
all  to  no  purpose.  By  1873  the  floating  liabilities, 
paying  nearly  fourteen  per  cent,  interest,  amounted 
to  about  ^26,000,000.  The  Messrs.  Oppenheim, 
who  had  secured  the  loan  of  1868,  now  proposed 
to  fund  the  entire  mass  of  debts  in  a  seven  per  cent. 
loan  of  ;^3 2,000,000.  This  offer,  disastrous  in  its 
results,  was  accepted.  The  Egyptian  government 
received  in  cash  only  ^11,740,077,  the  remainder 
of  the  amount  realized,  ^9,000,000,  being  paid  in 
bonds  of  the  floating  debt,  which  the  contractors 
bought  up  at  a  heavy  discount  and  gave  over  to 
the  Egyptian  government  at  93.  There  was,  to 
say  the  least,  a  good  deal  of  Shylockism  shown  by 
the  money-lenders  of  the  West  in   their  financial 


36       THE  CONFLICT  OF  EAST  AND   WEST  IN  EGYPT. 

relations  with  Egypt.  But  if  they  were  knavish, 
Ismail  was  not  altogether  simple.  Looking  at  the 
figures  that  tell  the  story  of  ''  this  wicked  waste 
of  a  country's  resources,"  as  Mr.  McCoan  calls 
it,  we  see  that  from  loans  amounting  to  ^58,887,- 
000,  the  Egyptian  government  received  only 
/^35'437'474-  At  the  end  of  1875  the  treasury  had 
repaid  ^^29, 5  70,995  in  interest  and  in  sinking 
fund.  Was  so  much  money  ever  paid  for  so  little 
gain  ? 

There  were  other  loans  than  those  above  men- 
tioned. The  daira,  the  immense  personal  estate 
of  the  khedive,  afforded  excellent  security  for  sup- 
plementary loans.  The  first  of  these  was  nego- 
tiated in  1866,  its  amount  being  ^3,387,000.  The 
following  year  the  khedive  compelled  his  uncle 
Halim  to  sell  to  him  his  inherited  estate  ;  and  to 
pay  for  the  property  obtained  by  his  enforced  sale, 
the  so-called  ''  Mustapha  Pasha  loan  "  of  ^2,080,000 
was  negotiated.  Still  another  daira  loan  of  more 
than  seven  millions  sterling  was  raised  in  1870  at 
seven  per  cent,  the  stock  being  issued  at  75.  Only 
;^5, 000,000  was  handed  over  to  the  borrower.  Thus 
the  same  story  is  told  with  the  private  as  with  the 
public  loans. 

The  question  now  was  :  How  long  could  the 
ruinous  rate  of  interest  be  paid  on  these  enormous 
debts  ?     Up  to  1875  it  was  regularly  paid,  and  the 


THE  ROAD   TO  RUIN.  37 

credit  of  Egypt  was  good.      But  the  crisis  was  now 
near  at  hand.     The  stock  of  the  great  loan  of  1873 
was  quoted  at  53  in  the  London  market,  and  the 
Cairene  treasury  was  almost  empty.     Even  Ismail 
Sadyk,    the   muffetish,    with    all   his    tortures    and 
threats,   could   not  get  piasters  enough    from  the 
fellahin  to  meet  the  demands  that  were  measured 
by  hundreds  of  thousands  of  pounds.      And  yet  he_^ 
was  ordered  to  find  money  to  pay  the  December 
dividend.     At  this  juncture  the  khedive  appealed 
to  England  to  rescue  Egypt  from  ruin  ;  and  pro- 
duced,  as    his  last    card,  the    176,000  Suez   canal        1 
shares,  held  by  his  government.      The  muffetish       \ 
was   offering  the  same  securities    in    negotiations 
with    the   bankers  of   Paris    and    Alexandria,   and 
with  the  Credit  Fonder  of  France,  in  his  attempt  A 
to  force  upon  them  new  treasury  bonds^Tor  ;^i6,-    I 
000,000  at  fifteen  per  cent,  interest.     After  a  series 
of  advances  and  retreats  on  the  part  of  the  English 
and  the  French  governments,  Disraeli's  government^ 
finally  telegraphed  to  the  khedive,  in  December,  I 
1875,  ^hat  England  would  give  four  millions  ster- T 
ling  for  the  shares  in  drafts  on   Rothschild.     The  4 
offer  was  eagerly  accepted,  and  the  crisis  was  tid«i 
over.     The  shares  of  the  '73  loan  in   London  rose 
twenty  points  at  a  jump,  but  after  a  few  days  they 
were  quoted  at  61,  midway  between  the  points  of 
utmost  depression    and    inflation.      A   more  vital 


38       THE  CONFLICT  OF  EAST  AND   WEST  IN  EGYPT. 

interest  in  the  affairs  of  Egypt  was  now  given  to 
England  than  she  had  before  possessed.  She  had 
gone  thither,  in  the  first  place,  to  further  the  de- 
mands of  her  commerce  ;  she  had  then  manoeuvred 
for  the  protection  of  the  interests  of  the  British 
bondholders  ;  and  now,  in  addition  to  these  under- 
takings, she  was  to  guard  the  rights  that  this  pur- 
chase gave  her,  and  increase  the  obligations  that  it 
heaped  upon  Egypt. 

Four  million  pounds,  as  Ismail  soon  found,  could 
not  stem  the  tide  of  disaster  for  long.  Everything 
w  worth  it  had  been  mortgaged,  and  the  muffetish  was 
offering  treasury  bonds  to  the  extent  of  two  hundred 
thousand  and  three  hundred  thousand  and  even  four 
hundred  thousand  pounds  in  return  for  cash  advances 
of  one  hundred  thousand  at  twenty  per  cent.  A  few 
were  taken,  and  by  heavy  sales  of  daira  sugar  and 
corn  the  demands  were  satisfied  for  a  time.  The 
pchedive  now  invited  England  to  investigate  the 
\financial  condition  of  his  country,  and  Mr.  Stephen 
Cave,  M.P.,  was  sent  out  for  this  purpose.  Nubar 
Pasha,  the  foremost  of  Egyptian  statesmen,  was 
called  to  the  cabinet,  and  at  the  beginning  of  1876 
everything  had  a  reassuring  aspect.  But  within 
three  months  Nubar  had  resigned,  and  Disraeli,  to 
the  consternation  of  bondholders,  had  announced 
in  Parliament  that  the  khedive  requested  that  Mr. 
Cave's  report  be  not  published  for  fear  of  its  effect 


THE  ROAD  TO  KUIN.  39 

upon  Egyptian  finances.  But  this  request  was  dis- 
regarded. The  effect  of  the  report,  however,  was 
more  favorable  to  the  khedive  than  he  expected, 
owing  to  the  somewhat  rose-colored  view  Mr.  Cave 
took  of  the  financial  outlook. 

Egypt  [he  wrote]  may  be  said  to  be  in  a  transition 
state,  and  she  suffers  from  the  defects  of  the  system  out 
of  which  she  is  passing- as  well  as  from  those  of  the  system 
into  which  she  is  attempting  to  enter.  She  suffers  from 
the  ignorance,  dishonesty,  waste,  and  extravagance  of  the 
East,  such  as  have  brought  her  suzerain  to  the  verge  of 
ruin,  and  at  the  same  time  from  the  vast  expense  caused 
by  hasty  and  inconsiderate  endeavor  to  adopt  the  civihza- 
tion  of  the  West. 

He  read  the  causes  of  Egyptian  dif^culty  aright. 
But  he  was  wrong  in  estimating  that  the  yearly 
revenue  from  1876  to  1885  would  be  more  than 
double  the  cost  of  the  administration.  To  meet 
the  necessities  of  the  government,  he  proposed 
another  unification  of  all  debts,  exclusive  of  three 
of  the  earliest  and  smallest  loans  which  were  to  be 
paid  off  by  the  operation  of  the  mukabala.  The 
consolidated  debt,  amounting  to  ;^75, 000,000,  was 
to  bear  interest  at  seven  per  cent.,  and  to  be  re- 
deemable in  1926.  The  project,  however,  was  not 
carried  out. 

^he  Khedive  Ismail,  in  the  meantime,  had  suc- 
ceeded in  getting  the  greater  part  of  his  floating 


40       THE  CONFLICT  OF  EAST  AND   WEST  IN  EGYPT. 

debt  taken  up  In  France.  That  the  holders  had 
been  duped  was  evident  before  the  end  of  March 
(1876),  for  there  was  no  money  in  the  Egyptian 
treasury  to  meet  the  April  dividends,  and  the 
khedive  was  appealing  for  aid  to  the  English  and 
French  governments.  His  overtures  were  flatly 
refused  by  England  ;  but  when  France  realized 
that  the  Credit  Fonder,  the  second  financial  in- 
stitution of  the  land,  was  in  a  strait  in  consequence 
of  its  relations  with  Egypt,  a  cabinet  council  was 
surnmoned  in  Paris,  and  on  March  31  the  April 
dividend  was  dispatched  to  London.  And  again 
the  Impending  disaster  was  averted. 

Mr.  Cave's  scheme  for  the  unification  of  the 
debt  fell  through,  as  above  noticed,  although 
coupled  with  certain  measures  of  reform,  which 
provided  for  a  regular  control  of  the  revenue  under 
the  administration  of  Europeans  and  natives,  and 
for  the  establishment  of  debt  and  audit  officers. 
The  cause  of  failure  was  that  nominations  were 
left  in  the  hands  of  the  khedive,  who  was  himself 
controlled  by  the  corrupt  muffetish,  Ismail  Sadyk. 
France  now  proposed  a  financial  scheme  ;  but  this 
also  failed  of  adoption.  In  November,  1876,  how- 
ever, the  English  and  French  bondholders  united 
in  sending  to  Egypt  a  joint  commission,  consisting 
of  Mr.  Goschen,  M.P.,  and  M.  Joubert,  to  solve 
the  financial  problem.      Their  labor  resulted  in  the 


THE  ROAD   rO  RUIN.  4 1 

khedive's  Issuing  a   decree,    November    i8,    1876, 
that  remodelled  the  debt  on  the  following  basis  : ' 


Title. 

Amount. 

Interest,  etc. 

Security. 

Unified, 

;^^59,ooo,ooo 

^4,130,000 

General  revenues. 

Preference, 

17,000,000 

886,000 

Railways,  etc. 

Daira, 

8,825,000 

450,000 

Khedive's  estates. 

^^84,825,000     ^5,466,000 

The  reforms  of  November  18  secured  a  sub- 
stantial power  to  European  comptrollers,  and  the 
downfall  of  Ismail  Sadyk,  who  now  disappeared 
from  the  face  of  the  earth  in  the  mysterious  way 
common  to  the  Orient.  He  left  an  immense  prop- 
erty, which  included  three  hundred  women  in  his 
harem,  two  hundred  and  fifty  men-servants,  ^600,- 
000  in  money,  and  30,000  feddans  ^  of  land.  The 
mukabala,  which  would  have  been  abolished  if  the 
unification  proposed  in  May  had  been  accepted, 
was  retained  by  the  Messrs.  Goschen  and  Joubert 
in  a  slightly  modified  form. 

Those  who  fancied  that  plain  sailing  was  now  in 
store  for  the  khedive  and  the  bondholders  were 
again  doomed  to  disappointment.  Within  a  few 
months  it  was  apparent  that  the  financial  state  of 
affairs  was  as  bad  as  ever.  The  ordinary  expenses 
were  augmented  by  a  special  tax  of  two  shillings 

'  M.  G.  Mulhall,  Egyptian  Finance,  The  Contemporary  Review,  October, 
1882. 

'  A  feddan  is  about  equal  to  an  acre. 


42       THE  CONFLICT  OF  EAST  AND   WEST  IN  EGYPT. 

an  acre  to  assist  Turkey  in  the  war  against  Russia. 
Egypt,  backed  by  England  and  France,  whose  in- 
terest it  was  to  have  all  revenues  applied  to  the 
public  debt,  for  a  time  resisted  the  pecuniary  de- 
mands of  the  Porte,  though  she  told  the  Turkish 
envoys  that  she  would  forward  troops  to  the  seat 
of  war  if  the  Porte  would  bear  the  expenses  of 
transport  and  maintenance.  The  new  Egyptian 
parliament,  however,  at  last  voted  the  special  war 
tax,  and  ten  thousand  troops  were  sent  at  the  ex- 
pense of  Egypt. 

During  1877  the  interest  on  the  loans  was  raised 
by  collecting  the  taxes  with  all  the  old-time  cruelty 
(Mr.  Mulhall  says  "  the  fellahin  were  bastinadoed 
even  more  than  before "  ;  but  that  was  not  pos- 
sible) and  as  much  as  nine  months  in  advance. 
This  ruinous  system,  of  course,  brought  greater 
difficulties  with  each  pay-day  ;  and  at  the  begin- 
ning of  1878  the  outlook,  to  say  the  least,  was 
most  doleful.  It  was  at  this  time  that  the  exiled 
Prince  Halim,  the  uncle  of  Ismail  and  the  most 
enlightened,  perhaps,  of  the  descent  of  Mehemet 
Ali,  wrote  a  letter  of  advice  to  Ismail  from  Con- 
stantinople. The  letter,  which  bears  the  date  of 
March  4,  1878,  is  worth  quoting,  at  least  in  part. 
He  wrote : 

I.  Place  the  financial  administration  of  the  country  in 
the  hands  of  Europeans  chosen  by  the  interested  powers; 


THE  ROAD  TO  RUIN,  43 

such  administration  alone  having  the  power  to  appoint 
and  dismiss  all  officials  connected  with  the  finance  of  the 
country. 

2.  The  financial  administration  thus  constituted,  and  all 
its  dealings  being  carried  on  in  broad  daylight,  you  must 
appoint  a  special  inquiry  commission,  chosen  by  the 
high  officials,  to  establish  an  equitable  repartition  of 
taxes,  which  are  now  arbitrarily  distributed  and  levied. 

3.  All  property  belonging  to  the  princes  and  princesses 
shall  be  made  over  to  the  state,  so  as  to  be  used  in  pay- 
ment of  all  debts. 

4.  The  revenue  of  all  the  dairas,  the  kh^dive's  and  his 
family's,  being  thus  devoted  to  the  paying  off  of  public 
and  private  debts,  the  civil  list,  the  amount  of  which  shall 
be  agreed  upon  by  the  interested  powers,  will  support  the 
khedive  and  his  family. 

5.  The  reform  tribunals,  having  over  them  a  sovereign 
free  from  all  personal  interests,  and  by  whose  care  all  the 
judgments  ^hich  they  pronounce  shall  be  carried  out,  will 
be  empowered,  over  and  above  their  present  jurisdiction, 
to  try  causes  between  natives,  if  the  latter  shall  so 
choose  it. 

These  five  articles,  says  Mr.  Jerrold,'  "became 
the  basis  on  which  the  discussion  of  Egyptian 
affairs  turned."  The  first  article  of  reform  had 
already  met  with  Ismail's  apparent  approval,  the 
state  revenues  having  been  placed  in  the  hands  of 
two  ''  comptrollers-general,"  one  English  and  the 
other  French.    They  were  appointed  for  five  years, 

*  Egypt  Under  Ismail  Pasha,  p.  256. 


44      THE   CONFLICT  OF  EAST  AND    WEST  IN  EGYPT. 

with  almost  unlimited  powers  in  the  domain  of 
finance.  But  the  step  was  taken  reluctantly  ;  for 
the  khedive  realized  that,  to  quote  the  words  of 
Mr.  Justin  McCarthy/  "when  a  country  has  once 
accepted  an  investigation  of  its  finances  by  foreign 
powers,  and  given  the  practical  control  of  its 
treasury  into  the  hands  of  foreign  representatives, 
its  claim  to  independence  can  hardly  fail  to  be 
regarded  as  signally  diminished."  Still  more  re- 
luctantly, we  may  w^ell  believe,  did  the  khedive 
yield  to  the  demand  of  the  commission  to  hand 
over  his  vast  private  estates  to  meet  the  daira 
coupons.  But  he  had  been  forced  into  both  of 
these  actions  by  the  troubles  of  1877.  Early  in 
1878  the  khedive  made  a  bold  effort  to  secure 
foreign  favor  and  quiet  the  discontent  among  the 
money-lenders  of  Alexandria.  The  Egyptian  gov- 
ernment had  announced,  in  1877,  ^hat  it  could  not 
pay  the  existing  high  rate  of  interest  on  the  public 
debt ;  but  before  the  bondholders  would  consent  to 
any  reduction,  they  demanded  the  appointment  of 
a  commission  to  examine  into  the  receipts  and 
expenses  of  the  government.  The .  khedive,  in 
January,  1878,  allowed  an  investigation  of  receipts, 
but  would  permit  no  examination  of  expenditures. 
Two  months  later,  however,  he  issued  the  follow- 
ing decree  : 

^  England  Under  Gladstone,  ch.  xili. 


THE  ROAD   TO  RUIX.  45 

We,  Khedive  of  Egypt — with  respect  to  our  decree  of 
the  27th  of  January,  1878,  instituting  a  superior  Commis- 
sion of  Inquiry,  considering  that  it  is  the  duty  of  that 
Commission  to  prepare  and  submit  for  our  sanction  regu- 
lations to  secure  the  regular  working  of  the  pubHc  ser- 
vices, and  to  give  a  just  satisfaction  to  the  interests  of  the 
country,  and  to  the  public  creditors — have  decreed  and  do 
decree  : 

Article  i.  The  widest  powers  are  given  to  the  Com- 
mission we  establish. 

Art.  2.  The  investigation  of  the  Commission  of 
Inquiry  will  embrace  all  the  elements  of  the  financial 
situation,  always  respecting  the  legitimate  rights  of  the 
Government. 

Art.  3.  The  ministers  and  officials  of  our  Govern- 
ment will  be  bound  to  furnish  directly  to  the  Commission, 
at  its  request  and  without  delay,  all  information  required 
from  them. 

Art.  4.  There  are  named  as  members  of  the  superior 
Commission  of  Inquiry :  President,  M.  Ferdinand  de 
Lesseps  ;  Vice-President,  Mr.  Rivers  Wilson  ;  Vice-Presi- 
dent, his  Excellency,  Riaz  Pasha ;  M.  Baravelli ;  Mr. 
Baring;  M.  de  Blignieres;  M.  de  Kremer. 

Art.  5.  A  credit  necessary  for  the  expenses  of  the 
Commission  will  be  opened  on  the  budget  of  1878,  in 
accordance  with  the  report  which  the  President  will  pre- 
sent us. 

Ismail. 

Cairo,  March  30,  1878. 

On  August  20,  Mr.  Rivers  Wilson  presented  the  7 
report  of  the  commission  of   inquiry.      The  report 
considered  first  the  system  of  accounts  employed 


46      THE   CONFLICT  OF  EAST  AND    WEST  IN  EGYPT. 

by  the  Egyptian  government.  It  then  explained 
the  system  of  taxation,  and  discussed  the  corvee, 
the  miHtary  conscription,  and  the  water  laws.  The 
second  part  of  the  report  was  taken  up  with  the 
estimate  of  the  non-consolidated  liabilities.  The 
amount  of  floatingf  debt  to  be  settled  was  found  to 
be  ;^6, 276,000.  The  gross  expenditure  for  1878 
was  estimated  at  ^10,405,665,  and  the  gross  re- 
ceipts at  ^7,819,000.  Adding  the  difference  be- 
tween receipts  and  expenditures,  ;^2, 586,665,  to 
the  amount  of  floating  debt,  the  total  deficit  for 
1878  would  appear  to  be  ^8,862,665  ;  but  this  sum 
was  reduced  to  a  little  more  than  six  millions 
sterling  by  deductions  for  security  against  partially 
guaranteed  debts,  and  for  amounts  nominally  due 
to  the  dairas,  but  before  that  time  surrendered. 
There  was  immediate  need,  therefore,  for  about  six 
millions.  The  report  closed  with  the  following 
suggestions  of  reform  : 

That  no  taxes  shall  be  imposed  or  gathered  without  a 

Claw,  authorizing  them,  being  promulgated  ;  that  future 
legislation  may  extend  the  taxation  to  foreigners ;  that 
there  shall  be  an  efficient  control  over  tax-collectors  ;  that 
there  shall  be  a  reserve  fund  to  provide  against  the  con- 
tingency of  a  bad  rising  of  the  Nile;  that  there  shall  be 
a  special  jurisdiction  for  complaints  on  the  subject  of  the 
collection  and  assessment  of  taxes  for  the  special  protec- 
tion of  the  natives ;  that  existing  vexatious  taxes  shall  be 
abolished,   except   for  works  of   public  utility ;  that  the 


THE  ROAD   TO  RUIN.  4/ 

obligation  to  military  service  shall  be  placed  under  restric- 
tions; and  that  all  the  immovable  property  of  the  differ- 
ent dairas,  shall  be  independently  managed  by  a  special 
administration  for  the  benefit  of  the  creditors  both  of 
the  state  and  the  dairas. 

These  were  excellent  recommendations,  though 
there  was  something  very  naive  in  the  suggestion 
that  ''  there  shall  be  a  reserve  fund  to  provide 
against  the  contingency  of  a  bad  rising  of  the  Nile." 
It  would  have  been  as  easy  to  resolve  that,  if  the 
river  failed  to  rise,  copious  rains  should  fall ;  for 
reserve  funds  are  as  rare  in  Egypt  as  rain-storms  in 
the  desert.  Not  the  least  good  of  the  recommenda- 
tions was  that  providing  that  foreigners  should  be 
taxed  ;  a  measure  that  the  Westerners  have  always 
been  shamefully  slow  to  encourage.  The  reforms 
contained  also  a  plan  for  the  cadastral  survey  of 
Egypt,  which  was  recognized  in  England,  in  France, 
and  in  Egypt,  as  just  to  the  fellahin  and  as  the 
treasury's  only  safeguard  against  fraud  and  corrup- 
tion. The  khedive  accepted  the  report  on  August 
23  in  a  speech  expressing  entire  approval  of  the 
work  of  the  commission,  appreciation  of  their  ser- 
vices, and  determination  to  carry  out  the  reforms. 
To  show  how  thoroughly  in  earnest  he  was,  so  he 
said,  he  had  recalled  Nubar  Pasha  from  exile  and 
would  entrust  him  with  the  formation  of  a  new 
ministry.     The  new  ministry  was  composed  of  the 


48       THE   CONFLICT  OF  EAST  AND    WEST  IN  EGYPT. 

following  persons  :  Nubar  Pasha,  president  of  the 
council,  minister  of  foreign  affairs  and  of  justice  ;  Riaz 
Pasha,  minister  of  interior  ;  Ratif  Pasha,  minister 
of  war ;  AH  Mubarek  Pasha,  minister  of  public 
instruction,  agriculture,  and  public  works.  The 
portfolio  of  finance  was  left  vacant,  but  it  was  soon 
offered  to  Mr.  Rivers  Wilson,  Avho  accepted  the 
office  with  the  consent  of  the  British  government. 
This  excited  the  jealousy  of  France,  to  appease 
which  the  comparatively  unimportant  office  of  pub- 
lic works  was  offered  to  M.  de  Blignieres.  Italy 
then  put  in  the  claim  that  she  should  be  consulted 
in  Egyptian  affairs  ;  but  her  voice  was  ignored. 

Before  any  active  steps  had  been  taken  toward 
inaugurating  the  proposed  reforms,  Mr.  Wilson 
urged  the  necessity  of  another  loan  to  meet  imme- 
diate demands,  and  this,  although  the  total  debt 
already  amounted  to  ninety-two  millions  sterling. 
But  he  had  no  choice  in  the  matter  ;  the  loan  was 
imperative.  The  only  unmortgaged  property  on 
which  a  loan  could  be  raised  consisted  of  the  daira 
estates  belonging  to  the  khedive's  family.  These, 
now,  with  a  rent-roll  of  ^430,000  a  year,  were 
handed  over  to  the  state,  in  consequence,  not  of 
the  advice  of  Prince  Halim,  but  of  the  utter  neces- 
sity of  the  time.  The  loan  was  concluded  with  the 
Messrs.  Rothschild  of  Paris,  In  November,  1878,  at 
the  rate  of  ']'^.     The  nominal  amount  of  the  loan  was 


THE  ROAD   TO  RUIN.  49 

;^8, 500,000,  but  with  the  discount  of  twenty-seven 
per  cent,  and  the  commission  of  two  and  a  half  per 
cent,  the  net  product  was  only  ^5,992,000.  Think- 
ing that  financial  affairs  could  rest  for  the  moment, 
Mr.  Wilson  now  made  a  tour  of  inspection  through 
Lower  Egypt.  The  people  met  him  with  petitions, 
which  he  received  with  promises  of  redress.  He 
believed,  and  they  had  every  reason  to  believe,  the 
words  he  uttered  in  a  speech  at  Tanta. 

A  new  era  [he  said]  has  begun  for  Egypt.  Reforms  are 
already  initiated,  and  if  you  will  only  have  patience,  you 
can  count  on  their  completion.  If  you  have  grievances, 
make  them  known  to  us,  and  you  shall  be  righted.  We 
wish  to  establish  equality  and  legality  in  the  country,  and 
the  law  shall  no  longer  be  for  the  rich  alone  ;  it  shall  work 
for  rich  and  poor  alike. 

The  fellahin  might  well  have  been  happy ;  they 
had  never  in  their  ages  of  oppression  received  such 
assurances  before. 

But  tranquillity  was  not  yet.  A  number  of  credi- 
tors at  Alexandria  had  put  an  end  to  the  financial 
negotiations  in  a  most  unexpected  manner.  These 
creditors  had  been  watching  their  opportunity.  They 
had  tried  some  months  before  to  seize  the  furniture 
of  the  palace  at  Ramleh,  but  had  been  foiled  by  the 
bailiffs.  They  had  succeeded,  however,  in  obtaining 
a  lien  on  the  very  estates  that  were  offered  as  security 
for  the  new  loan.     It  was  not  surprising,  therefore, 


50      THE   CONFLICT  OF  EAST  AND    WEST  IN  EGYPT, 

that  Baron  Rothschild  withheld  the  amount  of  the 
loan.  To  add  to  the  khedive's  troubles,  the  unpaid 
officers  of  the  army  in  Cairo  were  urging  their 
claims.  The  delay  of  Baron  Rothschild  precipi- 
tated matters  ;  and  on  February  i8,  1879,  a  "^i^^" 
tary  uprising  occurred  in  Cairo,  which  nearly  cost 
Mr.  Rivers  Wilson  and  Nubar  Pasha  their  lives. 
While  driving  from  a  council  of  ministers  their  car- 
riage was  beset  by  a  throng  of  officers,  estimated 
at  from  four  to  twelve  hundred;  their  driver  was 
wounded,  and  they  were  insulted  and  forced  back 
into  the  court-yard  of  the  palace.  The  khedive 
attempted  to  pacify  the  mob,  but  they  were  only 
dispersed  by  the  force  of  arms.  Nubar  Pasha,  the 
next  day,  offered  his  resignation.  It  was  at  once 
accepted  by  the  khedive,  and  again  the  foremost 
statesman  of  Egypt,  and  the  only  one  worthy  the 
name,  according  to  the  Western  conception  of  the 
term,  went  into  exile.  It  was  immediately  claimed 
in  England  and  France  that  Ismail  had  sought  to 
bring  about  this  result  by  instigating  or  conniving 
at  the  insurrection  among  the  officers.  It  was  gen- 
erally known  that  Ismail  had  a  pet  aversion  to  Nu- 
bar. They  were  as  different  as  an  honest  man  and 
a  cunning  diplomat  could  well  be,  and  it  is  certain 
that  the  khedive  would  not  have  entrusted  Nubar 
with  the  new  ministry  if  the  influence  of  England 
and  France  had  not  seemed  to  demand  it.     Confi- 


THE  ROAD  TO  RUIN,  5  I 

dence  having  been  secured,  Ismail  was  ready,  and 
probably  only  too  glad,  to  break  with  his  prime- 
minister.  Nubar  appreciated  the  desperate  state  of 
affairs  that  prevailed  in  Egypt.  He  had  written  to 
a  friend  on  January  20  : 

The  everlasting  political  comedy,  or  tragedy,  is  being 
played  on  the  little  stage  here,  just  as  it  is  everywhere 
else  :  a  lost  power  sought  to  be  regained,  persons  inter- 
ested in  not  letting  it  be  regained,  who  yet  aid  it  for 
personal  motives,  or  to  give  themselves  importance — and 
not  a  sou  in  the  Treasury  withal.  What  a  situation  for 
the  country,  for  the  interested  countries,  and  for  your 
friend  ! ' 

England  and  France  were  naturally  displeased 
with  the  dismissal — for  such  it  was — of  Nubar 
Pasha  ;  and  while  the  commander-in-chief  of  the 
Egyptian  army  was  apologizing  to  Mr.  Rivers  Wil- 
son for  the  insult  he  had  received  at  the  hands  of 
the  officers,  the  two  powers  were  preparing  a  protest 
to  submit  to  the  khedive.  Notwithstanding  their 
demand,  Nubar  was  not  reinstated  ;  but  some  of 
the  conditions  they  imposed  upon  the  khedive  were 
followed  in  his  attitude  toward  the  new  cabinet. 
Ismail's  eldest  son,  Prince  Tewfik,  was  appointed 
president  of  the  council,  Zulfikar  Pasha  minister  of 
foreign  affairs,  and  Mr.  Wilson  and  M.  de  Bligni- 
eres  were   retained   in  their  former  ofifices.     The 

'  Quoted  from  Appleton's  Annual  Cydopadia,  1879. 


52       THE  CONFLICT  OF  EAST  AND   WEST  IN  EGYPT 

important  condition  that  was  imposed  upon  Ismail 
was  embraced  by  him  in  a  letter  to  Tewfik,  in  which 
he  said  :  ''  As  the  native  ministers  now  form  a  ma- 
jority in  the  cabinet,  it  is  right,  in  order  to  restore 
the  balance  of  power  and  lend  to  the  intervention 
of  our  European  ministers  all  the  usefulness  possi- 
ble, that  they  should  be  entitled  to  a  veto  on  all 
measures  they  agree  in  disapproving."  This  sop 
thrown  to  the  great  powers  was  soon  counteracted. 
Egyptian  and  European  influence  clashed  on  the 
financial  question,  and  Egypt  came  out  first  best. 
It  was  in  this  wise  :  Mr.  Wilson,  M.  de  Blignieres, 
Mr.  Baring,  and  the  debt  commissioners  submitted 
a  plan  for  the  equitable  reduction  of  the  claims  of 
all  creditors.  The  khedive  opposed  this  with  an- 
other plan,  giving  the  bondholders  better  terms  ; 
and  he  was  supported  by  the  native  parliament,  the 
pashas,  the  ulemas,  and  all  the  high  dignitaries  of 
the  land.  The  counter  projects  were  pushed  so  hard 
that,  on  April  7,  Prince  Tewfik  resigned  the  pres- 
idency of  the  council,  and  the  khedive  dismissed 
Mr.  Wilson  and  M.  de  Blignieres. 

If,  now,  there  was  ever  a  ship  of  state  that  sailed 
between  Scylla  and  Charybdis,  it  was  the  unsteady 
craft  that  Ismail  was  trying  to  guide.  If  he  avoided 
the  rocks  on  one  side,  it  was  only  to  meet  destruc- 
tion on  the  other.  The  wrath  of  the  Egyptians  had 
been  averted  by  the  dismissal  of  the  foreigners,  and 


THE  ROAD  TO  RUIN.  53 

by  the  same  act  the  wrath  of  the  great  powers  had 
been  incurred.  The  French  government  was  in 
high  dudgeon  at  the  offence,  and  threatened  to  rein- 
state her  representative  by  force  of  arms,  and  asked 
England  to  join  her.  But  England  would  not  agree 
to  any  such  decisive  step.  Even  had  she  cared  to, 
she  would  have  found  it  difficult  to  spare  more 
troops  than  were  needed  at  that  time  to  oppose  the 
Boers  in  South  Africa.  She  preferred,  therefore, 
while  waiting  for  the  blood  of  France  to  cool,  to 
send  dispatches  to  the  khedive,  demanding  a  recon- 
sideration of  his  hasty  and  unwarranted  action.  But 
the  khedive  was  now  running  things  with  a  high 
hand.  If  England  would  not  allow  France  to  send 
an  armed  force  to  Egypt,  and  did  not  do  so  herself, 
he  could  laugh  at  the  demands  and  threats  of  dis- 
patches. His  people  said  that  the  unbelievers  had 
brought  all  the  trouble  and  the  ruin  upon  the  fair 
valley  of  the  Nile,  and  he  decided  to  cut  loose  from 
the  Western  influence  and  defy  its  power.  He  vir- 
tually repudiated  the  debts  and  responsibilities  of 
his  country  in  a  way  that  would  put  our  own  Vir- 
ginia to  shame,  by  issuing  a  decree,  April  22,  in 
which  he  declared  that,  for  the  future,  he  would 
himself  control  the  finances  and  regulate  the  dis- 
charge of  liabilities.  He  seemed  to  be  riding  on 
the  wave  of  triumph.  The  people  thought  that  the 
day  of  Mehemet  Ali  was  come  again. 


54       THE  CONFLICT  OF  EAST  AND   WEST  IN  EGYPT. 

But  at  this  moment  an  unexpected  voice  of 
authority  was  heard.  England  and  France  were 
passing  the  time  in  an  unavaiHng  effort  Hke  that  of 
two  horses  who  cannot  pull  their  load  because  the 
one  holds  back  while  the  other  starts,  when,  sud- 
denly, the  German  chancellor  made  a  protest  that 
cost  Ismail  his  throne.  The  German  consul  at 
Cairo,  on  the  17th  of  May,  simply  informed  the 
khedive  that  the  interests  of  German  subjects  must 
be  protected,  let  come  what  might,  and  that  any 
arbitrary  change  of  system  at  that  time  would  be 
considered  prejudicial  to  their  interests.  What  led 
the  astute  Bismarck  to  take  the  lead  at  this  junc- 
ture   is,    and   will    probably    remain,    an    enigma.' 

^  Of  this  action  and  its  consequences,  Mr,  Edward  Dicey,  writing  in 
The  Nineteenth  Century  of  February,  1880,  says  :  "  How  this  action  came 
about  has  never,  so  far  as  I  know,  been  clearly  ascertained.  Germany  had 
a  comparatively  insignificant  interest  in  the  affairs  of  Egypt.  A  verj'  small 
portion  of  the  floating  debt  was  due  to  German  creditors.  It  is  not  easy  to 
believe  that  Germany  ever  really  contemplated  any  intervention  in  Egypt, 
and  it  is  still  less  easy  to  understand  how  she  could  practically  have  inter- 
vened even  if  she  had  been  so  minded.  But  the  prestige  of  Germany — her 
repute  of  strength,  which  is  to  a  nation  what  credit  is  to  an  individual — 
stood  her  in  good  stead.  The  mere  fact  that  Prince  Bismarck  had  declared 
the  khedive  could  not  be  allowed  to  play  fast  and  loose  with  the  interests  of 
German  subjects  produced  more  effect  than  all  the  dispatches  indited  from 
London  and  Paris  ;  and  from  the  day  when  Germany  pronounced  against 
the  khe'dive  it  was  obvious  that  the  end  had  come.  Meanwhile,  the  initia- 
tive taken  by  Germany  had  a  result  which  might  easily  have  been  foreseen, 
and  which  doubtless  was  foreseen  by  those,  whoever  they  may  have  been, 
who  suggested  to  Prince  Bismarck  the  advisability  of  his  coming  forward  as 
the  champion  of  the  Egyptian  creditors.  It  was  felt  at  once  in  Paris  that  the 
time  for  vacillation  had  passed.     The  Republic  could  not  allow  it  to  be  said 


THE  ROAD  TO  RUIN.  55 

Doubtless  he  wished  France  still  to  be  occupied 
with  foreign  affairs,  so  that  her  internal  develop- 
ment might  not  be  commensurate  with  Germany's  ; 
for  at  that  day,  more  than  now,  there  seemed  a 
plausible  possibility  that  the  grievances  and  hatred 
that  did  not  die  with  Napoleon  Third  might  seek 
again  a  settlement  by  the  sword.  Certain  it  is  that 
the  very  reasons  that  have  led  England  to  oppose 
French  aggrandizement  abroad,  have  led  Germany 
to  favor  the  same,  or,  at  least,  to  view  with  satisfac- 
tion the  foreign  complications  that  require  the 
exportation  of  troops  and  treasure.  Against  France, 
England  has  had  to  protect  only  her  interests 
abroad,  and  Germany  her  interests  at  home.  This 
may  or  may  not  account  for  the  chancellor's  un- 
expected though  timely  interference  ;  but  the  fact 
remains  the  same  that  his  voice  settled  the  khe- 
dive's  fate,  '  England,  France,  Austria,  Russia,  and 
Italy  followed  the  lead  of  Germany,  and  protested 
against  any  interference  with  the  commission  of 
control  and  the  non-execution  of  the  tribunal  judg- 
ments.     At  this  juncture  the  proposal  to   depose 

that  France  was  unable  or  unwilling  to  protect  the  interests  of  her  subjects 
in  Egypt,  while  the  insignificant  interests  of  the  German  creditors  were 
safeguarded  by  the  mere  expression  of  Prince  Bismarck's  will  ;  and  the 
English  government  recognized,  on  the  one  hand,  that  France  could  not  be 
held  back  any  longer,  and,  on  the  other,  that  we  could  not  allow  Ger- 
many to  take  into  her  own  hands  the  forcible  solution  of  the  Egyptian 
question." 


56       THE  CONFLICT  OF  EAST  AND   WEST  IN  EGYPT. 

the  khedive,  which  the  Porte  had  made  to  England 
and  France  in  April,  was  renewed.  This  time  it 
was  accepted.  In  place,  however,  of  the  sultan's 
nominee  for  the  succession — Prince  Halim,  the 
uncle  of  Ismail — England  and  France  insisted  upon 
raising  Prince  Tewfik,  the  son  of  Ismail,  to  the 
throne.  The  diplomatic  correspondence  in  discus- 
sion of  this  difference  consumed  a  week  or  more  in 
June  ;  but  on  the  26th  of  that  month  the  sultan  at 
last  yielded  and  signed  the  firman  deposing  Ismail 
in  favor  of  Prince  Mehemet  Tewfik.  Four  days 
afterward  the  ex-khedive  left  the  shores  and 
troubles  of  Egypt  behind  him  for  an  Italian  life  of 
luxury.  If  he  had  been  a  pasha  in  the  feudal  days 
of  Egypt,  he  would  have  forfeited  his  treasure  and 
his  life.  As  it  was,  he  escaped  with  the  latter,  and 
was  given  an  annual  allowance  of  ;^5o,ooo. 

The  character  of  Ismail  Pasha  has  been  variously 
depicted.  He  has  been  painted  with  all  the  virtues, 
on  the  one  hand,  and  all  the  vices,  on  the  other,  that 
a  monarch  can  be  heir  to.  Of  course  neither  ex- 
treme gives  the  true  picture  ;  and  yet  there  is  so 
much  ground  for  each  conception,  that  one  inclines, 
at  first  thought,  to  declare  that  Ismail  was  both  the 
blessing  and  the  curse  of  his  country.  We  think  of 
the  development  of  Egypt  during  the  sixteen  years 
of  his  reign,  of  the  public  works,  schools,  railways, 
telegraphs,  founded  and  fostered,  and  we  bless  his 


THE  ROAD  TO  RUIN.  57 

name  ;  but  then  we  think  of  the  cost,  and  the  curse 
follows.  We  cannot  aeree  with  those  who  would 
shield  Ismail  by  regarding  him  as  the  dupe  of  his 
wicked  miiffetish.  He  may  have  been  deceived  and 
cheated  by  the  latter,  but  he  could  not  have  been  alto- 
gether ignorant  of  the  financial  schemes  of  his  treas- 
urer. They  worked  in  the  same  groove  and  to  the 
same  end.  They  were  both  ambitious,  but  were 
not  equally  extravagant  ;  for  the  muffetish  grew 
rich  correspondingly  as  the  khedive  grew  poor,  al- 
though the  money  poured  into  the  hands  of  the  two 
alike.  The  muffetish  hoarded  while  the  khedive 
wasted  ;  but  the  desire  of  the  miser  was  no  greater 
than  that  of  the  spendthrift,  and  he  must  not  bear 
the  blame  for  both.  For  the  financial  woes  of 
Egypt  under  Ismail  some  blame,  undoubtedly,  at- 
taches to  the  European  money-lenders,  whose  bar- 
gains were  so  disastrou^^o  the  khedive.  Their 
rates  were  often  merci]^^^  To  prove  that  all  the 
blame  is  theirs,  Mr.  Ke^B^Us  A  Tale  of  Shame, ^ 
from  the  British  blue  books,  in  which  he  supports 
his  arguments  with  many  italics,  small  capitals,  and 
exclamation  points.  But  they  are  not  conclusive. 
They  do  not  obliterate  the  fact  of  Ismail's  ex- 
travagance. 

If  we  could  wholly  lose  sight  of  the  different  acts 

'  J.  Seymour  Keay,  Spoiling  the  Egyptians;  A  Tale  of  Shame.     Told 
from  the  Blue  Books. 


5  8       THE  CONFLICT  OF  EAST  AND   WES  T  IN  EG  YP  T. 

of  the  financial  tragedy,  the  glory  of  Ismail's  reign 
would  still  be  marred  by  the  means  and  measures 
he  employed  in  carrying  out  his  designs  of  develop- 
ment. No  obstacle  could  turn  him  from  his  plan, 
and  the  teachings  of  economic  science  were  ignored 
or  misunderstood.  We  have  seen  how  he  bent  his 
energies  upon  the  senseless  attempt  to  refine  sugar, 
when  his  country  furnished  no  fuel  to  run  his  dearly 
boueht  machines.  Western  civilization  was  Ismail's 
model  in  all  things.  It  was  his  ambition,  from  the 
start,  to  implant  in  Egypt  European  arts  and  ideas. 
He  thought  he  could  declare  into  existence  what 
had  been  the  slow  development  of  centuries  in  more 
enlightened  lands.  Even  when  he  must  have  known 
that  his  country  was  on  the  verge  of  ruin,  he  boasted 
that  Egypt  was  no  longer  a  part  of  Africa,  but  of 
Europe.'  Nothing  could  be  more  ridiculous  than 
the  story  of  Ismail's  attempt  to  give  his  people  gov- 
ernmental representation.  He  did  not  propose  to 
establish  even  a  paper  constitution  ;  and  he  had  no 
idea  of  giving  up  any  of  his  prerogatives,  when,  in 
1866,  he  summoned  the  first  Egyptian  parliament 
that  had  assembled  since  the  day  of  Mehemet  Ali.* 

'  In  an  interview  with  Mr.  Rivers  Wilson,  August  23,  1877,  Ismail  said  : 
"  My  country  is  no  longer  African  ;  M^e  now  form  part  of  Europe."  From 
Annual  Cycloptzdia  for  1877. 

'  Mr.  McCoan,  in  Egypt  As  It  Is,  page  117,  thus  describes  the  func- 
tions of  the  assembly  :  "  In  1866,  the  Khedive  revived  the  defunct  Assembly 
of  Delegates,  one  of  the  inchoate  reforms  projected  by  Mehemet  Ali,  but 


THE  ROAD  TO  RUIN.  59 

The  members  of  the  new  parHament  had  not  the 
faintest  Idea  of  their  duties  and  powers.  When  the 
first  bill  was  submitted  to  them  by  the  khedlve,  and 
they  were  asked  to  signify  their  approval  or  disap- 
proval, there  was  not  a  dissenting  vote  against  the 
measure.  For,  they  said,  his  Highness  is  the  rep- 
resentative of  Allah  ;  and  his  will,  like  that  of  Allah 
and  the  Prophet,  is  our  law.  But  this  political  sim- 
plicity vanished  before  the  end  of  Ismail's  reign, 
though  the  voice  of  the  parliament  was  still  recog- 
nized as  the  khedive's  voice. 

It  is  only  fair  to  Ismail  that  a  somewhat  detailed 
statement  should  be  made  of  the  amounts  expended 
by  him  in  public  works ;  for,  having  seen  how  one 
loan  after  another  was  received,  the  question  natu- 
rally arises  :  Where  did  the  money  go  ?  There  was 
a  considerable  sum  that  the  greed  of  money-lenders 
did  not  absorb  in  commissions  and  interest,  and  a 
large  part  of  this  went  into  public  works.  Mr.  Mul- 
hall  gives  the  following  table  of  works  established 
between  1863  and  1879,  i^  his  article  on  ''Egyptian 
Finance  ":' 

which  had  not  met  since  his  death.  This  germ  of  an  Egyptian  Parliament 
consists  of  village  sheikhs  and  other  provincial  notables,  elected  by  the  com- 
munes, and  assembles  once  a  year  to  receive  from  the  Privy  Council  a  re- 
port on  the  administration  during  the  twelvemonth.  Its  function  is  also  to 
consider  and  advise  on  all  proposed  fiscal  changes,  new  public  works,  and 
other  matters  of  national  concern  that  may  be  laid  before  it.  It  has,  of 
course,  no  legislative  power  ;  but  in  practice  iis  recommendations  are  re- 
ceived not  merely  with  respect,  but  are  often  acted  on  by  the  Government." 
'  Contemporary  Review,,  Octobox,  1882.. 


6o 


THE  CONFLICT  OF  EAST  AND   WEST  IN  EGYPT. 


r 


V 


Work. 

Amount.     < 

Suez  canal    .     .     . 

;^6,77o,ooo| 

Nile  canals  .      .      . 

12, 600, coo 

Bridges    .... 

2,150,000 

Sugar-mills  . 

6v  100,000 

Harbor  Alexandria 

2,542.000 

Suez  docks  .     .     . 

1,400,000 

Alex,    water-works 

300,000 

Railways       .     .     . 

13,361,000 

Telegraphs  . 

853,000 

Lighthouses . 

188,000 

Observation. 
After  deducting  value  of  shares  sold. 
Made  8,400  miles  at  ^^1,500  per  mile. 
Built  430  at  ^5,000  per  bridge. 
Built  64,  with  machinery,  eU. 
Greenfield  and  Elliot,  contract. 
Dussaud  Bros. 

Price  agreed  by  Paris  Syndicate. 
Length  910  miles,  new. 
Length  5,200  miles,  new. 
Built  15  on  Red  Sea  and  Mediterranean. 


^46,264,000 

We  see  thus  that  Ismail  expended  on  works  of 
public  utility  not  less  than  forty-six  millions  sterling. 
Now,  as  the  loans  contracted  by  him  netted  only 
<C  about  forty-five  millions,  his  admirers  and  defenders 
say  at  once  that  he  did  not  squander,  but  that  he 
spent  all  for  the  public  weal.  But  there  Is  the  item 
of  revenue,  which  these  writers  do  not  consider,  and 
which  yielded  the  government.  In  the  sixteen  years 
of  Ismail's  reign,  not  far  from  one  hundred  and 
fifty  millions.  How  large  a  part  of  this  was  wasted 
by  Ismail  we  can  only  guess  ;  but  we  may  be  sure 
that  all  those  millions  did  not  go  toward  defraying 
necessary  governmental  expenses.  The  canals,  rail- 
ways, bridges,  docks,  eU,,  were  the  best  work  of 
Ismail's  reign  If  the  financial  side  of  the  question  be 
left  out  of  consideration.  They  brought  in,  it  is 
true,  a  certain  revenue,  but  this  was  by  no  means 
equal  to  the  interest  on  the  debts  incurred  to  make 
the  improvements.     Where  national  development  is 


THE  ROAD  TO  RUIN,  6 1 

only  secured  by  contracting  with  each  change  a 
counterbalancing  debt,  it  is  doubtful  if  the  changes 
can  be  considered  beneficial.  There  were,  however, 
certain  other  outlays  by  Ismail  that  were  of  unques- 
tionable advantage  to  the  land,  even  though  they 
produced  no  revenue.  He  established  4,632  public  ^ 
schools,  with  5,850  teachers,  drawing  salaries  that 
ranged  from  £2\  to  ^84  a  year,  and.  expended  in 
the  sixteen  years  of  his  reign  no  less  than  ^3,600,000 
for  this  purpose.  He  organized  village  banks — we 
will  say  with  philanthropic  intent  to  protect  the  fel- 
lahin  from  the  money-lenders^and  lost  ^900,000 
by  the  experiment.  And  he  lost  largely  on  the 
shares  he  took  in  the  Nile  Steam  Navigation  Com- 
pany. On  the  other  hand,  just  at  the  time  of  the 
financial  difficulties  of  1873,  ^^  embarked  upon  a 
war  with  Abyssinia  which  despoiled  the  Egyptian 
treasury  of  not  less  than  ^3,000,000.  He  squan- 
dered a  vast  sum  in  building  palaces  and  theatres 
and  in  the  entertainment  of  distinguished  foreigners. 
His  expenditures  at  the  time  of  the  opening  of  the 
Suez  canal  were  simply  enormous.  He  gave  bribes 
and  presents  at  all  times  with  true  Oriental  prodi- 
gality. Even  if  he  could  have  afforded  these  out- 
lays, they  would  have  been  foolish  ;  as  it  was,  they 
were  wicked.  And  yet,  as  Mr.  Mulhall  says, 
"■  whatever  the  faults,  he  raised  Egypt  in  the  scale 
of  nations "  ;  for  there  was  an  actual  progress  be- 


62       THE  CONFLICT  OF  EAST  AND   WEST  IN  EGYPT. 


tween  the  death  of  Said  and  the  accession  of  Tewfik. 
It  may  be  measured  in  the  following  table,  prepared 
by  Mr.  Mulhall  : ' 

Progress  of  Egypt  in  Seventeen  Years. 


Last  Year  of 

Last  Year  of 

Said  Pasha. 

Ismail  Pasha. 

1862. 

1879. 

Acres  tilled 

4,052,000 

5,425,000 

Value  of  imports 

^1,991,000 

^5,410,000 

Value  of  exports 

;^4,454,ooo 

;£  13,8 10,000 

Revenue       .... 

^4,937,000 

;£'8,562,000 

Public  debt 

;£'3,3oo,ooo 

^98,540,000 

Number  of  public  schools    . 

185 

4,817 

Railways — miles  . 

275 

1,185 

Telegraphs     ''     .         .         . 

630 

5,820 

Canals             "... 

44,000 

52,400 

Population     "     . 

.       4,883,000 

5,518,000 

If  from  this  table  could  be  excluded  that  decided- 
ly negative  item  of  progress  denoted  by  the  public 
debt  in  1879,  there  would  remain  a  good  showing 
for  Ismail ;  but  that  one  item  cancels  all  the  others, 
even  as  it  was  the  primal  cause  of  Ismail's  over- 
throw. 

There  was  another  reform,  which  has  not  yet 
been  noticed  because  bearing  no  direct  relation  to 
finances,  that  was  accomplished  during  Ismail's 
reign,  and  for  which  he  must,  at  least  indirectly, 
be  credited  —  the  reform  in  judicial  procedure. 
There  had  come  to  be  a  very  pernicious  Increase 

*  Contemporary  Review,  October,  1S82, 


THE  ROAD  TO  RUIN.  63 

of  consular  jurisdiction  in  Egypt  after  the  death  of 
Mehemet  Ali.  The  native  had  to  bring  a  suit 
against  a  foreigner  in  the  foreigner's  consulate, 
where  he  was  almost  sure  to  be  denied  justice. 
With  as  little  chance  of  justice,  also,  the  for- 
eign plaintiff  had  to  sue  the  foreign  debtor  in 
the  latter  s  consulate.  Some  consuls  even  claimed 
the  right  to  sit  in  judgment  of  cases  in  which 
the  natives  were  defendants.  The  government 
suffered  too.  It  was  estimated,  says  Mr.  McCoan,' 
that,  in  the  four  years  preceding  1868,  consular 
influence  extorted  from  the  government  ;^2,88o,- 
000  in  satisfaction  of  claims,  without  judicial 
sanction  of  any  kind.  ''  The  whole  system,'*  he 
goes  on  to  say,  ''was,  in  fact,  a  scandal  and  a 
denial  of  justice  all  around."  It  was,  if  anything, 
worse  in  criminal  than  in  civil  matters.  The  abuses 
were  so  flagrant  that  Nubar  Pasha,  in  1867,  pro- 
posed a  scheme  of  reform  to  the  khedive.  It  was 
submitted  to  France,  but  was  unfavorably  received. 
England,  however,  when  approached  on  the  subject, 
promised  to  give  the  reform  her  hearty  support, 
provided  the  other  powers  would  concur.  They 
did  so  in  the  fall  of  1869.  Negotiations,  however, 
were  interrupted  for  a  time  by  the  war  between 
France  and  Germany  ;  and  when  they  were  re- 
newed, in  1 87 1,  the  sultan  entered  his  veto  against 

'  Egypt  As  It  Is,  p.  276. 


64       THE  CONFLICT  OF  EAST  AND   WEST  IN  EGYPT. 

the  scheme,  though  he  afterward  withdrew  it  at  the 
demand  of  England  and  Russia.  France  now 
offered  objections  once  more,  and  the  negotiations 
dragged.  Some  of  her  amendments  were  accepted ; 
but  it  was  not  until  December,  1875,  ^^^^  ^^  scheme 
was  finally  agreed  to. 

The  reform  was  inaugurated  in  February,  1876, 
to  continue  in  force  for  five  years.  It  is  thus  de- 
scribed by  Mr.  McCoan  :^ 

As  now  constituted  the  new  system  includes  three  tri- 
bunals of  first  instance — one  at  Alexandria,  a  second  at 
Cairo,  and  a  third  ...  at  Zagazig — and  a  Court  of 
Appeal,  which  also  sits  at  Alexandria.  Of  the  inferior 
courts,  that  at  Alexandria — divided  into  two  chambers, 
with  equal  jurisdiction — consists  of  fourteen  judges,  of 
whom  six  are  natives  and  eight  Europeans ;  that  at  Cairo, 
of  three  natives  and  five  foreigners ;  and  that  at  Zagazig, 
of  three  natives  and  four  foreigners.  The  nominal  chiefs 
of  all  three  are  natives,  but  foreign  vice-presidents  actually 
direct  their  proceedings.  In  the  Court  of  Appeal  the  alien 
element  is  still  more  preponderant,  the  bench  of  eleven 
judges  there  consisting  of  seven  foreigners  and  only  four 
natives.  .  .  .  The  judicial  and  other  personnel  is  thus 
complete,  and  the  jurisdiction  exercised  includes  all  civil 
disputes  between  the  government  and  natives  on  the  one 
hand  and  foreigners  on  the  other,  as  also  those  between 
foreigners  of  different  nationalities ;  and  all  suits  and  regis- 
trations of  sale  and  mortgage  whatsoever  of  real  property. 

^  Egypt  As  It  Is,  p.  280. 


THE  ROAD  TO  RUIN.  65 

Such  was  the  reform  inaugurated ;  and  a  most 
excellent  one  it  was.  Not  forgetting  that  Nubar 
was  its  author,  we  give  the  credit  of  it  to  Ismail's 
reign,  just  as  we  lay  the  blame  of  the  muffetish's 
villany  at  his  door.  If  all  his  changes  had  been  as 
wisely  carried  out,  his  ambitious  designs  of  raising 
Egypt  to  the  plane  of  European  civilization  would 
not  have  failed  so  utterly  of  realization.  In  this 
connection  we  must  refer  to  Ismail's  appointment, 
first  of  Sir  Samuel  Baker  and  then  of  Colonel  Gor- 
don, as  governors-general  of  the  Sudan  and  of  his 
apparently  earnest  attempts  to  suppress  the  slave 
trade.  He  gave  Gordon  unlimited  power  to  ''  pun- 
ish, change,  and  dismiss  "  officials,  and  assured  him 
that  Egypt  would  loyally  support  England  in  this 
"•  measure  of  humanity  and  civilization."  We  shall 
see  later  how  Baker  and  Gordon  succeeded  in  their 
missions. 

Long  before  his  collapse  the  shrewd  Ismail  must 
have  known  that  his  reign  was  doomed  ;  but  he  kept 
on  his  high-handed  course  to  the  end.  The  discharge 
of  the  European  administrators  and  the  virtual  repu- 
diation of  debts  were  his  last  acts  of  bravado.  Pow- 
erless and  empty-handed,  he  made  no  protest  against 
the  firman  of  deposition.  But  "■  it  would  be  a  mis- 
l  take,"  writes  Mr.  Edward  Dicey  ''  to  attribute 
\  Ismail  Pasha's  collapse  to  lack  of  personal  courage. 

'  The  Nineteenth  Century,  February,  1880. 


(i6      THE   CONFLICT  OF  EAST  AND    WEST  IN  EGYPT. 

I  should  doubt  his  possessing  any  exceptional  physi- 
cal bravery ;  but  he  had  to  a  remarkable  degree  the 
gambler's  instinct  and  the  gambler's  boldness.  He 
was  not  the  man  to  forfeit  his  stakes  while  there  was 
a  chance,  however  remote,  of  holding  on  to  his  win- 
nings. He  threw  up  the  game  simply  and  solely 
because  he  knew  better  than  any  one  else  that  he 
had  absolutely  no  cards  in  his  hand."  His  people 
suffered  him  to  depart  into  exile  without  a  protest 
or  a  murmur.  It  is  true  that ''  the  resident  European 
community" — to  quote  Mr.  Dicey's  words  once  more 
— ''  to  whom  he  had  always  been  friendly,  and  who 
had  partaken  freely  of  his  lavish  hospitality,  stood 
by  him  in  his  disgrace,  and  his  departure  into  exile 
was  accompanied  by  sincere  expressions  of  regret 
on  the  part  of  the  court  circle  and  the  European 
embassy,  but  without  one  solitary  manifestation  of 
sympathy  on  the  part  of  the  Egyptian  population." 


IV. 

MEHEMET   TEWFIK,  KHEDIVE. 

PRINCE  MEHEMET  TEWFIK  was  not  yet 
twenty-seven  years  old  when  he  ascended  the 
vice-royal  throne  of  Egypt.  He  was  a  very  differ- 
ent man  from  his  father.  He  had  not  his  inordinate 
ambition,  and  lacked,  consequently,  some  of  the 
energy  as  well  as  the  crafty  diplomacy  of  Ismail. 
He  had  not,  like  his  father,  served  an  apprentice- 
ship of  experience  in  the  gay  capitals  of  Europe  ; 
but  he  was  not  without  the  culture  that  European 
masters  can  inspire.  He  had  a  good  knowledge  of 
French  and  English,  speaking  both  languages 
fluently.  It  may  be  doubted  if  he  was  as  enlight- 
ened a  prince  as  his  great  uncle,  Prince  Halim,  the 
exile  of  Constantinople,  who  was  the  choice  of  the 
sultan  for  successor  to  Ismail  ;  but  under  the  law  of 
succession  in  Egypt,  established  by  the  firman  of 
1866,  England  could  not  well  have  supported  Halim, 
even  if  she  had  preferred  him,  which  she  did  not. 
The  Porte  had  to  yield.  Its  eagerness  to  depose 
Ismail  is  not  to  be  attributed  to  any  over-sensitive- 


68       THE   CONFLICT  OF  EAST  AND    WEST  IN  EGYPT. 

ness  at  the  scandal  of  his  financial  follies,  but  rather 
to  the  fact — which  the  sultan  foresaw — that  if  the 
Porte  did  not  depose  the  khedive,  England  and 
France  would.  Making,  thus,  a  concession  to  the 
inevitable,  the  sultan  would  have  still  maintained 
the  semblance  of  his  suzerain  authority  if  he  could 
have  named  the  successor.  But  this  was  not  per- 
mitted by  England  and  France,  who,  by  their  dicta- 
tion at  this  time,  showed  that  they  possessed  the 
virtual  control  of  affairs  in  Egypt. 

And  yet,  after  the  deposition,  England  at  least 
was  loth  to  put  her  power  further  to  the  test.  The 
opposition  at  home  was  to  be  feared  and  a  definite 
policy  was  not  outlined  ;  and  the  new  khedive  was 
left  to  follow  his  own  whim  largely  in  the  formation 
of  his  government.  France  did  not  relish  this  inac- 
tion on  the  part  of  England,  and,  for  herself,  insisted 
that  M.  de  Blignieres  should  continue  to  act  as 
representative.  Germany  and  the  other  Powers 
having  retired  from  participation  in  the  discussion 
of  Egyptian  affairs,  England  and  France  at  last 
came  to  a  compromise.  They  agreed  not  to  insist 
upon  the  reinstatement  of  their  representatives  in 
the  khedive's  cabinet,  but,  instead,  upon  the  appoint- 
ment by  the  khedive  of  two  comptrollers,  one  of 
whom  should  be  nominated  by  France  and  the 
other  by  England.  France  named  M.  de  Bli- 
gnieres,  who  was  accepted   by  Tewfik  with  much 


MEHEMET  TEWFIK,    KHEDIVE.  69 

dissatisfaction.  England  did  not  insist  upon  the 
appointment  of  Mr.  Rivers  Wilson,  though  losing 
thereby  some  prestige,  but  named  Major  Baring 
instead.  Their  powers  were  not  defined  ;  but  it 
was  understood  that  they  would  be  as  unlimited  as 
France  and  England  might  choose  to  make  them. 
In  the  meantime  there  had  been  several  ministe- 
rial changes  since  Tewfik's  accession.  He  had 
placed  the  ministry  under  the  leadership  of  Sherif 
Pasha.  None  but  natives  received  portfolios.  The 
ministry  thus  formed  indicated  a  reactionary  spirit, 
and  was  totally  out  of  sympathy  with  the  reform 
movement  instigated  by  Nubar  Pasha.  Tewfik 
I  feared  to  depart  at  once  from  the  ways  of  Ismail ; 
for  he  regarded  his  position  as  somewhat  insecure 
so  long  as  Ismail's  covert  overtures  to  the  Porte 
were  received.  The  ex-khedive  sought  to  obtain 
permission  of  the  sultan  to  live  in  Cairo.  ^  This 
could  not  have  been  allowed  without  prejudicing 
the  stability  of  the  Egyptian  government  ;  but  all 
fear  of  the  possibility  was  ended  when,  on  August 
14,  the  firman  of  investiture  was  presented  to 
Tewfik.  Four  days  after,  the  Sherif  ministry  was 
dismissed  and  a  new  one  formed,  of  which  the  khe- 
dive  himself  assumed  the  presidency.  But  this  was 
short-lived  ;  for,  on  September  2 1 ,  Tewfik  gave  up 
his  position  of  minister  and  appointed  Riaz  Pasha 
to  the  presidency  in  his  place.      Riaz  had  been  min- 


^0       THE  CONFLICT  OF  EAST  AND   WEST  IN  EGYPT. 

ister  of  the  interior  under  Nubar,  with  whom  he 
was  in  complete  sympathy.  It  would  seem,  how- 
ever, as  if  the  ministry  should  have  been  intrusted 
to  Nubar,  the  most  enlightened  man  of  Egypt  ;  but 
Riaz  was  preferred  by  France  and  England  because, 
in  case  of  differences  arising,  he  would  hardly  have 
the  courage  or  strength  to  oppose  the  Dual  Control, 
which  was  a  consideration  of  some  moment  now  that 
the  Powers  had  no  representatives  in  the  cabinet. 
Then,  too,  Nubar  was  not  popular  among  the 
natives,  being  an  Armenian  and  a  Christian.  At 
the  same  time  that  the  khedive's  government  was 
placed  upon  an  apparently  stable  footing,  the  bur- 
dens of  the  fellahin  were  materially  lightened  by 
unusually  abundant  crops.  They  were  also  less 
harassed  than  formerly  by  the  tax-gatherers,  who  no 
longer  forced  money  from  them  a  year  or  more  be- 
fore it  was  due,  but  were  content  merely  to  collect 
arrearages.  There  seemed  thus  to  be  a  brighter 
sky  above  Egypt  than  in  the  days  of  Ismail  Pasha. 
But  there  was  the  great  question  of  finance  still 
remaining  to  be  solved.  To  this  the  comptrollers 
turned  their  first  attention.  The  difficulty  that  met 
them  at  the  outset  was  of  an  international  charac- 
ter. It  will  be  remembered  that  Baron  Rothschild 
had  withheld  a  part  of  his  loan  at  the  beginning  of 
the  year,  because  individual  creditors  had  obtained 
liens  against  the  daira  domains,  which   Ismail  and 


MEHEMET  TEWFIK,   KHEDIVE.  7 1 

his  family  had  ceded  to  the  state.  The  domains 
could  not  be  mortgaged  to  the  Rothschilds  until  the 
liens  had  been  satisfied  ;  for  their  legality  had  been 
upheld  by  the  International  Courts,  whose  law  was 
that  of  a  code  based  upon  French  law.  This  code, 
now,  could  not  be  deviated  from  or  modified  in  the 
least  degree  except  with  the  consent  of  all  the  Pow- 
ers represented  in  the  International  Courts.  But  it 
was  evidently  a  matter  of  right  and  necessity  that 
funds  borrowed  to  lighten  certain  burdens  of  the 
state  should  be  expended  to  that  end  and  not  in  the 
payment  of  the  claims  of  individuals.  An  indepen- 
dent Power  would  have  so  decided  at  once  ;  but 
Egypt  had  to  abide  by  the  code,  while  the  comptrol- 
lers proceeded  to  try  to  secure  the  consent  of  the 
Powers  concerned.  This  was  a  difficult  task.  Some 
of  the  lesser  Powers  were  jealous  of  the  Anglo-French 
control,  and  had  no  desire  to  act  upon  its  bidding. 
Italy  and  Austria  declined  to  sanction  any  change 
in  the  international  code.  Major  Baring  and  M.  de 
Blignieres  themselves  went  to  Vienna  to  expostulate, 
and  with  the  strong  influence  of  the  nations  they 
represented  they  were  at  last  able,  in  November,  to 
effect  a  compromise,  by  which  all  the  liens  on  the 
domains,  obtained  before  their  mortgage  to  the 
Rothschilds  on  February  3,  1879,  were  to  be  satis- 
fied from  the  unpaid  balance  of  the  loan  ;  while,  with 
respect  to  all  other  debts,  the  Rothschilds  were  to 


72       THE  CONFLICT  OF  EAST  AND   WEST  IN  EGYPT. 

have  the  first  mortgage  on  the  lands.  This  was  ac- 
comphshed  only  by  tedious  negotiations.  In  the 
month  of  November,  also,  the  khedive  issued  the 
following  decree  concerning  the  powers  of  the  comp- 
trollers-general : 

Article  i.  The  Comptrollers-General  shall  have  in 
financial  matters  the  most  complete  powers  of  investigation 
into  all  the  public  services,  including  those  whose  receipts 
have  a  special  destination  by  virtue  of  decrees  and  con- 
tracts. Ministers  and  functionaries  of  every  rank  shall  be 
bound  to  give  every  information  and  to  furnish  every 
document  required  by  the  Comptrollers  and  their  agents. 
The  Minister  of  Finance  especially  shall  furnish  the  Con- 
trol every  week  with  a  detailed  statement  of  all  receipts 
and  expenditures  at  his  Ministry.  Every  other  Adminis- 
tration shall  every  month  furnish  a  similar  statement  of 
receipts  and  expenditures. 

Art.  2.  The  Comptrollers  shall  agree  upon  the  public 
services  over  which  they  shall  exercise  the  rights  of  super- 
vision and  control  conferred  by  this  decree. 

Art.  3.  The  Governments  of  France  and  Great  Brit- 
ain having  consented,  for  the  moment,  that  the  Comptrol- 
lers shall  take  no  part  in  the  management  of  the  Adminis- 
tration and  financial  services,  the  Comptrollers  shall  for 
the  present  confine  themselves  to  the  communication  to 
us  or  to  our  Ministers  of  such  observations  as  their  inves- 
tigations give  rise  to.  They  shall  also  communicate  to 
the  Commission  of  the  Debt  all  facts  of  a  nature  to  inter- 
est the  creditors  of  the  consolidated  Debt.  They  may 
also,  on  account  of  such  facts,  convene  the  Commissioners 


MEHEME    TEWFIK,  KHEDIVE.  73 

of  Public  Debt  to  examine  such  questions  as  the  Comp- 
trollers or  the  Commissioners  of  Public  Debt  may  think 
advisable  to  discuss  in  common. 

Art.  4.  The  Comptrollers  shall  have  the  rank  of 
Ministers  at  the  Council  [of  Ministers],  and  shall  have  a 
seat  and  a  consultive  voice  there. 

Art.  5.  At  the  end  of  each  year,  and  more  frequently 
if  necessary,  the  Comptrollers  shall  communicate  to  us 
their  work  in  a  report,  which  shall  be  published  by  them 
and  inserted  in  the  Monitciir  Egyptien. 

Art.  6.  The  Comptrollers  can  only  be  removed  from 
their  posts  with  the  consent  of  their  respective  Govern- 
ments. They  shall  name  their  own  officials  and  fix  their 
salaries. 

Art.  7.  The  expenses  of  the  department  of  the  Con- 
trol shall  be  fixed  by  the  Comptrollers  and  approved  by 
the  Ministers. 

Art.  8.  The  amount  required  by  them  shall  be  paid 
to  them  monthly. 

Art.  9.  Our  Ministers  are  charged  with  the  execu- 
tion of  this  decree. 

[Signed]  Mehemet  Tewfik, 

RiAZ  Pasha. 

November  15,  1879. 

The  remainder  of  the  year  1879  was  consumed  by 
the  comptrollers  in  drafting  a  plan  for  the  settlement 
of  the  financial  question.  Their  report  was  pre- 
sented to  the  khedive  in  January,  1880.  Its  most 
important  suggestion  was  that  a  line  of  demarcation 
should  be  drawn  at  December  31,  1879;  and  that 
all  debts  contracted  before  that  date  should  be  set- 


74      THE   CONFLICT  OF  EAST  AND   WEST  IN  EGYPT 

tied  by  a  law  of  liquidation,  which  should  protect 
the  Egyptian  government  from  all  suits  based  on 
claims  of  earlier  date  than  1880.  It  had  been  un- 
derstood, when  the  comptrollers  were  appointed  the 
previous  summer,  that  a  committee  of  liquidation 
should  be  instituted  to  draft  such  a  law  as  the  comp- 
trollers now  suggested  and,  further,  to  devise  some 
such  scheme  for  the  final  settlement  of  financial 
difficulties  as  was  outlined  in  the  report  of  the 
comptrollers.  The  commission  was  now  appointed 
with  the  approval  of  England,  France,  Italy,  Austria, 
Germany,  and  Egypt,  and  Sir  Rivers  Wilson  was 
chosen  its  president.  The  khedive,  in  a  decree 
issued  in  March,  outlined  the  duties  of  the  commis- 
sion. It  was  to  investigate  thoroughly  the  finances 
of  the  country,  to  draw  up  a  law  of  liquidation  be- 
tween Egypt  and  her  creditors  which  should  be 
binding  on  all  concerned,  and  to  make  general  pro- 
vision to  ease  Egypt  of  her  burdens.  The  govern- 
ments represented  in  the  commission  agreed  to 
accept  its  decisions  as  binding  on  the  International 
Courts,  and  to  request  jointly,  after  having  given 
their  own  approval,  that  the  other  Powers  represent- 
ed in  the  International  Courts  should  also  consent 
to  the  new  law. 

The  work  of  the  commission  was  completed  by 
the  middle  of  July,  and  the  khedive  at  once  signed 
the  law  of  liquidation.     It  provided  for  the  payment 


MEHEMET  TEWFIK,  KHEDIVE.  75 

of  the  floating  debt  by  giving  thirty  per  cent,  cash 
and  seventy  per  cent,  in  the  bonds  of  a  new  pref- 
erence debt.  The  national  debt  was  converted  into 
unified  and  preference  stock,  the  former  bearing  in- 
terest at  four  per  cent,  and  the  latter  at  five  per  cent. 
The  unified  stock,  amounting  to  ^57,776,340,  was 
secured  by  the  land  tax,  and  the  preference  stock, 
amounting  to  ^22,587,800,  was  secured  by  the  rail- 
ways, telegraphs,  etc.  The  daira  debt  of  ^9,5 1 2,870, 
and  the  domain  debt  of  ;^8,499,620  were  secured 
respectively  by  the  khedive's  estates  and  his  family's 
estates.  The  mukabala  amounted  to  ^7,500,000. 
The  entire  indebtedness  was  thus  placed  at  over 
one  hundred  and  five  millions  sterling-.  The 
mukabala  tax  was  abolished,  and  a  source  of  revenue 
cut  off;  but  it  was  thought  that  the  daira,  being 
freed  now  from  debt,  could  be  made  to  yield  a 
revenue  enough  larger  to  counterbalance  the  loss  of 
the  mukabala  tax.  The  khedive  had  previously 
signed  decrees  abolishing  this  tax  and  certain  others 
that  had  been  declared  by  the  commissioners  of  in- 
quiry to  be  annoying  to  the  tax-payer  and  of  little 
profit  to  the  state.  The  relief  to  Egypt  by  the  new 
law  was  to  be  found  in  the  reduction  of  the  interest 
on  the  unified  debt  to  four  per  cent.  That  would 
at  once  bring  the  expenses  of  the  government  below 
the  sum  of  the  revenues  and  furnish  a  surplus  that 
could  be  applied  to  the  service  of  the  debt.     The 


J 6      THE   CONFLICT  OF  EAST  AND  WEST  IN  EGYPT. 

practical  working  of  the  law  secured  this  very  result. 
In  t88i,  after  the  discharge  of  all  obligations,  there 
remained  a  surplus  of  ^321,265,  which  enabled  the 
government  to  cancel  nearly  half  a  million  of  the 
funded  debt.  ''The  Liquidation  Law  of  1880," 
says  Mr.  Mulhall/  ''  first  put  the  finances  on  a 
sound  footing  and  ...  its  effects  have  been 
just  and  beneficial." 

Other  causes,  also,  worked  to  secure  the  pros- 
perity of  1880.  There  was  an  abundant  harvest, 
and  trade  was  vastly  improved  by  the  readjustment 
of  the  land  tax  and  by  the  abolition  of  taxes  in 
kind.  In  short,  the  condition  of  the  fellah  was  sub- 
stantially bettered ;  and  when  the  fellah  is  happy, 
Egypt  prospers.  The  improvement  in  the  national 
credit  was  the  cause  of  a  great  influx  of  foreign 
capital,  chiefly  from  France,  which  was  directed 
toward  the  development  of  the  agricultural  resources 
of  the  land  and  toward  the  erection  of  buildings 
and  the  improvement  of  mechanical  appliances. 
Money  was  loaned  at  a  lower  rate  of  interest  than 
formerly,  and  as  a  consequence  the  price  of  land 
rose  rapidly.  At  the  same  time  attention  was 
roused  to  secure  the  advancement  of  the  people  by 
giving  them  better  facilities  for  education.  The 
great  Moslem  university  of  Cairo  instructed  twelve 
thousand  students  in  the  philosophy  of  the  Koran, 

^  The  Contejnporary  Revietv,  October,  1882. 


MEHEMET  TEWFIK,  KHEDIVE,  77 

but  gave  them  no  broader  education  than  the  word 
of  the  Prophet  required.  This  was  not  enough  for 
a  country  that  was  no  longer  isolated  from  the 
laws  and  learning  of  unbelievers,  as  it  had  been  for 
the  centuries  preceding.  The  actual  contact  with 
European  nations  now  made  it  necessary  to  cul- 
tivate the  learning  of  the  West.  A  commission 
was  appointed  to  secure  this  end. 

But  the  reform  and  prosperity  were  not  to  be 
without  their  hindrances.  The  Egyptians  had  had 
little  thought  for  themselves  while  their  condition 
seemed  hopeless.  Suffering,  they  were  content  to 
exist.  But  now  their  prosperity  seemed  to  arouse 
the  prejudices  of  race  and  religion  and  stirred  the 
people  to  complain  of  the  foreign  influence  and  in- 
terference in  Egypt.  And  though  the  prosperity 
was,  as  we  have  seen,  in  large  part  due  to  the 
foreign  direction,  there  was  some  natural  ground 
for  complaint.  The  people  could  not  look  without 
envy  and  jealousy  on  the  foreigners  who  were  draw- 
ing immense  salaries  from  the  Egyptian  treasury. 
Fifty  thousand  pounds  a  year  was  paid  to  European 
officials  in  the   national  debt  office  alone/     There 

'  The  following  salaries  paid  to  foreign  oflficials  in  the  different  depart- 
ments were  reported  by  Sir  Edward  Malet  to  his  government  on  May  i8, 
1882  :  Cabinet  of  the  Khedive,  ;^3,ooo  (Egyptian  pounds,  ^i  being  about 
equal  to  $5)  ;  Maieh  Sanieh,  £(i'^b  ;  Presidency  of  the  Council  of  Ministers, 
;^452  ;  Teft  of  Gizeh  and  Gizereh,  ^436  ;  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs, 
;^2,o88  ;    Ministry  of  Finance,  ^17,200  ;    General  Control,   ;^I4,I0I  ;    Di- 


'/?>       THE   CONFLICT  OF  EAST  AND   WEST  IN  EGYPT. 

might  not  have  been  complaint  if  salaries  had  gone 
solely  to  comptrollers,  commissioners,  and  judges  ; 
but  there  were,  besides,  French  or  English  officials 
to  direct  the  customs,  the  railways,  the  telegraphs, 
the  harbors  of  Alexandria,  of  Port  Said,  and  of  Suez, 
the  coast-guard,  the  light-houses,  the  post-office,  the 
finance  department  of  the  government,  the  public 
works,  and  the  administration  of  the  domain  and 
daira  lands.  In  all  these  offices,  furthermore,  the 
subordinate  positions  were  divided  almost  equally 
between  Frenchmen  and  natives.  Major  Baring 
had  been  replaced  by  Mr.  Colvin  as  English  comp- 
troller, and  M.  de  Blignieres  had  assumed  the  lead 
In  control  in  consequence  of  his  seniority  and  greater 
experience    in    Egyptian    affairs.       In    every   way 

rection  of  the  Cadastral  Survey,  £26,']^'^  ;  General  Inspection  of  the 
Octrois,  £,i,TiQ>\  Light-House  Service,  ;^  10, 239  ;  Mint,  ^^144;  Ministry 
of  War,  ;^8,35i  ;  Ministry  of  Marine,  £i,(:)f^\  ;  Ministry  of  Public  In- 
struction, ;^7,g05  ;  Administration  of  the  Wakfij,  £i,0'})W  Ministry  of  the 
Interior,  ;[^3,g78;  Government  of  Alexandria,  ^780  ;  of  Port  Said,  ;^870  ; 
of  Suez,  ^163  ;  of  El  Arish,  £%^  ;  Municipality  of  Alexandria,  ;^540  ; 
Cairo  Police,  ;^i,567  ;  Alexandria  Police,  ;^2,793  ;  Suppression  of  the 
Slave  Trade,  _;^2,052  ;  Marine  Sanitary  Council  and  Quarantine,  ;^5,2go  ; 
Council  of  Public  Health,  ;^6,o84  ;  Ministry  of  Justice,  ;^6,848  ;  Ministry 
of  Public  Works,  ;^26,2i6  ;  Railroad  Administration,  £2(^,']b\  ;  Telegraph 
Administration,  ;i^6,i93  ;  Port  of  Alexandria,  ;i^3,68i  ;  Administration  of 
Customs,  _^i6,647  ;  Administration  of  the  Port,  ;!^I9,509  ;  Postal  Steamer, 
;^i6,94i  ;  Salines,  £\ti2  ;  Administration  of  the  Public  Domain,  ;^25,042  ; 
Daira  Sanieh,  ;^I9,672  ;  Public  Debt,  £\(i,ii'j  ;  Parquet  Administration, 
;^3.o83  ;  Court  of  Appeals,  ;i^i4,97i ;  Alexandria  Court  of  the  First  In- 
stance, ;^22,344;  Court  of  the  First  Instance  at  Cairo,  £ii\,2\'i  ;  Court  of 
the  First  Instance  at  Mansurah,  ;,^8,869.     Total,  ^373, 491. 


ME  HE  MET  TEWFIK,  KHEDIVE.  79 

France  had  been  more  aggressive  than  her  ally,  and 
hers  was  now  the  leading  influence  in  Egypt.  It 
was  even  whispered  that  the  prophecy  that  the 
Mediterranean  would  one  day  be  "  a  French  lake  " 
was  destined  to  fulfillment.  French  accessions  in 
northern  Africa  encouraged  this  kind  of  talk.  But 
it  mattered  not  to  the  Egyptians  whether  French 
or  English  controlled  :  they  were  all  alike  foreign- 
ers, and  on  that  account  hated.  Both  were  bad, 
and  either  was  as  bad  as  the  other.  That  they  were 
apparently  robbing  the  natives  of  the  salaries  that 
seemed  rightfully  theirs  was  enough  to  make  the 
inborn  hatred  intense. 

The  khedive,  however,  had  more  tolerance  for  the 
foreigners  and  more  sympathy  with  the  reforms 
they  suggested.  He  believed  that  the  comptrollers 
had  the  welfare  of  Egypt  at  heart,  and  he  was  ready 
to  show  his  confidence  by  awaiting  the  development 
of  the  plans  undertaken.  This  attitude,  of  course, 
tended  to  alienate  the  khedive  from  his  people. 
Among  them  a  national  feeling  had  been  aroused. 
During  1881  this  feeling  was  crystallized  into  a  rec- 
ognized national  movement,  which  was  to  culmi- 
nate, in  1882,  in  the  cry  of  ''  Egypt  for  the  Egyp- 
tians." There  was  only  one  place  where  this  move- 
ment could  take  form,  and  that  was  in  the  army. 
Up  to  1 88 1  this  was  still  composed  almost  entirely 
of  Egyptians  ;  but  with  the  accession  of  Tewfik,  in 


80       THE   CONFLICT  OF  EAST  AND  WEST  IN  EGYPT. 

1879,  ^he  army's  grievances  had  begun.  The  sultan, 
notwithstanding  the  firman  that  Ismail  had  so  dearly 
purchased,  insisted  upon  enforcing  military  restric- 
tions. The  limit  of  enlistment  was  placed  at  18,000 
men.  Next  to  the  interference  of  France  or  Eng- 
land, that  of  the  Porte  was  most  unpopular  among 
Egyptians.  The  curtailment  of  the  army,  however, 
might  have  been  endured  ;  but  the  innovations  that 
were  beofun  with  1881  were  unbearable.  The 
special  grievance  was  the  replacement  of  native 
officers  by  Turks. 

The  leading  spirit  among  the  disaffected  troops 
was  Ahmed  Arabi  Bey.  Like  many  another  who 
has  moulded  the  destinies  of  kingdoms  and  peoples 
in  the  East,  Arabi  was  born  in  the  humblest  sur- 
roundings. His  parents  were  fellahin,  who  toiled  in 
the  wheat-fields  of  Lower  Egypt  by  day,  and  slept 
by  night  in  a  squalid  hut,  built  of  mud  and  straw. 
We  may  suppose  that  Arabi' s  boyhood  did  not  dif- 
fer materially  from  that  of  others  of  his  class.  He 
grew,  however,  to  a  stature  and  strength  that  made 
him  noticeable  among  his  fellows  ;  and  in  his  earliest 
manhood  he  was  drafted  into  the  military  service  of 
Said ;  for  the  latter,  like  the  great  king  of  Prussia, 
loved  a  man  of  fine  form.  But,  like  that  king,  he 
also  had  a  temper  that  sometimes  got  the  better  of 
his  love,  and  at  one  of  those  times  he  had  Arabi, 
for  some  slight  fault,  publicly  bastinadoed  and  dis- 


MEHEMET  TEWFIK,  KHEDIVE.  8 1 

missed  from  the  army.  The  latter  now  entered  the  uni- 
versity at  Cairo,  where  he  devoted  himself  to  the  fanat- 
ical studies  enjoined  by  his  religion  and  won  for  him- 
self a  reputation  for  learning,  piety,  and  good  morals. 
Loring  Pasha,  who  knew  him  at  that  time,  writes  : 

He  was  a  fanatic  in  his  close  attention  to  the  duties  of 
his  religion,  rigidly  following  its  superstitious  customs, 
never  neglecting  his  numerous  prayers  and  ablutions,  or  his 
attendance  at  the  mosque.  Intimate  with  the  sheiks  and 
ulemas,  he  was  always  looked  upon  as  a  pillar  of  the  faith.' 

Upon  Ismail's  accession  to  the  throne,  Arabi  re- 
entered the  army,  where  the  influence  of  his  studies 
brought  him  into  prominence.  Soon  afterward  he 
married  the  daughter  of  a  nurse  to  one  of  the 
princes,  and  this  connection  gave  him  some  acquaint- 
ance with  royal  affairs.  But  his  power  and  popu- 
larity really  had  their  beginning  in  a  secret  society 
that  was  organized  in  Cairo  after  the  close  of  the 
Abyssinian  campaign,  in  which  Arabi  had  held  the 
rank  of  lieutenant-colonel.  His  chief  coadjutor  in 
the  formation  of  this  society  was  Ali  Pasha,  and 
their  object  was  to  encourage  a  feeling  of  opposi- 
tion amonof  the  fellah  officers  to  the  condition  of 
affairs  imposed  on  Egypt  by  the  European  control. 
Arabi  had  always  been  the  friend  of  the  fellahin, 
from  whom  he  sprang  ;  and  it  was  the  desire  of  his 
life  to  secure  their  rights. 

'  W.  W.  Loring,  A  Confederate  Soldier  in  Egypt,  p.  193. 


82       THE   CONFLICT  OF  EAST  AND   WEST  IN  EGYPT. 

When  Tewfik  ascended  the  throne,  Arabi  was 
made  colonel,  and  his  influence  steadily  increased. 
In  1 88 1,  therefore,  the  disaffected  troops  looked  to 
him  as  their  natural  leader.  His  own  experience 
under  Said  gave  Arabi  a  sympathy  for  those  officers 
who  were  removed  without  cause  that  Circassians 
and  Turks  might  be  given  places,  and  he  now  be- 
came the  champion  of  those  who  had  been  thus 
wronged.  In  February,  Arabi  and  the  other  colo- 
nels demanded  the  dismissal  of  the  minister  of  war, 
a  Circassian  who  favored  the  Turks  and  hated  the 
xAirabs.  As  soon  as  the  minister  heard  of  the  de- 
mand, he  had  Arabi  and  two  colleagues  arrested  ; 
but  they  were  rescued  from  prison  by  Arabi's  regi- 
ment and  borne  off  in  triumph.  The  Circassian, 
Osman,  was  removed,  and  Mahmud  Sami  was  ap- 
pointed to  his  place.  For  some  months,  now,  the 
distrust  existing  between  the  military  party  and  the 
khedive  increased.  The  colonels  feared  assassina- 
tion, and  the  khedive  a  revolution.  The  rupture 
came  on  September  9,  in  the  so-called  "  Insurrec- 
tion of  the  Colonels."  On  the  morning  of  that 
day  Arabi  submitted  a  document  to  the  khedive, 
calling  for  the  dismissal  of  the  entire  ministry,  for 
the  drafting  of  a  constitution,  and  for  the  increase 
of  the  army  to  its  limit,  18,000  men.  On  the  after- 
noon of  the  same  day,  with  4,000  troops  and 
eighteen  cannon,  the  champion  of  the  army  marched 


MEHEMET  TEWFIK,  KHJ^DIVE.  83 

to  the  palace  to  get  the  khedive's  answer.  Arabi 
intimated  that,  if  the  demands  were  not  met,  Tew- 
fik's  successor  would  be  forthcoming.  And  still  the 
khedive  demurred  ;  but  only  for  a  time.  He  at 
length  named  a  ministry — which,  however,  was  un- 
satisfactory to  Arabi.  The  latter  demanded  that 
the  formation  of  the  cabinet  be  left  to  Sherif  Pasha. 
Sherif  was  second  only  to  Nubar  among  Egyptian 
statesmen  ;  but  he  utterly  lacked  the  latter's  firm- 
ness of  character.  This  was  to  Arabi's  liking  ;  for 
he  wanted  not  a  master,  but  a  slave.  Sherif  was, 
moreover,  a  good  Mohammedan  ;  and  he  was  there- 
fore better  liked  by  the  people  than  Nubar,  the  Ar- 
menian. The  khedive  gave  way  to  the  inevitable, 
and  on  September  14  Sherif  formed  a  new  ministry. 
The  foreign  Powers  now  awoke  to  the  apparent 
danger  of  a  still  more  formidable  insurrection.  As 
Mr.  McCarthy  rhetorically  stated  it : 

A  wondering  world  began  to  ask  whether  Arabi  Bey 
was  the  Cromwell  of  a  great  movement  against  an  Egyp-' 
tian  Charles ;  the  Garibaldi  of  a  struggle  for  national  lib- 
erty against  a  foreign  rule ;  a  scheming  political  adven- 
turer, fighting  for  his  own  hand  like  Hal  of  the  Wynd,  or 
only  a  puppet,  whose  actions  were  guided  by  mysterious 
unseen  strings.^ 

England  was  somewhat  alarmed,  but  not  to  the  ex- 
tent of  wishing  to  intervene  herself.     She  wanted 

'  Justin  McCarthy,  M.P.,  England  Under  Gladstone,  ch.  xiii. 


84      THE   CONFLICT  OF  EAST  AND   WEST  IN  EGYPT. 

Turkey  to  send  troops  to  Egypt  to  overawe  the 
spirit  of  insurrection.  But  France  would  not  con- 
sent to  any  kind  of  Turkish  intervention.  The  sul- 
tan, however,  was  not  to  be  baffled.  The  wily  Abdul 
Hamid  did  not  propose  to  let  Egypt  drift  away  from 
his  suzerainty  again  to  the  length  that  it  had  under 
Ismail.  He  may  not  have  had  any  determined 
policy.  If  he  had,  we  are  certainly  ignorant  of  it. 
We  simply  know  that  he  kept  a  jealous  guard  of  his 
authority.  From  this  time  on  there  were  intimations 
of  mysterious  signs  of  secret  correspondence,  first 
between  the  sultan  and  the  khedive,  and  afterward 
between  the  sultan  and  Arabi ;  but  the  signs  were 
almost  never  supplemented  with  proofs.  Abdul 
Hamid  did,  however,  take  some  steps  openly  that 
indicated  a  considerable  degree  of  independence. 
He  announced  on  September  20  that  he  had  decided 
to  send  an  emissary  to  Cairo.  Both  France  and 
England  protested ;  but,  notwithstanding  this,  he 
dispatched  two  emissaries,  October  3.  Two  days 
after  this  Lord  Granville,  the  English  minister  of 
foreign  affairs,  proposed  to  M.  St.  Hilaire,  who  held 
the  same  portfolio  for  France,  that  the  khedive  be 
advised  to  receive  the  envoys,  but  ''  firmly  to  oppose 
any  interference  on  their  part  in  the  internal  admin- 
istration of  Egypt."'  A  joint  note  to  this  effect  was 
sent  to  the  khedive. 

^  Quoted  from  William  Stone,  M.  A.,  Shall  We  Annex  Egypt  ? 


MEHEMET  TEWFIK,   KHEDIVE.  85 

No  sooner  had  the  envoys  arrived  in  Egypt  than 
the  feeHng  against  the  unbeHevers  began  to  show 
itself  more  openly.  It  is  thought  that  the  sultan 
sent  secret  messages  to  encourage  a  show  of  bitter- 
ness on  the  part  of  the  students  of  the  university  of 
Cairo.'  The  foreign  population  became  alarmed  at 
the  evidences  of  hatred  and  hostility.  To  reassure 
them,  and  to  protect  them  if  necessar}^  an  English 
and  a  French  vessel  were  sent  at  once  to  Alexan- 
dria. This  move  naturally  excited  the  disapproval 
of  the  sultan  ;  but  Lord  Granville  said,  through  the 
English  ambassador  at  Constantinople,  that  the  war- 
ships must  remain  at  Alexandria  so  long  as  the  en- 
voys remained  in  Egypt.  The  sultan  hastily  decided, 
therefore,  to  recall  the  envoys,  and  they  left  Egypt 
on  October  19.  Though  their  stay  had  been  short, 
they  had  succeeded  in  fomenting  the  ill-feeling 
against  England. 

It  was  known  that  France  was  occupied  with  the 
new  acquisition  of  Tunis,  and  all  attention  was 
turned  to  England  with  fear  that  she  was  bent  on 

^  This  great  university  has  always  been  the  hot-bed  of  Moslem  fanati- 
cism. When  I  arrived  in  Egypt,  two  months  after  the  emissaries  had  been 
recalled,  it  was  considered  almost  dangerous  for  foreigners  to  visit  the  uni- 
versity. A  party  of  us  went,  however,  and  suffered  no  other  indignity  than 
hisses  from  the  students  whenever  our  faces  were  turned  away.  Some  friends 
of  mine  were  less  fortunate  in  their  visit  a  few  weeks  later.  Not  only  were 
they  hissed,  but  missiles  were  thrown  at  them,  and  they  were  actually  set 
upon  and  driven  from  the  place.  The  insult  was  prompted  by  the  feeling 
that  found  vent  a  few  months  later  in  the  massacre  of  Alexandria. 


86      THE   CONFLICT  OF  EAST  AND   WEST  IN  EGYPT. 

annexation.  To  allay  this  fear  it  became  necessary 
for  the  British  government,  in  November,  to  instruct 
Sir  Edward  Malet,  her  consular  representative  in 
Egypt,  to  assure  the  khedive's  government  that  the 
British  policy  was  opposed  to  intervention  and  for- 
eign aggrandizement,  and  would  not  favor  the  sepa- 
ration of  Egypt  from  Turkey,  nor  contend  for  more 
than  the  fulfillment  of  the  sultan's  firmans  as  already 
promulgated.  It  was  declared,  however,  that  this 
policy  would  not  be  maintained  if  disorders  became 
prevalent.  This  was  a  firm  note  for  Mr.  Gladstone's 
government,  which  had  not  sought  a  control  in  the 
affairs  of  Egypt,  but  had  been  compelled,  rather,  by 
the  circumstance  of  governmental  inheritance,  to  ac- 
cept what  Disraeli  bequeathed.  The  note  had  the 
effect  of  averting  for  a  time  the  dread  of  British  occu- 
pation. The  feeling  of  security  was  still  further 
increased  by  a  joint  letter  addressed  to  the  khedive 
by  Lord  Granville  and  M.  Leon  Gambetta,  who 
had  been  called  to  the  presidency  of  the  French 
cabinet,  November  14.  Its  purpose  was  less  to 
calm  the  nationalists  than  to  strengthen  the  khe- 
dive's  government  against  the  military  party.  The 
letter  declared  that  England  and  France  considered 
the  maintenance  of  the  khedive's  power  the  sole 
guaranty  of  the  present  and  future  welfare  of  Egypt. 
Soon  after  this,  when  all  was  apparently  quiet  in 
Egypt,  I  visited  that  country,  and  was  privileged  to 


MEHEMET  TEIVFIK,  KHEDIVE.  87 

have  an  Interview  with  the  khedlve,  January  2,  1882, 
in  which  he  dwek  at  some  length  upon  the  reforms 
he  was  endeavoring  to  introduce.  He  desired  and 
was  aiming  at  three  great  reforms,  reHgious,  poHt- 
ical,  and  educational.  On  the  last  he  rightly  laid 
the  greatest  stress. 

For  [said  the  kh^dive]  while  the  people  remain  igno- 
rant, reform  in  any  direction  is  impossible  ;  but  let  learn- 
ing be  spread  among  the  people  and  throughout  the  land, 
and  political  and  religious  reform  will  follow  as  a  natural 
consequence  in  the  path  of  educational  advancement. 
For  this  reason  I  am  devoting  my  greatest  energies  to  the 
spread  of  learning.  The  people  must  know  more  than 
the  Koran  ;  they  must  know  geography  and  arithmetic 
and  algebra  and  the  sciences  and  the  modern  languages. 
All  these  pursuits  and  studies  are  now  being  advanced  ; 
schools  are  being  founded  in  all  the  large  towns  of  Egypt, 
both  Upper  and  Lower,  and  now  the  numbers  have  in- 
creased from  the  ten  or  fifteen  thousand  I  found  on  my 
accession  to  between  eighty  and  ninety  thousand  students. 
My  own  boys  attend  the  common  schools  ;  and,  though 
princes  to  the  world,  they  are  there  boys  with  the  other 
boys  and  stand  upon  no  different  footing.  Out  of  my  own 
purse  I  have  given  fifteen  thousand  pounds  a  year  to  the 
schools  since  I  came  to  the  throne.  Often,  too,  I  go  to 
the  schools  myself,  and,  if  I  say  anything,  I  point  to  the 
United  States  for  an  example.  I  say  that  its  greatness  is 
due  to  the  education  of  the  people,  to  their  enterprise,  to 
their  liberty  of  speech  and  freedom  of  thought ;  and  I 
urge  my  people  to  become  likewise  educated,  free,  and 


88       THE   CONFLICT  OF  EAST  AND   WEST  IN  EGYPT. 

great.  Another  reform  that  I  am  about  to  introduce  is 
the  education  of  women.  Heretofore  they  have  always 
been  ignorant,  more  Hke  slaves  and  animals  than  free 
women  ;  but  now  they,  too,  shall  have  their  schools,  and, 
being  educated,  they  can  be  better  mothers  to  their  sons, 
the  coming  children  of  a  new  Egypt.  Soon,  now,  one  of 
these  schools  will  be  opened  in  Cairo,  and  I  shall  send 
there  my  own  little  daughter  and  the  daughters  of  the 
nobility  of  Egypt,  and  then  the  others  will  come.  The 
women  of  enlightened  countries  are  on  an  equal  footing 
with  the  men,  and  they  must  be  here  also  ;  and  therefore 
they  must  be  educated. 

When  travelers  come  here,  I  do  not  wish  them  to  look 
upon  us  as  barbarians,  but  as  the  most  enlightened  coun- 
try of  the  Orient.  We  have  been  barbarous  in  some 
things  ;  but  of  these  I  wish  to  remove  the  last  vestige, 
and  I  have  already  abolished  some  of  the  most  atrocious 
practices  of  our  religion.  Last  year  I  put  an  end  to  that 
barbarous  ceremony  of  the  Dosseh.  Before  then  it  was 
the  custom,  when  the  yearly  pilgrims  had  returned  from 
Mecca  bearing  the  holy  carpet,  to  have  a  great  ceremony, 
most  revolting  and  barbarous.  One  hundred  men  would 
lie  prostrate  at  the  door  of  the  mosque,  with  head  toward 
Mecca,  and  over  their  bodies  would  ride  upon  a  horse  the 
sheikh  of  the  mosque.  Always  from  eighteen  to  twenty 
of  this  hundred  were  killed  under  the  feet  of  the  horse. 
Europeans  used  to  go  in  crowds  to  see  this  spectacle,  and 
then  call  it  barbarous.  It  is  true,  it  was  barbarous,  and 
was  without  authority  from  the  Bible,  the  Koran,  or  the 
Prophet ;  and  so  I  abolished  it.  People  said  a  revolution 
would  follow  ;  but  we  are  better  for  the  change. 

Another  change  that  I  am  working  for  is  to  make  my 


MEHEMET  TEWFIK,  KHAdIVE.  89 

people  content  with  one  wife.  I  have  but  one  myself, 
while  my  predecessor  (my  father)  had  many.  I  set  the 
example  I  wish  my  people  to  follow  ;  for,  thank  God,  I 
make  my  own  personal  desire  second  to  the  welfare  of 
Egypt  and  my  people.  When  the  people  tell  me  the 
Koran  says  a  man  may  have  four  wives,  I  tell  them  to 
read  further  on  in  the  same  book,  where  it  says  that  the 
man  who  is  content  with  one  wife  will  lead  a  better, 
purer,  and  happier  life.  As  it  is  now,  family  happiness  is 
impossible.  The  children  of  one  mother  are  jealous  of 
those  of  another,  and  the  man  cannot  be  the  same  husband 
to  four  wives  that  he  would  be  to  one.  The  man  and 
woman  must  be  equal,  and  live  their  lives  for  each  other  and 
their  children.  And  this,  I  say,  is  not  inconsistent  with, 
but  the  better  interpretation  of,  our  religion. 

Further,  I  desire  to  make  my  people  liberal  in  regard  to 
religious  beliefs  and  respectful  towards  Christians,  Jews, 
and  Mussulmans  alike.  They  must  not  call  the  Christian 
the  Devil,  as  they  have  heretofore  ;  but  must  respect  if 
they  do  not  believe.  I  myself  am  a  Mussulman.  I  go  to 
the  mosque  once  a  week  ;  for  although  my  father  did  not 
do  so  before  me,  I  nevertheless  said,  when  I  came  into 
power,  that  I  would  respect  my  religion  and  live  up  to  its 
teachings.  But  I  encourage  all  religions.  Here,  in  Cairo, 
I  gave  land  on  which  to  build  a  Protestant  mission,  where 
the  young  might  be  instructed  ;  also  other  land  on  which 
to  build  a  hospital,  open  to  people  of  all  religions  ;  and 
just  within  a  few  days  I  have  given  land  in  Upper  Egypt 
for  the  erection  of  another  Protestant  mission.  All  this 
I  do  without  changing  my  own  religion  or  asking  others 
to  change  theirs.  In  fact,  when  a  person  wrote  me  the 
other  day  that  he  would  like  to  change  his  religion  for 


90      THE   CONFLICT  OF  EAST  AND   WEST  IN  EGYPT. 

mine,  I  replied :  Follow  the  teachings  of  your  own  reli- 
gion and  you  will  be  good  without  any  change. 

It  is  difficult  [the  khedive  went  on,  with  a  perceptible 
sadness  in  his  voice]  for  me  to  do  all  that  I  would  like  to, 
or  give  my  people  all  that  I  desire  while  other  Powers 
have  their  hands  in  my  pockets.  Still,  I  have  decreased 
the  royal  expenses  greatly  since  I  ascended  the  throne.' 
My  allowance  is  half  a  million  dollars,  and  even  out  of 
this  I  give  considerable.  My  father  before  me  spent  be- 
tween ten  and  fifteen  millions  yearly  in  supporting  his 
five  or  six  hundred  women  and  a  palace  and  household 
that  rivaled  the  Vatican  for  size.  But  I  have  great  hopes 
for  Egypt,  and  shall  live  and  work  for  her  prosperity.' 

It  will  be  admitted  that  these  are  views  of  an  en- 
lightened ruler,  even  though  subsequent  events  may 
have  proved  him  a  weak  one.  The  khedive's  prime 
minister,  Sherif  Pasha,  said  at  the  same  time  : 

Give  us  time  for  our  reforms  ;  let  us  have  ten  years  of 
peaceful  toiling,  and  Europe  will  be  astonished  at  the 
vitality  of  a  long-suffering  nation,  at  the  prosperity  and 
wealth,  the  progress  and  rapid  development  of  a  country 
so  long  misgoverned,  and  for  ages  kept  in  ignorance  and 
in  the  bondage  of  servitude." 

But  there  were  so  many  disturbing  elements  in 
the  condition  of  affairs  in  Egypt  that  the  dream  of 
''years  of  peaceful  toiling"  was  as  vain  as  it  was 
impossible  of  realization. 

'  These  utterances  of  the  khedive  were  published  in  an  article  of  mine  in 
The  Independent,  February  2,  1882. 

•  Quoted  from  The  Belgium  of  the  East,  p.  138. 


V. 


EGYPT    FOR    THE    EGYPTIANS. 

JANUARY  4,  1882,  Arabi  Bey  was  taken  into 
the  cabinet  as  assistant  minister  of  war.  Just 
before  this  the  chamber  of  notables,  strongly- 
representative  of  the  national  party,  had  convened 
on  the  summons  of  Sherif  Pasha.  Sherif  at  once 
proposed  a  parliamentary  reorganization,  wishing  to 
introduce  the  principle  of  ministerial  responsibility, 
and  gave  the  notables  full  constitutional  preroga- 
tives. They  were  to  be  no  longer  the  mere  consulta- 
tive body  that  Ismail  organized  with  his  false  show 
of  reform.  The  notables  had  outgrown  their  former 
pious  regard  for  the  will  of  the  khedive,  and  were 
not  only  willing  to  accept  all  that  Sherif  offered, 
but  demanded  in  addition  that  the  budget  be  sub- 
mitted to  them.  This  met  with  a  quick  opposition 
on  the  part  of  the  comptrollers-general.  The  two 
Powers  vetoed,  January  7,  the  demand  for  con- 
stitutional government.  Arabi  and  the  nationalists 
were  incensed.  They  longed  for  constitutional 
liberty  and  knew  not  that  it  appears  only  as  the 

91 


92       THE   CONFLICT  OF  EAST  AND   WEST  IN  EGYPT. 

result  of  a  slow  Internal  growth,  of  which  the  germ 
had  as  yet  barely  taken  root  in  Egypt.  Outside 
of  the  Copts,  the  Christian  Syrians,  and  the  mer- 
chants of  Cairo  and  Alexandria,  there  were  few  men 
in  Egypt  who  had  the  faintest  conception  of  what 
was  meant  by  constitutional  liberty.  The  Porte, 
however,  not  to  neglect  an  opportunity  to  show  its 
suzerainty,  protested  against  the  veto  and  appealed 
to  the  other  Powers.  Gambettawas  eaeerto  make 
the  most  of  the  complications,  and  proposed  to 
England  that  they  should  dispatch  a  joint  expedi- 
tion to  Egypt  to  re-establish  order.  England  re- 
fused, and  Gambetta's  aggressiveness  was  cut  short 
by  the  defeat  of  his  ministry.  He  was  succeeded 
by  de  Freycinet,  whose  policy  was  diametrically 
opposed  to  Gambetta's.  The  new  minister  was  for 
non-interference.  He  replaced  the  zealous  de 
Blignieres  by  M.  Bredif,  thus  giving  England's 
representative  in  the  control  the  predominance  that 
goes  with  seniority. 

While  now  the  western  Powers  were  occupied 
with  diplomatic  negotiations  with  the  Porte,  the 
chamber  of  notables  submitted  an  alternative  to 
Sherif  Pasha  :  either  he  must  accept  their  constitu- 
tional demands  or  resign  from  the  ministry.  He 
resigned,  and  Mahmud  Barudi  formed  a  new 
cabinet  with  Arabi  Bey  as  minister  of  war  and 
marine.     The  military  party  now    took  the    lead. 


EGYPT  FOR  THE  EGYPTIANS.  93 

ArabI  and  six  other  colonels  were  promoted  to  the 
rank  of  general,  with  the  title  of  pasha.  Some  five 
hundred  promotions  were  made  during  three 
months.  At  the  same  time  many  European  clerks 
were  dismissed  from  their  offices.  Arabi's  popu- 
larity, meanwhile,  was  steadily  increasing.  In 
April  he  claimed  to  have  discovered  a  plot  to  as- 
sassinate himself  and  other  generals.  Some  fifty 
officers,  many  of  them  the  still  unpopular  Circas- 
sians, and  all  of  them  believed  to  be  loyal  to  the 
khedive,  were  arrested  and  tried  by  court-martial, 
and  forty  were  sentenced  to  be  banished  for  life 
to  the  White  Nile — a  sentence  considered  equiva- 
lent to  death.  This  produced  an  agitation.  The 
foreign  consuls  protested  ;  the  sultan  was  furious 
that  the  Circassians  whom  he  had  himself  deco- 
rated with  favors  should  be  thus  dishonored  ;  and 
the  khedive  refused  to  give  the  sentence  his  sig- 
nature. Finally,  however,  he  commuted  the  sen- 
tence to  exile  from  Egypt.  But  this  displeased 
his  nationalist  ministry,  who,  on  the  14th  of  May, 
convoked  the  chamber  of  notables  without  the  con- 
sent of  the  khedive.  The  notables,  however,  re- 
fused to  sit.  At  this  juncture  England  and  France, 
who  had  reconciled  their  differences,  gave  notice  to 
the  Powers  that  they  were  about  to  send  a  joint 
fleet  to  Alexandria  to  uphold  the  authority  of  the 
khedive  and  preserve    the  status  quo.       And  the 


94      THE   CONFLICT  OF  EAST  AND  WEST  IN  EGYPT, 

sultan,  who  slyly  sought  to  ride  on  the  crest  of 
every  wave,  sent  a  note  to  the  Egyptian  ministry, 
chiding  them  for  summoning  the  chamber  uncon- 
stitutionally and  rebuking  them  for  their  threat  to 
oppose  with  force  the  landing  of  Turkish  troops  in 
Egypt.  This  was  considered  by  the  Powers  an  ir- 
regular communication  on  the  part  of  the  Porte. 
But  the  wily  sultan  was  to  be  charged  with  still 
more  irregular  notes.  His  alleged  secret  corre- 
spondence from  this  time  on  is  believed  to  have 
concealed  many  plots  and  intrigues. 

On  the  20th  of  May  the  united  English  and 
French  squadrons  appeared  in  the  harbor  of  Alex- 
andria. Five  days  later  the  English  and  French 
consuls  demanded  the  dismissal  of  the  ministry  and 
the  expatriation  of  Arabi.  The  ministers  forthwith 
handed  in  their  resignations  ;  but  Arabi  declared 
that  he  would  remain  at  the  head  of  the  army.  In 
the  meantime  the  fortifications  about  Alexandria 
were  increased  and  the  harbor  was  put  in  a  state  of 
defence.  The  guards  at  Cairo  swore  to  oppose 
with  force  any  foreign  intervention  ;  and  the  sheikhs 
and  Bedawin  of  the  desert  promised  their  support 
against  European,  but  not  against  Turkish,  inter- 
vention. Lord  Dufferin,  the  English  ambassador 
at  Constantinople,  naively  informed  the  sultan  that, 
as  the  Porte's  authority  had  never  been  called  into 
question,  it  would   not   be   necessary  for   Turkish 


EGYPT  FOR  THE  EGYPTIANS.  95 

troops  to  co-operate  to  quell  the  fractious  spirit; 
England  and  France  would  be  quite  equal  to  the 
task.  The  poor  khedive,  from  the  day  he  dismissed 
the  ministry,  was  beset  with  trials  and  torments. 
He  could  not  form  a  new  ministry,  and  the  utmost  in- 
fluence was  brought  to  bear  to  force  him  to  reinstate 
Arabi  as  minister  of  war.  The  commanders  of  the 
Alexandria  fortification  said  they  would  obey  the 
orders  of  no  one  but  Arabi.  Notables,  sheikhs, 
ulemas,  officers,  urged  and  even  demanded  the  rein- 
statement. At  length  Tewfik  was  forced  to  give 
way.  The  sultan  telegraphed  that  he  would  send  a 
commissioner  to  Egypt  to  investigate  the  troubles. 
France  objected  strenuously  to  his  coming,  but 
England  and  the  other  Powers  thought  that  he 
might  avert  the  impending  danger.  England,  how- 
ever, continued  to  oppose  any  military  expedition 
from  Turkey.  De  Freycinet  felt  that  France  had 
been  left  in  the  lurch,  and  proposed  that  a  confer- 
ence of  all  the  Powers  be  held  at  Constantinople  to 
settle  the  Egyptian  question  definitely.  But  in  the 
meantime  the  sultan  had  dispatched  Dervish  Pasha 
to  Egypt  to  lend  support,  as  he  announced,  to  the 
khedive. 

The  commissioner  arrived  on  the  8th  of  June. 
His  presence  had  no  quieting  effect.  Arabi  was 
the  only  minister  who  had  been  appointed ;  and  he 
was,  in  fact,  the  hero  and  the  autocrat  of  the  hour. 


96      THE   CONFLICT  OF  EAST  AND  WEST  IN  EGYPT. 

But,  through  the  influence  of  Dervish,  a  ministry- 
was  formed  favorable  to  the  khedive,  with  Ragheb 
as  president.  It  was,  however,  powerless  to  still 
the  tumult  of  passion  that  had  been  aroused  in 
Egypt  during  the  past  few  months.  Hatred  of  the 
Christians  was  shouted  through  the  streets.'  The 
people  who  had  cowered  before  the  kurbash  during 
all  the  woes  of  Ismail's  reign,  who  had  seen  the 
wealth  of  the  Nile  valley  melt  away  before  their 
eyes  year  after  year,  who  had  abjectly  begged  for 
backsheesh  from  every  stranger  in  their  land,  now 
sprang  to  a  position  of  independence  and  defiance. 
Fanaticism  was  burning  to  its  utmost  intensity.  It 
became  a  flame  of  fury  on  the  nth  of  June,  in  the 
massacre  at  Alexandria. 

Just  what  the  immediate  cause  of  that  outbreak 
was,  is  a  disputed  point.  It  is  claimed,  on  the  one 
hand,  that  it  began  by  a  Maltese  stabbing  an  Arab  ; 
and,  on  the  other,  that  the  massacre  was  precon- 
certed, being  countenanced  by  Arabi  himself.  Colo- 
nel Long,  who  was  in  Cairo  at  the  time,  says  ""  that  a 
secret  council  was  held  in  that  city  on  the  evening 
before  the  massacre,  which  Arabi  and  several  of  the 
notables  attended.  One  of  the  number,  who  had 
openly  preached  the  duty  of  massacre  in  the  mosques 
of  Alexandria,  arrived  in  that  city  before  the  hour 
of  the  slaughter.     The  troops  at  Alexandria,  who 

^  Col.  thaille  Long,  The  Three  Prophets,  p.  119.     '  Ibid.,  p.  120. 


EGYPT  FOR  THE  EGYPTIANS.  97 

had  proclaimed  that  they  would  obey  the  orders  of 
no  one  but  ArabI,  turned  their  bayonets  against  the 
Europeans  and  aided  the  Arabs  in  the  massacre. 
The  police  joined  the  same  mad  throng.  These 
facts  would  seem  to  point  toward  complicity  on  the 
part  of  Arabi.  The  massacre  was  as  horrible  in  its 
way  as  the  massacre  of  the  memluks  in  i8i  i,  or  the 
Syrian  massacre  of  i860.  The  Oriental  is  frenzied 
at  the  sight  of  blood  and  impelled  to  the  m.ost  atro- 
cious crimes.  His  fury  does  not  spend  itself  ;  it  is 
only  checked  when  the  opportunity  of  bloodshed  Is 
exhausted  or  some  force  interposed.  The  Maltese, 
the  Greeks,  and  other  Europeans  banded  together 
and  offered,  at  last,  an  effectual  resistance  ;  but  not 
before  about  a  hundred  of  their  number  had  been 
butchered,  and  some  five  hundred  Arabs  had  been 
killed. 

Abuse  was  heaped  upon  the  English  and  French 
admirals,  who  had  offered  no  assistance  to  the  Euro- 
peans of  Alexandria,  although  they  had  witnessed 
the  outrages  and  had  sufficient  force  on  the  ships, 
within  sight,  to  quell  the  disturbance.  Their  boats 
were  ready  to  land  the  marines,  but  the  admirals 
could  not  act  without  orders  from  their  governments. 
So  they  said,  at  least ;  but  they  might  as  well  have 
claimed  that  they  should  not  take  In  sail  at  the  ap- 
proach of  a  hurricane  except  by  governmental  sanc- 
tion.    As    Colonel  Long  says  :  *'  It  is  difficult  to 


98       THE   CONFLICT  OF  EAST  AND  WEST  IN  EGYPT. 

understand  the  hesitancy  of  an  officer  to  assume  re- 
sponsibiHty,  however  great,  in  the  presence  of  a 
great  crime  Hke  this  committed  against  humanity."  ' 
The  massacre  created,  naturally,  a  panic  among 
the  Europeans  in  Egypt.  They  fled  from  Cairo  to 
Alexandria,  and  from  Alexandria  they  took  passage 
in  any  craft  that  would  bear  them  from  the  scene  of 
crime  and  the  seat  of  danger.  It  was  a  stampede 
for  life,  with  no  thought  of  the  property  forsaken. 
The  khedive,  accompanied  by  Dervish  Pasha,  went 
to  Alexandria,  June  13,  to  endeavor  to  restore  quiet 
by  his  presence.  He  formed  a  new  ministry  at  the 
dictation  of  the  German  and  Austrian  consuls,  June 
16,  giving  Arabi  his  old  place  as  minister  of  war, 
and  retaining  Ragheb  as  president  of  the  council. 
But  England  and  France  refused  to  recognize  the 
ministry.  The  khedive  was  in  despair.  His  depart- 
ure from  Cairo  had  left  Arabi  virtual  ruler  there. 
The  latter  was  at  the  high  tide  of  his  power.  The 
sultan,  immediately  after  the  massacre,  had  conferred 
a  great  honor  upon  him  by  investing  him  with  the 
order  of  the  Medjidieh.  Dervish  Pasha,  the  sultan's 
representative,  was  believed  to  be  working  in  his  be- 
half, and  to  be  fomenting  rebellion.  Arabi  said  him- 
self when,  months  later,  his  power  was  gone  : 

The  Sultan,  the  real  sovereign  of  this  country,  also 
sided  with  us  and  loaded  us  with  marks  of  his  approba- 

'  The  Three  Prophets,  p.  129. 


EGYPT  FOR  THE  EGYPTIANS,  99 

tion.  His  representative  concurred  in  our  resistance,  and 
his  trusted  officers  exhorted  us  to  defend  the  country 
from  what  they  termed  the  rapacity  of  England.  The 
opening  acts  of  the  war  were  carried  on  in  his  name/ 

So  far  back  as  February,  the  chaplain  to  the  sul- 
tan had  written  to  Arabi :  ''  In  a  special  and  secret 
manner  I  may  tell  you  that  the  Sultan  has  no  confi- 
dence in  Ismail,  Halim,  or  Tewfik.  ...  His  Majes- 
ty has  expressed  his  full  confidence  in  you."  ^  During 
the  flight  of  the  Europeans,  Arabi  was  sounding  his 
cry  of  ''  Egypt  for  the  Egyptians,"  and  was  exercis- 
ing the  utmost  activity  possible  in  military  prepara- 
tions. The  warlike  spirit  had  spread  throughout  the 
country,  and  recruits  and  money  were  pouring  in. 
Work  on  the  fortifications  at  Alexandria  was  pushed 
with  renewed  vigor. 

Meanwhile  the  conference  of  Powers  had  met  at 
Constantinople,  June  23  ;  but  nothing  had  been 
accomplished.  The  Porte  would  not  commit  itself 
to  policy  or  to  action.  It  is  probable,  however, 
that  it  contemplated  the  restoration  of  all  its  old 
power  in  Egypt.  England,  at  all  events,  feared 
this.  The  possibility  of  such  a  thing  was  a  menace 
to  the  Indian  empire.  While,  therefore,  the  con- 
ference was  slowly  seeking  a  solution  of  difficulties, 

^  Ahmed  Arabi,  Instructions  to  my  Counsel,  in  The  Nineteenth  Century^ 
December,  1882. 

'  Quoted  from  Arabi's  papers  in  Broadley's  How  We  Defended  Arabi, 
pp.  169  and  170. 


lOO    THE   CONFLICT  OF  EAST  AND  WEST  IN  EGYPT. 

England  resolved  to  take  decisive  action  ;  not  so 
much,  as  has  been  held  by  some,  to  mete  out 
punishment  for  the  Alexandrian  massacre  as  to 
protect  her  interests  in  Egypt  and  the  farther  East. 
But,  whatever  her  motives,  she  acted  in  the  service 
of  the  world's  civilization  when  she  set  her  face 
against  the  restoration  of  the  sultan's  power  in 
Egypt. 

On  the  6th  of  July,  Sir  Beauchamp  Seymour,  the 
admiral  of  the  British  fleet  at  Alexandria,  protested 
against  the  continued  work  on  the  fortifications 
about  the  harbor,  and  announced  to  the  military 
governor,  Tulba,  that  unless  the  work  ceased  he 
would  open  fire  upon  the  fortresses.  Tulba  replied 
that  the  admiral's  assertions  as  to  the  work  of 
fortifying  were  unfounded.  But  electric  lights 
from  the  British  vessels  discovered  the  Egyptian 
soldiers  hard  at  work  by  night.  July  lo.  Admiral 
Seymour  sent  a  second  message  : 

I  shall  carry  out  the  intention  expressed  to  you  in  my 
letter  of  the  6th  inst.,  at  sunrise  to-morrow,  the  nth  inst., 
unless,  previous  to  that  hour,  you  shall  have  temporarily 
surrendered  to  me,  for  the  purpose  of  disarming  the  bat- 
teries on  the  isthmus  of  Ras-el-Tin  and  the  southern 
shore  of  the  harbor  of  Alexandria. 

The  khedive's  prime  minister  replied  to  this,  re- 
fusing to  comply  with  the  admiral's  demands ; 
whereupon  the  latter  sent  a  brief  message  contain- 


EGYPT  FOR  THE  EGYPTIANS.  lOI 

ing  the  implication  that  his  threat  would  be  carried 
out.  These  messages  had  not  been  exchanged 
without  creating  great  alarm  among  the  Europeans 
who  still  remained  in  Egypt.  The  consuls  ap- 
pealed to  the  admiral  for  delay  and  sought  to 
mediate,  and  the  Porte,  through  its  London  am- 
bassador, demanded  that  the  bombardment  be 
interdicted ;  but  the  admiral's  determination  re- 
mained unaltered.  Endeavors  were  now  made  to 
put  all  remaining  foreigners  on  shipboard.  Many 
had  lingered  in  Cairo,  loth  to  leave  their  posts  or 
their  property.  The  notice  given  them  was  short 
— so  short  that  Admiral  Seymour  has  been  bitterly 
blamed  for  his  haste.'  The  impending  bombard- 
ment, it  was  known,  would  be  avenged  on  any 
unfortunate  foreigners  who  might  thereafter  fall 
into  Arab  hands. 

Late  on  the  afternoon  of  July  lo,  all  the  vessels 
in  the  Alexandrian  harbor,  except  the  British  fleet, 
weighed  anchor  and  passed  out  to  sea,  their  decks 
swarming  with  refugees  of  many  nationalities. 
The  French  fleet  was  among  the  departing  ships. 
If  a  Gambetta  had  been  premier  of  the  French 
government.  Admiral  Conrad  would  have  remained. 
He  would  have  insisted  upon  joint  action  or  joint 
inaction.     But  de  Freycinet  was  weak.     After  see- 

^  Vide  Stone  Pasha's  Introduction  to  Fanny  Stone's  Diary,  in  The 
Century  Magazine,  June,  1884. 


102    THE   CONFLICT  OF  EAST  AND  WEST  IN  EGYPT. 

ing  the  disfavor  with  which  France  had  suffered 
intervention  in  Tunis,  he  feared  to  sanction  inter- 
vention in  Egypt.  And  so  Admiral  Conrad  and 
his  fleet  sailed  away  ;  and  France,  as  the  sequel 
has  shown,  passed  from  a  controlling  power  in 
Egypt. 

The  story  of  the  bombardment  of  Alexandria, 
from  a  military  point  of  view,  is  best  told  from  the 
official  reports'  of  Admiral  Seymour.  Rewrote 
the  following  from  his  flagship  Invincible,  July  20 : 

At  7  A.M.,  on  the  nth,  I  signalled  from  the  Invincible 
to  the  Alexandria  to  fire  a  shell  into  the  recently  armed 
earthworks,  termed  the  Hospital  Battery,  and  followed 
this  by  a  general  signal  to  the  fleet,  '^  Attack  the  enemy's 
batteries !  "  when  immediate  action  ensued  between  all 
the  ships  in  the  positions  assigned  to  them,  and  the  whole 
of  the  forts  commanding  the  entrance  to  the  harbor  of 
Alexandria.  A  steady  fire  was  maintained  on  all  sides 
until  10.30  A.M.,  when  the  Sultan,  Superb,  and  Alexa?idria, 
which  had  been  hitherto  under  way,  anchored  off  the 
Light-House  Fort,  and  by  their  well-directed  fire,  assisted 
by  that  of  the  Inflexible,  which  weighed  and  joined  them 
at  12.30  P.M.,  succeeded  in  silencing  most  of  the  guns  in 
the  forts  on  Ras-el-Tin  ;  still  some  heavy  guns  in  Fort 
Ada  kept  up  a  desultory  fire.  About  1.30  P.M.,  a  shell 
from  the  Superb,  whose  practice  in  the  afternoon  was  very 

'  These  official  reports,  as  well  as  detailed  descriptions  of  the  defences 
of  Alexandria  and  of  the  attacking  fleet,  and  statements  of  the  effect  of  the 
fight  upon  ships  and  fortifications,  are  given  by  Lieutenant-Commander 
Casper  F.  Goodrich,  of  the  U.  S.  Navy,  in  his  Report  of  the  British  Naval 
and  Military  Operations  in  Egypt. 


EGYPT  FOR  THE  EGYPTIANS.  IO3 

good,  blew  up  the  magazine  and  caused  the  retreat  of  the 
remaining  garrison.  These  ships  then  directed  their  at- 
tention to  Fort  Pharos,  which  was  silenced  with  the 
assistance  of  the  Temeraire^  which  joined  them  at  2.30 
P.M.,  when  a  shot  from  the  Inflexible  dismounted  one  of 
the  heavy  guns.  The  Hospital  Battery  was  well  fought 
throughout ;  and,  although  silenced  for  a  time  by  a  shell 
from  the  Inflexible^  it  was  not  until  5  P.M.  that  the  artil- 
lerymen were  compelled  to  retire  from  their  guns  by  the 
fire  of  the  off-shore  squadron  and  the  Inflexible.  The  In- 
vifzcible,  with  my  flag,  supported  by  the  Penelope,  both 
ships  being  at  anchor,  the  latter  on  one  occasion  shifting 
berth,  and  assisted  by  the  Monarch,  under  way  inside  the 
reefs,  as  well  as  by  the  Inflexible  and  Temeraire  in  the 
Boghaz  and  Corvette  Channels,  succeeded,  after  an  en- 
gagement of  some  hours,  in  silencing  and  partially  destroy- 
ing the  batteries  and  lines  of  Mex.  Fort  Marsa-el-Khanat 
was  destroyed  by  the  explosion  of  the  magazine  after  half 
an  hour's  action  with  the  Monarch. 

About  2  P.M.,  seeing  that  the  gunners  of  the  western 
lower  battery  of  Mex  had  abandoned  their  guns,  and  that 
the  supporters  had  probably  retired  to  the  citadel,  I  called 
in  the  gun-vessels  and  gun-boats,  and  under  cover  of  their 
fire  landed  a  party  of  twelve  volunteers,  under  the  com- 
mand of  Lieut.  B.  R.  Bradford,  of  the  Invincible,  accom- 
panied by  Lieut.  Richard  Poore,  of  that  ship,  .  .  . 
[and  three  others]  .  .  .  who  got  on  shore  through  the 
surf,  and  destroyed,  with  charges  of  gun-cotton,  two  10- 
inch  M.  L.  R.  guns,  and  spiked  six  smooth-bore  guns  in 
the  right-hand  water  battery  at  Mex,  and  returned  with- 
out a  casualty  beyond  the  loss  of  one  of  their  boats 
{Bittern  s  dingy)  on    the    rocks.     This  was   a  hazardous 


104    ^^^   CONFLICT  OF  EAST  AND   WEST  IN  EGYPT, 

operation  very  well  carried  out.  Previous  to  this,  after 
the  action  had  become  general,  Commander  Lord  Charles 
Beresford,  of  the  Condor ,  stationed  as  repeating  ship,  see- 
ing the  accuracy  with  which  two  lo-inch  rifled  guns  in 
Fort  Marabout  were  playing  upon  the  ships  engaged  off 
Fort  Mex,  steamed  up  to  within  range  of  his  /-inch  90 
cwt.  gun,  and  by  his  excellent  practice  soon  drew  off  the 
fire.  I  then  ordered  him  to  be  supported  by  the  Beacon^ 
Bittern,  Cygnet,  and  Decoy,  the  Cygnet  having  been  en- 
gaged with  the  Ras-el-Tin  forts  during  the  early  part  of 
the  day.  I  am  happy  to  say,  during  the  action,  no  casu- 
alties happened  to  those  vessels,  owing,  in  a  great  measure, 
to  the  able  manner  in  which  they  were  manoeuvred,  and 
their  light  draught  enabling  them  to  take  up  their  posi- 
tions on  the  weakest  point  of  the  batteries.  The  action 
generally  terminated  successfully  at  5.30  P.M.,  when  the 
ships  anchored  for  the  night. 

The  force  opposed  to  us  would  have  been  more  formida- 
ble had  every  gun  mounted  on  the  line  of  works  been 
brought  into  action  ;  but  in  the  Ras-el-Tin  batteries,  few 
of  the  large  smooth-bores,  and  fewer  still  of  the  French 
36-pounders,  bought  in  the  time  of  Mehemet  Ali,  were 
manned,  the  Egyptians  preferring  to  use  the  English 
lO-inch,  9-inch,  8-inch,  and  smaller  muzzle-loading  rifled 
guns.  These  guns  are  precisely  the  same  as  those  which 
her  Majesty's  ships  carry,  and  no  better  muzzle-loading 
guns  can  be  found.  They  were  abundantly,  even  lavishly, 
supplied  with  projectiles  of  the  latest  description,  chilled 
shot,  and  the  sighting  of  the  guns  was  excellent.  The 
same  may  be  said  of  the  guns  in  the  Mex  Lines,  except- 
ing that  in  them  the  36-pounders  were  more  used,  and  that 
one,  if  not  two,  15-inch  smooth-bores  were  brought  into 


EGYPT  FOR  THE  EGYPTIANS.  I05 

action,  in  addition  to  the  lo-inch,  9.inch,  and  smaller 
M.  L.  R.  gu-ns  fired.  Fort  Marabout  brought  two  lo-inch 
M.  L.  R.  guns  into  action  at  long  range,  shell  after  shell 
of  which  came  up  toward  the  in-shore  squadron  in  an  ex- 
cellent line,  falling  from  ten  to  thirty  yards  short.  Not 
one  shell  from  the  guns  in  the  southern  batteries  burst  on 
board  her  Majesty's  ships  during  the  day. 

Though  the  Arabs'  shells  failed,  their  other  shot 
took  effect.  The  Alexandria  was  struck  twenty- 
five  times,  and  the  Inviiicible  was  pierced  by  six 
shots.  The  shells  from  the  ships  burst,  many  of 
them,  over  or  in  the  city,  destroying  much  property. 
The  English  loss  for  the  day  was  six  killed  and 
twenty-seven  wounded.  The  Arab  loss  was  much 
greater.  At  least  one  hundred,  and  fifty  men  In  the 
forts  were  killed  ;  but  trustworthy  Information  as  to 
their  casualties  Is  wanting.  The  Arabs  stood  by 
their  guns  with  an  undreamed-of  courage  ;  for  the 
forts  were  not  silenced  till  the  gunners  had  been 
killed.  On  the  12th  of  July  the  firing  was  resumed. 
Admiral  Seymour  said.  In  his  dispatch  : 

On  the  morning  of  the  1 2th  I  ordered  the  Temeraire 
and  Inflexible  to  engage  Fort  Pharos,  and  after  two  or 
three  shots  had  been  fired  a  flag  of  truce  was  hoisted  on 
Fort  Ras-el-Tin,  and  I  then  sent  my  flag  lieutenant,  the 
Honorable  Hedworth  Lambton,  in  to  discover  the  reason, 
and,  from  his  report,  there  is  no  doubt  it  was  simply  a 
ruse  to  gain  time  ;  and,  as  negotiations  failed,  my  demand 
being  to  surrender  the  batteries  commanding  the  Boghaz 
Channel,  one  shot  was  fired  into  the  Mex  Barracks  Bat- 


I06    THE   CONFLICT  OF  EAST  AND   WEST  IN  EGYPT. 

tery  earthwork,  when  a  flag  of  truce  was  again  hoisted, 
I  then  sent  Lieutenant  and  Commander  Morrison  into 
the  harbor,  in  the  Helicon,  and  on  his  going  on  board  the 
kh^dive's  yacht,  the  Mahrussa,  he  found  she  had  been 
deserted,  and  he  reported,  on  his  return  after  dark,  his 
behef  that  the  town  had  been  evacuated. 

Such,  indeed,  was  the  fact.  Arabi  had  gone,  but 
the  khedive  had  remained.  The  khedive  had  pre- 
sided at  a  cabinet  council,  held  at  Ras-el-Tin,  on 
the  morning  of  the  loth,  and  had  given  his  sanc- 
tion to  the  proposed  defence  of  the  city.  That 
evening,  accompanied  by  Dervish  Pasha  and  his 
immediate  household,  he  retired  to  the  palace  of 
Ramleh,  where  he  remained  during  the  bombard- 
ment. On  the  afternoon  of  the  12th  he  sent  to 
Admiral  Seymour,  imploring  his  protection.  Arabi 
claimed  that  by  this  act  the  khedive  basely  deserted 
his  people.  But  Tewfik  feared  for  his  life.  A 
band  of  soldiers  had  sought  entrance  to  the  palace, 
asserting  that  they  had  Arabics  instructions  to 
murder  the  khedive.  Arabi  is  said  to  have  coun- 
termanded this  order  and  to  have  stationed  a  guard 
about  the  palace,  when  he  determined  to  evacuate 
the  city.  Another  story  states  that  Tewfik  bought 
his  life  with  bribes  and  orders  of  distinction.  At 
all  events  the  trembling  Tewfik  remained  at  Ramleh 
while  Arabi  withdrew  his  forces  and  his  followers 
along  the  Mahmudieh  canal. 


EGYPT  FOR  THE  EGYPTIANS.  \OJ 

And  now  the  fair  city  of  Alexandria  became 
such  a  scene  of  pillage,  massacre,  and  wanton  de- 
struction as  to  make  the  world  shudder.  It  was 
the  old  tale  of  horrors.  Houses  were  plundered 
and  burned  ;  the  European  quarter,  including  the 
stately  buildings  surrounding  the  Great  Square  of 
Mehemet  AH,  was  sacked  and  left  a  heap  of  smol- 
dering ruins  ;  and  more  than  two  thousand  Euro- 
peans, for  the  most  part  Levantines,  were  massacred 
with  all  the  cruelty  of  oriental  fanaticism.  This 
was  on  the  afternoon  of  the  1 2th.  It  was  the  second 
massacre  that  had  occurred  under  the  very  eyes  of 
the  British  fleet.  The  admiral's  failure  to  prevent 
it  has  been  called  unfortunate  by  some  and  criminal 
by  others.  It  seems  to  have  been  wholly  without 
excuse.  The  most  plausible  palliation  of  the  neglect 
is  found  in  Lieutenant-Commander  Goodrich's 
*'  Report,"  but  even  that  carries  its  blame.  He 
says  (page  75)  : 

A  few  hundred  men  could  have  seized  and  held  the 
place  on  July  12th,  so  great  was  the  fear  on  the  part  of 
the  Egyptians,  both  soldiers  and  citizens,  caused  by  the 
bombardment — a  fear  not  known,  at  the  time,  to  the 
British  Commander-in-chief.  In  consequence  of  the  lack 
of  information,  this  memorable  battle  was  followed  by 
one  of  the  most  shocking,  wanton,  and  deplorable  catas- 
trophes of  the  century. 

The  blue-jackets  were  landed  on  the   13th,  and 


I08    THE   CONFLICT  OF  EAST  AND   WEST  IN  EGYPT. 

cleared  the  way  before  them  with  a  GatHng  gun. 
The  next  day,  more  ships  having  arrived,  a  suffi- 
cient force  was  landed  to  take  possession  of  the 
entire  city.  The  khedive  was  escorted  back  to 
Ras-el-Tin  from  Ramleh,  and  given  a  strong  guard. 
Summary  justice  was  dealt  out  to  all  hostile  Arabs 
who  had  been  captured  in  the  city.  In  short, 
English  intervention  was  followed  by  English 
occupation. 

The  bombardment  of  Alexandria  had  defined 
clearly  the  respective  positions  of  Arabi  and  the 
khedive  toward  Egypt  and  the  Egyptian  people. 
The  soldiers  and  the  sympathy  of  the  land  were 
with  Arabi.  His  cry  was,  "  Egypt  for  the  Egyp- 
tians," and  these  words  embodied  everything  that, 
was  held  dear  and  sacred  by  the  people.  The  khe- 
dive was  not  only  weak  in  the  eyes  of  his  people, 
but  he  was  regarded  as  the  tool  of  England.  He 
had  deserted  his  soldiers  and  fallen  on  his  knees  to 
beg  the  protection  of  unbelievers.  From  the  mo- 
ment the  first  shot  was  fired  upon  Alexandria, 
Arabi  was  the  real  ruler  of  the  people.  But  Eng- 
land could  never  suffer  Egypt  to  exist  solely  **  for 
the  Egyptians."  With  France,  she  had  placed 
Tewfik  on  the  throne  to  protect  the  interests  of 
her  bondholders,  and  to  secure  her  power  in  and 
over  the  country  alongside  of  which  flowed  the 
chiefest  artery  of  her  commercial  life.     Her  duty 


EGYPT  FOR  THE  EGYPTIANS,  I09 

and  her  interest  compelled  the  re-establishment  of 
Tewfik's  power.  He  was  the  nominal  ruler,  and 
must  once  more  be  made  so  in  fact.  If  Arabi 
refused  to  end  his  preparations  for  war  at  the 
bidding  of  the  khedive,  and  persisted  in  opposing 
the  defenders  of  the  khedive,  then  he  was  a  rebel 
and  the  leader  of  rebellion,  and  he  must  be  com- 
pelled by  force  to  submit.  Such  was  the  reasoning 
that  led  England  to  play  the  role  of  the  khedive's 
defender  and  to  prepare  for  a  war  in  Egypt. 

The  conference  at  Constantinople  was  stirred  by 
the  news  of  the  bombardment  of  Alexandria.  It 
presented  a  note  to  the  Porte,  July  15,  requesting 
the  dispatch  of  Turkish  troops  to  restore  the  status 
quo  in  Egypt.  But  the  sultan  had  no  idea  of  taking 
the  part  of  the  Christian  in  what  all  Islam  regarded 
as  a  contest  between  the  Moslem  and  the  unbe- 
liever. Arabi  had  called  himself  the  defender  of 
the  faith.  He  and  his  followers  were  the  soldiers  of 
the  Prophet.  The  ulemas  and  dignitaries  of  the 
mosques  of  Stambul  advised  the  sultan  not  to  risk 
his  caliphate  by  opposing  the  heroes  of  the  Moham- 
medan faith.  And  so  Abdul-Hamid  deliberated 
and  delayed.  France  was  uneasy  at  the  prospect 
of  war,  and  Gambetta,  now  the  leader  of  the  oppo- 
sition, was  furious  at  the  prospect  of  being  out  of 
the  row.  He  appealed  to  the  French  chamber  to 
insist  upon  dual  intervention,  but  in  vain.     Even 


no    THE    CONFLICT  OF  EAST  AND   WEST  IN  EGYPT. 

the  timid  de  Freycinet  went  farther  than  the  cham- 
ber would  sanction.  He  proposed  to  confine  opera- 
tions to  the  protection  of  the  Suez  canal,  and  ap- 
plied for  a  supplementary  credit  in  order  to  under- 
take the  necessary  military  preparations.  But  the 
credit  was  denied,  and  he  resigned,  July  24.  A 
ministry  with  a  policy  of  positive  inactivity  was 
formed  by  M.  Duclerc.  Contrasted  to  the  strange 
inertness  of  France  was  the  attempt  at  interference 
on  the  part  of  Russia,  Austria,  and  Italy.  Russia 
would  have  given  Egypt  to  England  if  she  could 
have  won  the  Bosphorus  as  an  offset ;  but  Prince 
Bismarck  did  not  approve  of  the  contemplated  an- 
nexation by  Russia,  and  his  power  over  Austria  and 
Italy  was  such  as  to  enable  him  to  frustrate  the 
plan.  The  sultan  appealed  to  Bismarck  to  support 
the  Porte  against  England  as  well  ;  but  this  the 
German  chancellor  declined  to  do,  telling  the  sultan 
that  he  must  yield  to  the  inevitable  in  Egypt.  And 
thus  the  diplomatic  contest  was  left  to  the  chief 
combatants,  England  and  Turkey. 

In  Egypt,  the  khedive  had  been  prevailed  upon, 
after  some  demur,  to  proclaim  Arabi  a  rebel  and 
discharge  him  from  his  cabinet.  Arabi  had  issued 
a  counter-proclamation,  on  the  same  day,  declaring 
Tewfik  a  traitor  to  his  people  and  his  religion. 
Having  received  the  news  of  the  khedive's  procla- 
mation, Lord  Dufferin,  the   British  ambassador  at 


EGYPT  FOR  THE  EGYPTIANS.  Ill 

Constantinople,  announced  to  the  conference  that 
England  was  about  to  send  an  expedition  to  Egypt 
to  suppress  the  rebellion  and  to  restore  the  authority 
of  the  khedive.  Thereupon  the  sultan  declared  that 
he  had  decided  to  send  a  Turkish  expedition.  Lord 
Dufferin  feigned  to  accept  the  sultan's  co-operation, 
but  demanded  that  the  Porte,  as  a  preliminary  step, 
should  declare  Arabi  a  rebel.  Again  the  sultan 
was  confronted  with  the  danger  of  incurring  the 
wrath  of  the  Moslem  world.  He  could  not  declare 
Arabi  a  rebel.  He  was  manifestly  in  an  uncomforta- 
ble position.  His  sympathies  were  with  Arabi.  But 
if  he  fought,  he  must  fight  against  him ;  for  he 
could  not  oppose  England  ;  and  if  he  kept  out  of 
the  fray,  he  must  suffer  the  humiliation  of  seeing  a 
foreign  force  settle  the  affairs  of  his  suzerainty.  He 
was  between  two  fires.  In  his  desperation  he  sent 
a  force  of  three  thousand  men  to  Suda  bay  with 
orders  to  hold  themselves  in  readiness  to  enter 
Egypt  at  a  moment's  notice.  Lord  Dufferin  now 
submitted  a  proposal  for  co-operation,  naming  the 
following  conditions  : 

I.  That  the  Turkish  contingent  should  be  restricted  to 
5,000  men.  2.  That  it  should  land  at  Abukir,  Damietta, 
or  Rosetta.  3.  That  its  movements  and  operations  should 
be  regulated  by  a  previous  agreement  between  the  Eng- 
lish and  Turkish  commanders.  4.  That  a  Turkish  military 
commissioner  should  be  attached  to  the  English  head- 


112    THE   CONFLICT  OF  EAST  AND  WEST  IN  EGYPT. 

quarters  and  an  English  commissioner  to  the  Turkish 
headquarters;  and,  5.  That  the  English  and  Turkish 
troops  should  evacuate  Egypt  simultaneously.' 

The  representatives  of  the  Porte  in  the  confer- 
ence would  not  accept  these  conditions,  wishing 
any  Turkish  expedition  to  act  independently  of 
England.  In  the  meantine,  however,  the  English 
expedition  had  arrived  in  Egypt  and  was  proceed- 
ing to  crush  the  rebellion,  regardless  of  the  diplo- 
matic delays  and  bickerings  at  Constantinople. 

*  Quoted  from  Appleton's  Annual  Cyclopcedia  for  1882,  p.  250. 


VL 


ARABI'S    REBELLION    AND    THE    REFORMS    THAT 
FOLLOWED. 

FOR  a  month  after  the  bombardment,  the  British 
army  at  Alexandria  was  satisfied  simply  to 
hold  its  position.  Lieutenant-Commander  Goodrich 
describes  the  role  it  played  during  this  time  as  ''  of  a 
negative  character,  in  the  main  consisting  in  an 
efficient  if  passive  defence  of  the  city  against  the 
Egyptians  encamped  and  intrenched  at  King 
Osman  and  Kafr  Dowar." '  Several  sorties,  how- 
ever, were  made  on  the  armed  railway  trains ;  but 
there  was  scarcely  an  engagement  worthy  the  name. 
On  the  2ist  of  July  an  army  corps,  under  the  com- 
mand of  General  Sir  Garnet  Wolseley,  had  been 
ordered  to  Egypt,  and  pending  his  arrival  the  arm)^ 
of  occupation  preserved,  for  the  most  part,  an  at- 
titude of  defence,  though  making  an  occasional 
reconnoissance.  On  the  28th  of  July  the  British 
Parliament  formally  recognized  the  preparations 
for  war  by  a  vote  of  two   million   three   hundred 

^  Report,  p.  87. 
113 


114    ^^^   CONFLICT  OF  EAST  AND   WEST  IN  EGYPT. 

thousand  pounds  for  the  expense  of  the  expedition. 
It  was  not  until  the  15th  of  August  that  Sir  Gar- 
net Wolseley  arrived  with  his  force '  in  Egypt. 
The  EngHsh  at  that  time  held  only  two  points, 
Alexandria  and  Suez,  while  the  entire  Egyptian 
interior,  as  well  as  Port  Said  and  Ismailia,  were 
held  by  Arabi,  whose  force,  it  was  estimated,  now 
amounted  to  about  70,000  men,  of  whom  at  least 
50,000  were  regulars. 

The  objective  point  of  General  Wolseley's  ex- 
pedition to  crush  Arabi  was,  of  course,  the  city  of 
Cairo.  There  were  two  ways  of  approaching  that 
city,  one  from  Alexandria,  through  the  Delta,  and 
the  other  from  the  Suez  canal.  There  were  many 
objections  to  the  former  route.  The  Delta  was 
intersected  by  a  net-work  of  canals,  dikes,  ditches, 
and  railways,  all  of  which  were  in  Arabi's  hands 
and  made  the  region  easily  defensible.  In  fact,  the 
banks  of  the  canals  and  dikes  were  natural  fortifica- 
tions as  they  stood.  On  the  other  hand,  the  way 
from  Ismailia,  the  central  station  on  the  Suez  canal, 
to  Cairo,  was  along  an  unobstructed  and  single  rail- 
way route.     Then,  too,  the  desert  by  the  latter  route 

^  Lieutenant-Commander  Goodrich  (Report,  p.  104)  gives  the  following 
totals  of  the  principal  corps  under  General  Wolseley's  command  :  Infantry, 
15,642  (officers  and  men) ;  cavalry,  2,304  ;  artillery,  including  siege  trains, 
2,435  ;  engineers,  I,i6i  ;  commissariat  and  transport  corps,  1,298  ;  army 
hospital  corps,  313  ;  army  medical  department,  429.  The  Indian  con- 
tingent brought  the  total  number  of  men  up  to  about  35,000. 


ARABPS  REBELLION,  II5 

was  comparatively  free  from  the  pestilential  diseases 
of  the  Delta.  Owing  to  the  Sweet  Water  canal,  the 
question  of  water  presented  no  difficulties.  There 
was,  however,  an  obstacle  to  the  choice  of  Ismailia 
as  a  base  of  operations  ;  but  it  was  a  purely  moral 
one,  and  was  easily  overcome  or  rather  disregarded. 
The  Suez  canal  was  supposed  to  be  neutral  water. 
Count  Ferdinand  de  Lesseps,  the  president  of  the 
Suez  canal  company,  assured  Arabi,  whom  he  met 
at  Ismailia  after  the  opening  of  hostilities,  that 
England  would  so  regard  it,  and  thus  prevented 
Arabi  from  establishing  Egyptian  fortifications 
along  the  canal.  But  England  felt  no  obligation 
to  recognize  any  neutrality.  De  Freycinet's 
scheme  to  enforce  the  neutrality  had  cost  him  his 
premiership,  and  there  was  little  force  in  the  orders 
and  threats  of  the  president  of  the  canal  company. 
England,  therefore,  consulted  simply  her  own  in- 
terests, acting  upon  the  principle,  which  is  doubt- 
less sound,  that  ''  the  neutrality  of  any  canal  joining 
the  waters  of  the  Atlantic  and  Pacific  oceans  will 
be  maintained,  if  at  all,  by  the  nation  which  can 
place  and  keep  the  strongest  ships  at  each  ex- 
tremity." '  In  other  words.  General  Wolseley 
decided  to  enter  Cairo  by  way  of  the  Suez  canal 
and  Ismailia. 

But  he  kept  his  plan  a  profound  secret.     Admiral 

*  Stated  thus  in  Goodrich's  Report,  p.  125. 


Il6    THE   CONFLICT  OF  EAST  AND   WEST  IN  EGYPT. 

Seymour  alone  knew  his  purpose.  On  the  i8th  of 
August,  all  the  orders  for  an  attack  on  Abukir, 
where  Arabi's  force  was  concentrated,  were  issued, 
and  concerning  this  plan  rumors  were  purposely 
allowed  to  reach  the  newspaper  correspondents. 
On  the  19th,  the  transports  moved  eastward  from 
Alexandria,  as  if  to  attack  Abukir ;  but  under  the 
cover  of  darkness  that  night,  they  were  escorted  on 
to  Port  Said,  where  they  learned  that  the  entire 
canal,  owing  to  the  preconcerted  action  of  Admiral 
Seymour,  was  in  the  hands  of  the  British.  On  the 
2 1st,  the  troops  met  Sir  Henry  McPherson's  Indian 
contingent  at  Ismailia.  Two  days  were  now  con- 
sumed in  rest  and  preparation.  The  Egyptians 
cut  off  the  water  supply,  which  came  from  the 
Delta  by  the  Sweet  Water  canal,  by  damming  the 
canal.  A  sortie  to  secure  possession  of  the  dam 
was  therefore  deemed  necessary,  and  was  successfully 
made  on  the  24th.  Further  advances  were  made,  and 
on  the  26th,  Kassassin,  a  station  of  some  impor- 
tance on  the  canal  and  railway,  was  occupied. 
Here  the  British  force  was  obliged  to  delay  for 
two  weeks,  while  organizing  a  hospital  and  a  trans- 
port service.  This  gave  Arabi  opportunity  to 
concentrate  his  forces  at  Zagazig  and  Tel-el-Kebir. 
But  he  knew  it  was  for  his  interest  to  strike  at 
once  before  the  British  transports  could  come  up 
with  the  advance.       He   therefore    made    two    at- 


ARABrS  REBELLION.  11/ 

tempts,  one  on  August  28,  and  the  other  on  Sep- 
tember 9,  to  regain  the  position  lost  at  Kassassin. 
But  he  failed  '  in  both,  though  inflicting  some  loss 
upon  his  opponents. 

On  the  1 2th  of  September  preparations  were 
made  by  General  Wolselev  for  a  decisive  battle. 

'  Arabi  could  not  recognize  defeat.  His  despatches  to  the  ministry  of 
war  at  Cairo  concerning  the  engagement  of  September  9,  are,  to  say  the 
least,  amusing.  In  one  he  said  {vide  Goodrich's  Report,  p.  144)  :  "At 
sunrise  the  enemy  came  out  with  infantry,  cavalry,  and  artillery,  and  firing 
began,  and  continued  on  both  sides  for  about  an  hour.  Then  the  Arabs 
charged  like  lions,  displaying  a  courage  and  bravery  which  enabled  them  to 
drive  back  the  enemy,  who  were  much  more  numerous  than  ourselves. 
Then  they  followed  the  enemy,  driving  them  until  they  had  killed  about 
100  of  them  [the  British  official  report  says  two],  and  dispersed  the  rest, 
driving  them  back  into  their  tents.  The  Arabs  captured  their  oxen,  about 
500  meters  of  torpedo-wire,  and  other  military  stores,  and  then  returned  to 
their  posts  victorious.  This  engagement,  including  the  attack  and  the 
pursuit,  lasted  about  six  hours.  .  .  .  Thanks  be  to  God,  not  one  of 
the  Arabs  nor  of  the  soldiers  was  wounded.  Give  this  news  to  those  under 
your  administration."  Three  days  after,  he  sent  another  despatch,  with  a 
different  statement  as  to  casualties  :  "I  give  you  good  news,  which  will 
cause  you  joy,  and  will  delight  each  individual  of  the  people— namely,  that 
the  engagement  of  Saturday  (gth  of  September)  was  the  most  serious  battle 
that  has  yet  taken  place  between  us  and  the  English  ;  for  the  force  of  both 
armies  was  very  great,  and  the  fighting  lasted  for  twelve  hours,  with  im- 
petuosity and  daring,  while  the  cannonade  and  the  discharge  of  musketry 
were  unceasing,  pouring  down  like  rain  on  the  field  of  battle.  Still  we 
lost  only  thirty-one  men,  martyrized,  and  150  were  slightly,  not  dangerously, 
wounded,  according  to  the  official  returns  presented  by  the  various  regi- 
ments with  great  exactness  and  precision.  It  had  been  thought  that  our 
casualties  would  have  been  double  that  number,  owing  to  the  seriousness 
of  the  engagement  and  its  long  duration.  Moreover,  from  true  observation, 
it  has  been  proved  to  us  that  the  number  of  the  enemy  killed  and  remaining 
on  the  field  of  battle  is  about  2,500,  and  their  carts  were  insufficient  for 
carrying  off  the  wounded,"  etc. 


Il8    THE   CONFLICT  OF  EAST  AND  WEST  IN  EGYPT 

He  had  become  convinced  ^  from  daily  reconnois- 
sance  and  from  the  view  obtained  in  the  engage- 
ment of  September  9,  that  the  fortifications  at 
Tel-el-Kebir  were  both  extensive  and  formidable. 
Against  an  enemy  so  strongly  intrenched,  and 
whose  force  consisted  of  about  38,000  men  and 
fifty-nine  siege-guns,  it  would  have  been  folly  to 
advance  across  an  open  desert ;  and  it  was  there- 
fore decided  to  make  the  approach  under  cover  of 
darkness.  All  possible  precautions  were  taken  to 
guard  against  alarm.  Bugle  calls  and  fires  were 
prohibited  after  nightfall,  and  strict  silence  was  en- 
joined. The  camp  was  struck  as  noiselessly  as 
possible,  and  at  1.30  on  the  morning  of  the  13th 
General  Wolseley  gave  the  order  for  the  advance, 
his  force  consisting  of  about  11,000  infantry,  2,000 
cavalrymen,  and  sixty  field-guns.  They  had  only 
the  stars  to  guide  them,  but  so  accurately  was  the 
movement  conducted  that  the  leading  brigades  of 
each  division  reached  the  enemy's  outposts  within 
two  minutes  of  each  other. 

The  enemy  [says  General  Wolseley]  were  completely 
surprised,  and  it  was  not  until  one  or  two  of  their  advanced 
sentries  fired  their  rifles  that  they  realized  our  close  prox- 
imity to  their  works.  These  were,  however,  very  quickly 
lined  with  infantry,  who  opened  a  deafening  musketry 
fire,  and  their  guns  came  into  action  immediately.     Our 

'  Vide  his  official  report  of  the  battle  of  Tel-el-Kebir,  dated  Cairo,  Sep- 
tember 16,  1882. 


ARABrs  REBELLION,  Iig 

troops  advanced  steadily  without  firing  a  shot,  in  obedi- 
ence to  the  orders  they  had  received  ;  and,  when  close  to 
the  works,  went  straight  for  them,  charging  with  a  ringing 
cheer/ 

The  intrenchments  were  not  carried  without  a 
severe  struggle.  The  Egyptians  fought  with  a  des- 
perate courage,  and  hundreds  of  them  were  bayo- 
neted at  their  posts.  *'  More  intelligence,"  declares 
Lieutenant-Commander  Goodrich,''  "■  and  less  down- 
right cowardice  in  the  upper  grades  might  have 
converted  these  men  into  a  formidable  army."  But 
what  could  the  rank  and  file  accomplish  when  "  each 
officer  knew  that  he  would  run,  but  hoped  his  neigh- 
bor would  stay."  3  At  the  first  shot  Arabi  and  his 
second  in  command  took  horse  and  galloped  to 
Belbeis,  where  they  caught  a  train  for  Cairo.  Most 
of  the  other  officers,  as  the  reports  of  killed  and 
wounded  show,  did  the  same. 

The  Egyptians  fired  their  first  shot  at  4.55  a.m., 
and  at  6.45  the  English  had  possession  of  Arabi's 
headquarters  and  the  canal  bridge.  The  British 
loss  was  57  killed,  380  wounded,  and  22  missing. 
The  Egyptian  army  left  about  2,000  dead  in  the 
fortifications.  There  is  no  report  of  the  number  of 
the  Egyptian  wounded  ;  but  it  probably  was  not 
proportionate  to  the  number  killed  ;  for,  if  rumor 
is  to  be  trusted,  the  wounded  were   not  spared  by 

*  Ibid.       "  Goodrich's  Report,  p.  15.       ^  Ibid. 


I20    THE   CONFLICT  OF  EAST  AND  WEST  IN  EGYPT, 

the  British  saber  and  bayonet.  There  was,  how- 
ever, some  excuse  for  the  alleged  cruelty  on  the 
part  of  the  attacking  troops.  An  Egyptian,  like 
the  wild  beast  of  the  jungle,  gets  an  added  ferocity 
and  desperation  with  each  wound.  **  So  many  cases 
are  authenticated,"  says  Lieutenant-Commander 
Goodrich,'  "of  the  virulence  displayed  by  the  Egyp- 
tian wounded,  that  it  is  demonstrated,  beyond  ques- 
tion, that  many  of  these  fellows  not  only  shot  at 
the  stretchermen  engaged  in  carrying  off  the  in- 
jured, but,  in  some  cases,  actually  killed  the  very 
Englishmen  who  had  stopped  to  give  them  water 
or  to  bind  their  wounds."  The  same  author  makes 
the  following  observations  upon  the  battle  from  a 
military  point  of  view  : 

In  view  of  the  decisiveness  of  the  victory,  comment 
appears  unnecessary.  It  may  be  alleged  that  the  mode 
of  attack  adopted  was  hazardous  to  the  degree  of  impru- 
dence ;  that  no  commander  would  dare  to  employ  such 
tactics  on  European  territory  ;  that  a  night  march  of  nine 
miles  could  only  be  followed  by  a  properly  disposed  and 
immediate  assault  under  circumstances  so  exceptional  as 
to  be  providential.  It  must,  however,  be  remembered 
that  General  Wolseley  understood  his  enemy,  knew  his 
military  habits  and  numbers,  as  well  as  the  ground  inter- 
vening ;  had  a  fairly  good  idea  of  his  intrenchments,  a 
just  appreciation  of  his  morale^  a  strong  conviction  as  to 
the  proper  manner  of  engaging  him,  and  confidence  in  the 

^  Ibid. 


ARABICS  REBELLION'.  121 

officers  and  men  of  his  own  command.  What  he  would 
have  done  had  the  enemy  been  of  a  different  character, 
is  another  question,  whose  consideration  does  not  come 
within  the  province  of  this  report.  It  seems  a  sufficient 
answer  to  such  criticisms  as  are  briefly  referred  to  above, 
to  remark  that  the  means  were  adjusted  to  the  end  to  be 
reached,  and  that  the  justification  (if  any  be  needed)  of 
the  risks  incurred  Hes  in  the  success  which  attended  them 
— a  success  as  rare  as  it  was  complete.' 

A  proof  of  the  completeness  of  the  success  was 
the  entire  dissipation  of  Arabl's  army.  Groups  of 
soldiers,  It  Is  true,  were  scattered  to  different  parts 
of  Egypt  ;  but  the  army  organization  was  com- 
pletely broken  up  with  the  battle  of  Tel-el-Kebir. 

The  movements  that  followed  the  decisive  victory 
were  promptly  begun  and  most  effectively  executed. 
The  best  account  Is  given  in  the  words  of  General 
Wolseley's  dispatch  of  September  i6 

The  enemy  were  pursued  to  Zagazig,  twenty-five  miles 
from  our  camp  at  Kassassin,  by  the  Indian  Contingent, 
the  leading  detachment  of  which  reached  that  place, 
under  Major-General  Sir  H.  Macpherson,  V.  C,  a  little 
after  4  P.  M.,  and  by  the  cavalry  division,  under  General 
Lowe,  to  Belbeis,  which  was  occupied  in  the  evening. 
Major-General  Lowe  was  ordered  to  push  on  with  all 
possible  speed  to  Cairo,  as  I  was  most  anxious  to  save 
that  city  from  the  fate  which  befell  Alexandria  in  July 
last. 

These  orders  were  ably  carried  out.  General  Lowe  reach- 

*  Goodrich's  Report,  p.  158. 


122       THE  CONFLICT  OF  EAST  AND   WEST  IN  EGYPT. 

ing  the  great  barracks  of  Abbassieh,  just  outside  of  Cairo, 
at  4.45  P.  M.,  on  the  14th  instant.  The  cavalry  marched 
sixty-five  miles  in  these  two  days.  The  garrison  of  about 
10,000  men,  summoned  by  Lieutenant-Colonel  H.  Stew- 
art, assistant  adjutant-general  to  the  cavalry  division,  to 
surrender,  laid  down  their  arms,  and  our  troops  took  posses- 
sion of  the  citadel.  A  message  was  sent  to  Arabi  Pasha 
through  the  prefect  of  the  city,  calling  upon  him  to  sur- 
render forthwith,  which  he  did  unconditionally.  He  was 
accompanied  by  Tulba  Pasha,  who  was  also  one  of  the 
leading  rebels  in  arms  against  the  Khedive. 

The  Guards,  under  His  Royal  Highness  the  Duke  of 
Connaught,  reached  Cairo  early  on  the  15th  instant. 

With  an  energy,  as  remarkable  as  It  was  praise- 
worthy. General  Wolseley  prevented  the  war  ending 
with  horrors '  like  those  with  which  it  began.   Arabi's 

*  The  death  of  the  eminent  oriental  scholar,  Professor  Palmer,  which 
occurred  on  August  12,  1882,  was  one  of  the  horrible  tragedies  for  which  the 
Egyptian  war  was  responsible.  Justin  McCarthy  (England  Under  Glad- 
stone, ch.  xiii.)  makes  the  following  reference  to  the  loss  the  world  sus- 
tained in  his  death  :  "  Professor  Edward  Palmer  was  one  of  those  rare  men 
who  possess  what  appears  to  be  an  almost  incredible  facility  for  learning  lan- 
guages. He  was  well-nigh  the  ideal  scholar,  devoted  to  learning  for  learn- 
ing's sake,  yet  never  tainted  by  the  faintest  tinge  of  pedantry,  pride,  or 
affectation.  The  story  of  his  life  has  been  told  by  his  close  friend,  attached 
admirer,  and  literary  colleague,  the  well-knov/n  novelist,  Mr.  Walter  Besant. 
It  is  a  touching  and  thrilling  record  of  marvellous  accomplishments,  of  bril- 
liant performance,  of  patient,  determined  struggle  toward  success,  of  success 
achieved,  of  honors  won,  of  firm  friendship,  and  a  peaceful,  happy  home — 
and  all  ended  by  a  sudden,  terrible  death  in  the  Wady  Sudr.  In  the  sum- 
mer of  1882,  Professor  Palmer  agreed  to  go  out  for  the  Government  to 
Egypt  to  prevent  any  alliance  between  Arabi  and  the  Bedawin  tribes  of  the 
desert.  It  seems  strange  that  so  precious  a  life  should  have  been  risked  on 
such  an  errand,  though  Professor  Palmer's  knowledge  of  the  languages  of 
the  East  was  proverbial.     It  is  not  very  surprising  that,  when  he  and  his 


ARABICS  REBELLION,  1 23 

revenge  was  forestalled  by  that  rapid  desert  journey. 
Before  leaving  England,  Wolseley  had  predicted 
that  he  would  enter  Cairo  on  the  i6th  of  Septem- 
ber ;  but  with  still  a  day  to  spare  the  feat  was  ac- 
complished, and  Arabi's  rebellion  was  completely 
crushed. 

England  now  stood  alone.  Victory  had  been 
won  without  the  aid  of  France  or  the  intervention 
of  Turkey.  In  Constantinople  negotiations  re- 
garding Turkish  expeditions  were  still  pending 
when  Lord  Dufferin  received  the  news  of  Wolse- 
ley's  success,  and  announced  to  the  Porte  that  there 
was  now  no  need  of  a  Turkish  force  in  Egypt,  as 
the  war  was  ended.  France  at  once  prepared  to 
resume  her  share  in  the  control  ;  but  England, 
having  borne  the  sole  burden  of  the  war,  did  not 
propose  now  to  share  the  influence  her  success  had 
given  her.  And  it  was  for  the  interest  of  Egypt 
that  she  should    not.     As    in    the    campaign   just 

party  were  captured  by  hostile  Arabs,  their  doom  should  be  death.  It  is 
certain  that  short  work  would  have  been  made  of  any  emissary  from  Arabi 
^vho  was  caught  attempting  to  interfere  with  the  relations  existing  between 
some  English  general,  and,  say,  an  Indian  regiment.  We  shall,  perhaps, 
never  exactly  know  the  story  of  the  tragedy  near  Nakl.  It  is  certain,  how- 
ever, that  Palmer  and  his  companions  were  captured  through  the  treachery 
of  the  Sheikh  Meter  Sofieh,  who  was  their  guide,  and  that  Palmer,  Captain 
Gill,  and  Lieutenant  Charrington  were  shot.  Some  thirteen  of  the  Arabs 
of  the  tribe  that  killed  Palmer  and  his  companions  were  afterward  captured, 
brought  to  trial,  and  five  of  them  were  hanged  at  Zagazig  on  February  28, 
1883.  The  remains  of  Palmer,  Gill,  and  Charrington  were  recovered,  car- 
ried to  England,  and  interred  in  St.  Paul's  Church." 


124       THE  CONFLICT  OF  EAST  AND   WEST  IN  EGYPT. 

ended  England  had  been  able  to  achieve  a  quicker 
and  more  effectual  success  alone  than  would  have 
been  possible  with  a  joint  command  of  jealous 
Powers,  so  now,  peace  having  been  restored,  a  sin- 
gle supervision  and  direction  promised  a  steadfast- 
ness to  the  government  that  could  not  have  been 
effected  under  a  re-establishment  of  the  joint  con- 
trol. While  there  was  a  general  agreement  in 
England  as  to  what  other  Powers  should  not  do, 
there  was  a  wide  difference  of  opinion  as  to  the  in- 
dividual course  to  be  pursued  by  the  British  gov- 
ernment. Lord  Derby,  who  became  colonial  sec- 
retary soon  after  the  end  of  the  war,  was  in  favor 
of  withdrawing  from  Egypt  altogether,  and  leaving 
the  country  to  *'  stew  in  her  own  juice  "  ;  but  the 
judgment  that  declared  that  anarchy  in  Egypt 
would  mean  injury  to  the  world  prevailed.  Egypt 
could  not  stand  alone  ;  and  Anglo-Saxon  support, 
with  its  civilizing  influences,  was  the  best  to  be  found. 
England's  first  duty,  after  quiet  was  assured,  was 
to  send  away  all  the  British  troops  except  a  force 
of  about  ii,ooo  men,  which  it  was  deemed  advisa- 
ble to  retain  in  Egypt  until  the  khedive's  authority 
was  placed  on  a  safe  footing  throughout  the  land. 
At  the  same  time  it  was  decided  to  reorganize  the 
military  establishment  of  Egypt,  and  Baker  Pasha, 
an  Englishman  in  the  service  of  the  sultan,  was  in- 
vited to  superintend  this  work.     The  khedive  sum- 


ARABICS  REBELLION.  1 2 5 

moned    a    new    cabinet,    giving   the    leadership  to 
Sherif  Pasha,  as  minister  of  foreign  affairs. 

What  should  be  done  with  Arabi  was  the  ques- 
tion of  paramount  interest,  when  once  the  khedive's 
authority  was  re-established  and  recognized.  Tew- 
fix  and  his  ministers,  if  left  to  themselves,  would 
unquestionably  have  taken  his  life  ;  for  in  the  Ori- 
ent an  unsuccessful  revolutionist  knows  but  one 
fate.  But  England  was  determined  that  Arabi 
should  have  a  fair  trial.  To  secure  this,  an  irre- 
sistible pressure  had  been  brought  to  bear  upon 
Mr.  Gladstone's  government  by  the  English  press. 
It  was  decided  that  the  rebel  leaders  should  appear 
before  a  military  tribunal,  and  they  were  given 
English  counsel  to  plead  their  cause.  The  pre- 
liminary negotiations  occupied  several  months, 
during  which  time  Mr.  Broadley  and  Mr.  Napier, 
Arabi's  counsel,  became  acquainted  with  the  pecu- 
liarities of  Egyptian  legal  procedure,'  and  Arabi 
wrote  out  his  story  of  the  rebellion.^  The  general 
tenor  of  his  tale  was  to  prove  himself  innocent  of 
the  charge  of  rebellion.  He  declared  that  Tewfik 
was  the  traitor  ;  for  the  sultan,  the  real  sovereign 
of  Egypt,  encouraged  the  resistance  against  Eng- 
land that  the  khedive  did  not  dare  show.      If  Arabi 

'  A.  M.  Broadley,  How  We  Defended  Arabi  and  His  Friends  :  A  Story  of 
Egypt  and  the  Egyptians. 

"^  Ahmed  Arabi,  Instructions  to  My  Counsel,  in  The  Nineteenth  Century 
October,  1882. 


126    THE   CONFLICT  OF  EAST  AND    WEST  IN  EGYPT. 

obeyed  his  sovereign,  how   could  he  be  a  rebel  ? 
He  vauntingly  wrote  : 

But  the  truth  is,  I  am  no  "rebel."  I  led  the  nation  in 
seeking  the  liberty  of  our  country,  and  employed  all 
honorable  means  to  this  end,  respecting  the  laws,  not 
thinking  of  self,  as  others  say,  but  of  the  welfare  of  Egypt. 
I  became  commander  of  the  troops  appointed  to  defend 
the  country  in  a  lawful  manner,  and  by  the  order  of  the 
Sultan,  the  Khedive,  the  Chamber,  and  with  the  sanction 
of  the  nation.  As  regards  accusations  of  massacre  and  in- 
cendiarism, I  laugh  them  to  scorn. 

Such  were  the  words  that  Arabi  wrote  in  October, 
when  lying  in  prison  in  Cairo.  If  he  had  stood  by 
them,  he  would  have  had  the  respect  of  all  who  had 
heard  the  cry  of  ''  Egypt  for  the  Egyptians,"  and  to 
many  he  would  have  posed  as  a  hero  and  a  martyr ; 
but  within  two  months  he  had  acknowledged  him- 
self guilty  of  rebellion,  and  was  cringing  at  the  feet 
of  England  and  all  Englishmen. 

The  trial  was  a  farce.  Everything  was  ''cut  and 
dried "  beforehand.  It  was  arranged  that  Arabi 
was  to  plead  guilty  to  rebellion,  that  he  was  forth- 
with to  be  condemned  to  death  by  the  court,  and 
that  the  khedive  was  immediately  to  commute  the 
sentence  to  perpetual  exile.  In  fact,  the  necessary 
papers  were  drawn  up  and  signed  before  the  court 
met  for  Arabi's  trial  on  December  3.  First,  the 
following  charge  was  read  ' : 

^  The  documents  and  articles  here  given  are  quoted  from  Mr.  Broadley's 
How  We  Defended  Arabi,  pp.  326,  332,  336^  and  341. 


ARABICS  REBELLION,  12/ 

Ahmed  Arabi  Pasha,  you  are  charged  before  us,  on  the 
report  of  the  Commission  of  Inquiry,  with  the  offence  of 
rebelHon  against  his  Highness  the  Khedive,  and  thereby 
committing  offences  against  Article  96 '  of  the  Ottoman 
MiHtary  and  Article  59 ""  of  the  Ottoman  Penal  Code. 
Are  you  guilty  or  not  guilty? 

Upon  Arabi's  saying  that  his  counsel  would  answer 
for  him,  Mr.  Broadley  read  the  following : 

Of  my  own  free  will,  and  by  the  advice  of  my  counsel, 
I  plead  guilty  of  the  charges  now  read  over  to  me. 

An  adjournment  of  several  hours  was  then  taken, 
as  a  matter  of  form,  we  must  believe,  for  the  de- 
liberations were  all  held  in  advance.  Upon  reassem- 
bling the  clerk  of  the  court  read  the  following 
sentence  : 

Whereas  Ahmed  Arabi  Pasha  has  admitted  having 
committed  the  crime  of  rebellion  in  contravention  of 
Article  96  of  the  Ottoman  Military  Code  and  Article  59 
of  the  Ottoman  Penal  Code ;  and  whereas,  in  face  of  this 
admission,  the  court  has  only  to  apply  the  articles  already 
cited,  which  punish  the  crime  of  rebellion  by  the  penalty 
of  death  ;    for  these  motives  the  court  unanimously  con- 

^  Art.  g6. — All  persons  who  to  the  number  of  eight  or  more  revolt,  using 
their  arms,  and  refuse  to  disperse,  or  do  not  cease  the  revolt  on  receiving 
the  orders  of  a  superior  authority,  may  be  punished  with  death. 

-Art.  59. — Whoever,  without  an  order  from  the  Government,  or  without 
a  legal  motive,  shall  assume  the  command  of  a  division,  a  fortified  place, 
or  city,  etc.,  and  any  commander  who,  without  a  legitimate  motive,  shall 
persist  in  keeping  his  troops  under  arms  after  their  disbandment  has  been 
ordered  by  the  Government,  may  be  punished  with  death. 


128    THE   CONFLICT  OF  EAST  AND    WEST  IN  EGYPT. 

demns  Ahmed  Arabi  Pasha  to  death  for  the  crime  of  re- 
bellion against  his  Highness  the  Khedive  by  application  of 
the  said  articles  and  orders.  That  the  said  judgment  be 
submitted  for  the  consideration  of  his  Highness  the 
Khedive. 

But  the  judgment  had  already  been  submitted,  so 
that  the  clerk  was  able  to  read  the  following  decree 
from  the  khedive  at  once : 

We,  Mehemet  Tewfik,  Khedive  of  Egypt :  Whereas 
Ahmed  Arabi  Pasha  has  been  condemned  to  death  by 
judgment  of  Court  Martial  of  this  day's  date,  by  ap- 
plication of  Articles  96  of  the  Military  Code  and  59  of  the 
Penal  Code,  and  whereas  we  desire,  for  reasons  of  our  own, 
to  exercise  in  reference  to  the  said  Ahmed  Arabi  Pasha 
the  right  of  pardon  which  appertains  to  us  exclusively, 
we  have  decreed  and  do  decree  as  follows  :  The  penalty 
of  death  pronounced  against  Ahmed  Arabi  is  commuted 
to  perpetual  exile  from  Egypt  and  its  dependencies. 
This  pardon  will  be  of  no  effect,  and  the  said  Ahmed 
Arabi  will  be  liable  to  the  penalty  of  death,  if  he  enters 
Egypt  or  its  dependencies.  Our  Ministers  of  the  Interior, 
War,  and  Marine  are  charged  with  the  execution  of  this 
decree. 

[Signed]  MeheMET  Tewfik. 

Arabi  was  glad  to  escape  with  his  life,  if  we  may 
judge  from  his  profuse  thanks.  He  thanked  Mr. 
Gladstone,  Lord  Granville,  Lord  Dufferin,  Sir 
Edward  Malet,  Mr.  Blunt,  Mr.  Broadley,  Mr.  Napier, 
the  English  people,  the  English  press,  and  others 
to  whom  he  felt  specially  grateful.     It  is  not  report- 


ARABICS  REBELLION.  1 29 

ed  that  the  khedive  was  among  the  number.  On 
the  26th  of  December  Arabi  and  his  six  companions, 
Mahmud  Sami,  Yakub  Sami,  Mahmud  Fehmy, 
Tulba  Osmat,  Ali  Fehmy,  and  Abd-el-Al  Hilmy, 
upon  whom  the  same  sentence  had  been  passed,  left 
Cairo  for  the  Island  of  Ceylon,  there  to  spend  their 
life  of  perpetual  exile. 

All  this  while  France  had  been  chafing  under  the 
prospect  of  the  abolition  of  the  Dual  Control.  Eng- 
land had  proposed  in  its  stead  a  public  debt  commis- 
sion, of  which  she  offered  the  presidency  to  France, 
by  way  of  a  sop  to  appease  any  anger  ;  but  Premier 
Duclerc  rejected  the  proposal.  It  therefore  became 
necessary  for  Lord  Granville  to  define  the  position 
of  England  in  Egypt.  This  he  did  on  January  25, 
1883,  in  an  identical  note  to  the  Powers.  He  recited 
that  the  Anglo-French  control  had  not  been  the  re- 
sult of  international  agreement,  but  of  tripartite  un- 
derstanding between  England,  France,  and  Egypt ; 
and  that,  France  having  withdrawn  from  Egypt  at 
the  beginning  of  the  war,  England  had  to  suppress 
the  rebellion  without  assistance.  She  now  purposed 
to  keep  an  army  of  occupation  in  Egypt  only  so  long 
as  to  secure  the  permanency  of  the  re-established 
government.  Lord  Granville  announced,  further, 
that  England  would  favor  new  regulations  to  pro- 
vide for  the  future  neutrality  and  inviolability  of  the 
Suez  canal.     He  was  careful  to  insert  in  his  note 


130    THE   CONFLICT  OF  EAST  AND    WEST  IN  EGYPT, 

that  the  protection  of  Egypt  would  be  considered 
the  only  justification  for  the  military  occupation  of 
the  canal.  He  begged  that  the  Powers  would  alter 
the  capitulations  so  that  foreigners  in  Egypt  might 
be  taxed,  a  plan,  as  we  have  seen,  that  is  contem- 
plated in  every  scheme  of  reform,  but  never  carried 
out.  He  also  suggested  the  prolongation  of  the 
mixed  tribunals  for  another  year.' 

With  regard  to  international  matters  in  Egypt, 
Lord  Granville  announced  that  certain  reforms  in 
the  army,  in  the  police,  and  in  political  institutions 
had  been  undertaken. 

Reference  has  already  been  made  to  the  appoint- 
ment of  Baker  Pasha  to  supervise  the  reorganization 
of  the  Egyptian  army.  At  the  beginning  of  1883 
he  was  superseded  by  Sir  Evelyn  Wood,  who  under- 
took to  introduce,  so  far  as  practicable,  a  discipline 
and  treatment  similar  to  those  employed  in  the  British 
army.  Relieved  from  the  supervision  of  the  army 
Baker  organized  a  police  force  of  4,000  men,  which 
was  divided  into  urban  and  rural  constabulary  and 
officered  by  Englishmen.  The  reform  in  political 
institutions  was  the  work,  largely,  of  Lord  Dufferin. 
He  had  been  sent  from  Constantinople  to  Cairo, 
early  in  November,  w^ith  the  special  mission  of 
bringing   order   out   of  governmental   chaos.       In 

'  Their  expiration  had  been  fixed  for  i88i,  but  two  yearly  prolongations 
had  already  been  added  to  the  original  term  of  five  years. 


ARABICS  REBELLION-.  I3I 

two  months  he  had  prepared  a  scheme  of  legisla- 
tive reorganization.  This  was,  however,  somewhat 
altered;  so  that  it  was  not  until  May,  1883,  that 
the  plan  in  its  improved  form  was  accepted  by  the 
decree  of  the  khedive. 

The  new  constitution  provided  for  three  classes 
of  assemblies  :  the  ''  Legislative  Council,"  the  "  Gen- 
eral Assembly,"  and  the  ''  Provincial  Councils,"  of 
which  there  were  to  be  fourteen,  one  for  each 
province.  The  legislative  council  was  to  consist 
of  thirty  members,  fourteen  of  whom  were  to  be 
nominated  by  the  khedive,  and  sixteen  of  whom 
were  to  be  elective.  Of  the  latter,  one  would  rep- 
resent Cairo,  another  the  towns  of  Alexandria, 
Damietta,  Rosetta,  Suez,  Port  Said,  Ismailia,  and 
El-Azich,  and  the  remaining  fourteen  would  repre- 
sent each  one  a  province.  The  elective  members 
were  to  be  chosen  for  terms  of  six  years,  and  might 
be  indefinitely  re-elected.  The  council  was  to  meet 
as  often  as  once  in  two  months.  Its  influence  on 
legislation  was  to  be  so  great,  says  Mr.  Amos,'  that 
"it  is  hardly  conceivable  that  a  law  could  be  per- 
sisted in,  in  the  face  of  a  determined  remonstrance 
of  the  legislative  council."  No  law  or  decree  of  a 
legislative  character  could  be  promulgated  unless 
the  government  had  obtained  the  opinion  of  the 

'  Sheldon  Amos,  The  New  Egj^tian  Constitution,  in  The  Contemporary 
Review,  June,  1883. 


132       THE  CON  FLIC  T  OF  EAST  A  ND   WES  T  IN  EGYPT. 

council.  If  it  should  dissent  from  that  opinion,  the 
government  must  give  its  reasons.  A  special  article 
provided  that  the  budget  must  be  submitted,  and  that 
the  council  might  express  its  opinion  and  wishes  on 
each  section  thereof.  The  reasons  for  dissent  must 
be  given  as  in  other  cases.  The  legislative  council 
was  to  have,  further,  the  right  to  discuss  freely  the 
condition  of  the  country  and  to  consider  any  needful 
legislative  reforms,  and  to  call  for  the  drafting  of 
measures,  to  be  submitted  to  itself,  which  should 
serve  as  the  basis  of  legislation. 

The  general  assembly  was  to  consist  of  eighty- 
four  members  :  the  eight  ministers  of  state,  the 
thirty  members  of  the  legislative  counsel,  and  forty- 
six  elected  members.  The  latter  were  to  be  elected 
for  terms  of  six  years  and,  like  the  members  of  the 
legislative  council,  might  be  indefinitely  re-elected. 
The  assembly  must  meet  as  often  as  once  in  two 
years,  and  its  functions  were  to  be  largely  of  a 
financial  character.  No  new  tax  could  be  levied 
unless  it  should  receive  the  vote  of  the  assembly, 
and  no  public  loan  could  be  contracted  unless  the 
assembly  should  be  consulted.  The  reasons  of  dis- 
sent on  the  part  of  the  government  must  be  given 
to  the  assembly,  as  to  the  legislative  council. 

The  fourteen  provincial  councils  were  to  consist 
each  one  of  from  four  to  eight  members,  and  were 
to  divide  between  them  the  representation  of  the  six 


ARABrS  REBELLION.  I  33 

thousand  villages  in  Egypt.  Considerable  legisla- 
tive power  in  local  government  was  to  be  given 
them,  such  as  voting  of  extraordinary  taxes  for 
local  improvement,  which  were  to  take  effect  mere- 
ly upon  the  sanction  of  the  government.  Every 
Egyptian  man,  over  twenty  years  of  age,  was  to 
vote  (by  ballot)  for  an  ''  elector-delegate  "  from  the 
villaofe  in  the  neigfhborhood  of  which  he  lived,  and 
the  ''  electors-delegate  "  from  all  the  villages  in  a 
province  were  to  form  the  constituency  that  should 
elect  the  provincial  council.  The  term  and  re-eligi- 
bility of  the  members  of  the  provincial  council  were 
to  be  the  same  as  those  of  members  of  the  other 
two  bodies,  except  that  at  the  end  of  three  years 
one-half  of  the  provincial  council  was  to  be  renewed 
by  lot.  The  *'  electors-delegate  "  were  also  to  elect 
directly  the  forty-six  elective  members  of  the  gen- 
eral assembly  ;  but  they  were  to  have  no  share  in 
the  election  of  members  of  the  legislative  council. 
Each  provincial  council  was  to  elect  from  its  own 
number  one  member  of  the  legislative  council. 

Such,  in  brief,  was  the  scheme  that  Lord  Dufferin 
proposed  and  the  khedive  sanctioned.  It  was  well 
received  by  many  who  thought  that  it  promised  a 
brilliant  future  for  Egypt.  The  idea,  however,  of 
looking  to  the  fellahin  of  Egypt  for  the  exercise  of 
constitutional  rights  and  duties  strikes  any  one  who 
is  acquainted  with  their  abject  condition  and  dispo- 


134    THE   CONFLICT  OF  EAST  AND   WEST  IN  EGYPT. 

sition  as  almost  absurd.  It  is  well  enough  for  the 
Westerner  to  import  the  ideas  that  have  been  the 
slow  growth  of  centuries  in  the  most  highly  civi- 
lized lands  ;  they  will  have  their  influence  ;  and  yet 
it  must  always  be  borne  in  mind  that  the  political 
idea  is  the  fruit  only  of  internal  growth.  Lord 
Dufferin  framed  the  constitution  ;  but  he  knew  that 
the  chiefest  truth  among  his  recommendations  lay 
in  the  following  paragraph  : 

The  chief  requirement  of  Egypt  is  justice.  A  pure, 
cheap,  and  simple  system  of  justice  will  prove  more  bene- 
ficial to  the  country  than  the  largest  constitutional  privi- 
leges. The  structure  of  society  in  the  East  is  so  simple 
that,  provided  the  taxes  are  righteously  assessed,  it  does 
not  require  much  law-making  to  make  the  people  happy. 

The  scheme  for  reorganization  was  carried  for- 
ward to  the  extent  of  electing  the  ''  electors-dele- 
gate "  in  September ;  but  by  that  time  Egypt  was 
again  in  a  state  of  such  disquietude  that  the  British 
advisers  of  the  khedive  considered  it  unwise  to  put 
the  new  institutions  into  operation.  In  place  of 
legislative  council  and  general  assembly,  the  khedive 
appointed  a  council  of  state,  consisting  of  eleven 
Egyptians,  two  Armenians,  and  ten  Europeans. 
The  reforms  were  set  aside  for  the  time  beinof  in 
view  of  impending  troubles  and  dangers  in  the 
Sudan. 


VII. 

THE    SUDAN    AND    THE    MAHDI. 

THE  Sudan  comprises  the  vast  region  lying 
between  the  equator  and  the  southern  boun- 
dary of  Egypt  at  the  first  cataract  of  the  Nile,  and 
extending  from  the  Red  Sea  and  Abyssinia  on  the 
east  to  a  western  indefiniteness — to  the  point,  one 
might  say,  from  which  a  slave  could  be  carried  to 
the  Nile  with  some  chance  of  profit  to  the  slave- 
hunter.  Since  the  day  of  Mehemet  Ali,  the  country 
had  been  to  Egypt  very  much  what  Egypt  was  to 
Turkey  before  the  day  of  the  great  pasha.  Me- 
hemet Ali  appropriated  the  Sudan  to  himself  with 
that  freehanded  robbery  that  was  characteristic  of 
power  in  the  time  of  feudalism,  and  his  successors, 
excepting  perhaps  Said,  did  all  they  could  to  keep 
up  the  system  of  robbery  and  spoliation  that  he  had 
begun.  On  the  other  hand,  the  chiefs  of  the  native 
tribes  did  all  they  could  to  resist  the  power  of 
Egypt,  often  even  to  the  point  of  bloodshed  and 
murder ;  or  paid  their  enforced  tributes  unwillingly 
and  only  after  these  had  been  diminished   by  all 

135 


136    THE   CONFLICT  OF  EAST  AND    WEST  IN  EGYPT. 

possible  peculations.  There  was  an  extensive  in- 
land commerce  in  the  Sudan  that  made  it  a  valuable 
province.  The  yield  of  ivory,  ostrich  feathers, 
grains,  and  tropical  fruits  was  very  large ;  but  the 
traffic  in  slaves  was  the  great  industry  of  the  country. 
The  Sudan  supplied  the  slave  markets  of  the  Eastern 
world.  It  was  this  feature  of  commerce  that  first 
attracted  the  attention  of  the  West  to  the  Sudan. 
It  was  the  motive  of  mercy  that  encouraged  the  in- 
terference of  civilized  people. 

Ismail,  with  all  the  ambition  of  Mehemet  Ali,  was 
ready  to  listen  to  any  plans  for  increasing  his 
authority,  especially  if  they  were  suggested  by 
Europeans.  He  had  long  entertained  a  scheme 
of  aggrandizement  in  the  Sudan  ;  and  he  fancied 
that  expeditions  to  suppress  the  slave-trade,  if 
organized  in  his  name,  would  somehow  secure  the 
extension  of  his  power.  It  may  be  doubted  if  he 
appreciated  the  humanitarian  motives  that  suggested 
to  Englishmen  the  necessity  of  such  an  expedition 
as  Sir  Samuel  W.  Baker  was  deputed  to  lead  in 
1 869  ;  but  he  gave  Sir  Samuel  his  hearty  co-opera- 
tion, and  appointed  him  governor-general  of  the 
entire  region  south  of  Gondokoro.  Several  years 
before  that  time  Ismail  had  reasserted  Egypt's 
authority,  which  had  been  suffered  to  lapse  through 
the  Inactivity  of  Said  and  the  opposition  of  the 
Sudanese,  by  an  extension  of  his  dominion  to  the 


THE   SUDAN  AND  THE  MAHDI.  1 37 

west  in  the  conquest  of  Darfur ;  and  now  he  was 
glad  to  have  his  governor-general  push  on  to  the 
south.  The  story  of  Sir  Samuel's  attempt  to  reach 
his  province,  and  of  his  success  in  abolishing  the 
slave-traffic  only  for  the  time  that  the  slave-posts 
were  under  his  eye,  is  told  in  his  own  book,  Ismailia, 
It  is  enough  to  state  here  that,  despite  his  strenuous 
and  most  worthy  efforts,  he  made  no  permanent 
impression  upon  the  trade  he  sought  to  wipe  out ; 
on  the  contrary,  by  his  opposition  to  the  most  in- 
fluential men  of  the  Sudan,  the  slave-traders,  he 
brought  Egypt  into  greater  odium  then  before,  and 
increased  the  hatred  that  had  always  been  felt  for 
Egyptian  rule. 

The  successor  of  Sir  Samuel  Baker  was  Colonel 
Charles  George  Gordon,  familiarly  known  as  ""  Chi- 
nese Gordon  "  from  his  remarkable  career  in  the 
suppression  of  the  Tai-ping  rebellion  in  China.  He 
was,  perhaps,  the  most  humane  man  in  England ; 
but  his  character  was  as  firm  as  it  was  sweet,  and 
his  courage  was  as  great  as  his  pity.  Of  the  man 
whose  name  has  been  for  years  a  household  word 
among  the  civilized  and  the  heathen,  whose  feats 
have  won  the  admiration  of  the  world,  and  whose 
charities  have  been  the  inspiration  of  the  rich  and 
the  comfort  of  the  poor,  further  characterization  is 
needless.  Suffice  it  to  say  that  Gordon  had  the 
qualities  that  fitted  him  pre-eminently  for  the  work 


138    THE   CONFLICT  OF  EAST  AND    WEST  IN  EGYPT. 

he  undertook  when,  In  1874,  he  started  upon  his 
mission  to  the  Sudan.  He  did  not  give  Ismail 
credit  for  much  philanthropy  ;  for,  before  he  left 
Cairo  for  Khartum,  he  wrote  to  England  : 

I  think  I  can  see  the  true  motive  of  the  expedition,  and 
believe  it  to  be  a  sham  to  catch  the  attention  of  the 
English  people  :  and  feel  like  a  Gordon  who  has  been 
humbugged/ 

Going  to  the  Equatorial  Province,  however,  solely 
on  the  authority  of  Ismail,  he  did  not  question  the 
latter's  motives  too  closely,  but  applied  himself  to 
the  work  of  the  expedition.  He  was  to  establish  a 
series  of  posts  between  Khartum  and  Gondokoro 
and  to  suppress  the  slave-trade.  In  eighteen  months 
Gordon  returned  to  Cairo  and  resigned  his  commis- 
sion under  the  khedive.  This  is  what  he  had  done 
at  that  time  : 

He  had  mapped  the  White  Nile  from  Khartum  to  within 
a  short  distance  of  the  Victoria  Nyanza.  He  had  given  to 
the  slave-trade  on  the  White  Nile  a  deadly  blow.  He  had 
restored  confidence  and  peace  among  the  tribes  of  the 
Nile  valley,  so  that  they  now  freely  brought  into  the 
stations  their  beef,  corn,  and  ivory  for  sale.  He  had 
opened  up  the  water  communication  between  Gondokoro 
and  the  Lakes.  He  had  established  satisfactory  relations 
with  King  M'tesa.  He  had  formed  Government  districts, 
and  established  secure  posts  with  safe  communication  be- 
tween them.  He  had  contributed  a  revenue  to  the  Kh^- 
'  Archibald  Forbes,  Chinese  Gordon,  p.  125. 


THE   SUDAN  AND  THE  MAHDI.  1 39 

divial  exchequer,  and  this  without  oppression.  The  Tai- 
ping  RebelHon  established  Gordon's  genius  as  a  military 
commander ;  the  Equatorial  Provinces,  when  he  left  them, 
testified  not  less  to  his  genius  as  a  philanthropic  and  prac- 
tical administrator/ 

Gordon  resigned  because  Ismail  Yakub,  the  gov- 
ernor-general of  the  Sudan,  threw  so  many  stumbling- 
blocks  in  his  way.  While  he  was  doing  all  he  could 
to  suppress  the  slave-trade,  Ismail  Yakub  was  doing 
all  he  could  to  foster  it.  At  the  beginning  of  1877 
the  khedive  removed  the  latter,  and  wrote  the  fol- 
lowing to  Gordon  (February  1 7)  : 

Setting  a  just  value  on  your  honorable  character,  on 
your  zeal,  and  on  the  great  services  you  have  already 
done  me,  I  have  resolved  to  bring  the  Sudan,  Darfur,  and 
the  provinces  of  the  Equator,  into  one  vast  province,  and 
place  it  under  you  as  Governor-General." 

Gordon  accepted  the  larger  responsibilities  and 
duties  of  the  office  bestowed  upon  him.  For  two 
years  and  more  he  worked  with  indomitable  energy 
in  crushing  the  slave-traffic,  in  putting  down  insur- 
rection, and  in  establishing  his  authority  throughout 
the  vast  provinces  nominally  under  his  control.  In 
spite  of  almost  insuperable  difficulties  in  the  way  of 
inadequate  resources,  both  military  ^  and  financial, 
he  accomplished  wonders.     If  he  had  been  content 

*  Ibid.,  p.  157.  ^  Ibid.,  p.  159. 

'  ' '  The  Sudan  had  been  well-nigh  drained  of  troops  for  the  support  of  the 
sultan  in  his  war  with  Russia."     Ibid.,  p.  162. 


140    THE   CONFLICT  OF  EAST  AND    WEST  IN  EGYPT. 

to  remain  at  Khartum  after  the  fall  of  Ismail,  the 
fame  and  fear  of  the  False  Prophet  might  never 
have  been  known  in  Egypt ;  but  he  was  disgusted 
with  the  abdication,  and  insisted  upon  resigning,  to 
the  no  small  relief,  probably,  of  the  new  khedive 
and  his  ministers,  who  were  glad  to  be  rid  of  all  the 
servants  of  Ismail. 

After  Gordon  left  the  Sudan,  in  1879,  ^^  Egyp- 
tian pasha  was  appointed  governor-general,  and  the 
country  relapsed  into  its  former  feeling  of  bitterness 
toward  Egyptian  rule.  It  was  not  long  before  the 
disaffection  found  its  leader.  He  was  no  less  a  per- 
son than  the  Mahdi,  whose  coming  had  been 
foretold  by  the  prophet  Mohammed.  He  chose  an 
opportune  moment  to  act  as  the  champion  of  his 
people.  They  had  been  incensed  at  the  suppression 
of  the  slave-trade,  they  hated  the  Egyptian  rule, 
and  they  believed  that  the  fourteenth  century  of  the 
Hegira,  which  was  close  at  hand,  would,  in  accord- 
ance with  prophecy,  usher  in  an  era  of  unexampled 
prosperity  and  happiness. 

Mehemet  Ahmed,  who  called  himself  the  Mahdi, 
was  an  obscure  carpenter  s  son,  who  had  studied 
religious  creeds  with  one  sect  of  dervishes  in  Khar- 
tum and  with  another  sect  in  Berber  until  1870, 
when  he  became  a  fakir,  or  dervish-chief,  himself. 
He  then  retired  to  the  island  of  Abba,  on  the  White 
Nile,  where  he  became  famed  for  his  piety.     He 


THE   SUDAN  AND  THE  MAHDI.  I4I 

lived  in  a  cave,  and  gave  himself  up  to  prayers, 
fastings,  and  mortifications  of  the  flesh.  He  won  a 
wide  notoriety,  and  made  many  disciples.  Rich 
gifts  were  bestowed  upon  him,  and  the  neighboring 
sheikhs  gladly  gave  him  their  daughters  in  marriage. 
His  brotherhood  in  Khartum  heard  of  his  devotion, 
wealth,  and  influence,  and  sent  to  him,  early  in 
1 88 1,  a  messenger  to  bid  him  arise,  in  answer  to  the 
call  of  God,  and  lead  a  great  army.  Mehemet 
Ahmed  took  up  the  sword  at  once,  and  in  May  de- 
clared to  the  fakirs  of  the  faith  of  the  Shiites  that 
he  was  the  Imam  Mahdi,  the  new  Messiah  who  had 
come  to  lead  new  believers  into  the  fold  of  Islam, 
and  to  annihilate  all  the  infldels  on  the  face  of  the 
earth.  His  declaration  met  with  no  denial  among 
the  Shiites,  whose  religious  order  was  confined 
almost  wholly  to  the  Sudan ;  but  at  Cairo,  Con- 
stantinople, and  Mecca,  the  report  of  a  Mahdi 
was  scoffed  at.  Where  were  the  signs'  and  por- 
tents that  should  herald  his  coming  ? 

'  The  greater  signs,  among  which  the  coming  of  the  Mahdi  is  reckoned, 
are  seventeen  in  all,  and  it  must  be  confessed  that  some  at  least  among 
these  seem  unlikely  to  be,  for  the  present,  literally  fulfilled.  The  sun 
must  rise  in  the  west  ;  the  beast  must  emerge  from  the  earth  near  Mecca  ; 
the  walls  of  Stambul  must  fall  by  miracle  before  an  invading  foe  ;  the 
Messih  ed-Dejdl,  or  '  Lying  Anointed  One,'  marked  K  F  R  on  his  fore- 
head, one-eyed,  and  riding  from  Irak  on  an  ass,  must  lay  waste  the  earth. 
The  true  Messiah  (our  Lord  Jesus)  must  appear  on  the  minaret  at  Damas- 
cus, must  reign  in  Jerusalem,  and  defeat  Gog  and  Magog,  and  slay  ed- 
Dejal  at  the  gate  of  Lydda.  A  massacre  of  the  Jews,  and  invasion  of  Syria 
by  the  great  giants  (Gog  and  Magog),  who  are  to  drink  dry  the  sea  of 


142    THE   CONFLICT  OF  EAST  AND  WEST  IN  EGYPT. 

But  the  Mahdi  set  about  the  estabHshment  of  "  a 
universal  equaHty,  a  universal  law,  a  universal  re- 
ligion, and  a  community  of  goods,"  '  and  swore  that 
he  would  visit  with  death  all  who  did  not  believe  in 
and  follow  him.  In  August,  Rauf  Pasha,  the 
governor-general  of  the  Sudan,  became  alarmed  at 
the  growing  power  of  the  False  Prophet, — for  such 
he  had  been  declared  by  the  ulemas  of  Constantino- 
ple and  Cairo  and  the  Grand  Sherif  of  Mecca,  the 
highest  priest  of  Islam, — and  he  sent  an  army  to 
crush  him.  But  the  Mahdi  easily  repulsed  the 
Egyptian^  force,  as  he  did  also  a  stronger  force 
sent  against  him  at  the  end  of  1881.  In  June,  1882, 
he  fought  his  first  great  battle,  and  won  a  brilliant 
victory.  Abdel  Kadir,  who  had  succeeded  Rauf 
Pasha  as  governor-general,  sent  out  the  strongest 
force  he  could  muster;  but  it  was  overwelmingly 
defeated  by  the  Mahdi's  fanatical  followers.     Not  a 

Galilee,  a  smoke  which  shall  fill  the  world,  a  relapse  of  Arabia  into  pagan- 
ism, the  discovery  of  hid  treasures  in  the  Euphrates,  the  destruction  of  the 
Kaaba  by  negroes,  beasts  and  stones  speaking  with  human  voices,  a  fire  of 
Yemen,  a  man  of  the  sons  of  Kahtan,  wielding  a  rod,  and  an  icy  wind 
from  Damascus  which  shall  sweep  away  the  souls  of  all  who  have  faith  as 
a  grain  of  mustard-seed,  and  blow  to  heaven  the  Koran  itself  ;  these  are 
the  wonders  which,  together  with  the  coming  of  the  Mahdi,  will  prepare 
the  way  for  the  tremendous  Yossr  ed  Din,  or  final  day  of  judgment." — 
C.  R.  Conder,  The  Guide  of  Islam,  in  The  Fortnightly  Review. 

'A.  Egmont  Hake,  The  Story  of  Chinese  Gordon,  vol,  ii.,  p.  24. 

"  The  government  forces  in  the  Sudan  were  in  large  part  made  up  of 
Egyptian  soldiers,  the  Sudanese  soldiers  being  sent  to  Egypt  in  at  least 
equal  numbers.  This  exchange  of  military  was  held  one  of  the  chief 
grievances  against  Egyptian  rule. 


THE  SUDAN  AND  THE  MAHDI.  I43 

commander  escaped  with  his  life,  and  nearly  every 
Egyptian  soldier  perished.  And  now  for  a  time  the 
False  Prophet  had  things  pretty  much  his  own  way. 
Arabi's  rebellion  not  only  diverted  attention  from 
the  Sudan,  but  it  drew  largely  upon  the  Sudanese 
garrisons  for  troops  to  support  the  nationalist  cause. 
The  Mahdi  became  more  and  more  aggressive,  and 
his  ranks  and  his  coffers  were  continually  filling. 
But,  in  attacking  El  Obeid,  he  was  repulsed  with 
heavy  loss.  He  was  beaten  off  only  temporarily, 
however ;  for  he  soon  returned  and  laid  siege  to  the 
garrison,  which  was  finally  compelled  to  yield, 
January  15,  1883.  The  commander  of  the  garrison 
and  many  of  his  subordinates  saved  their  lives  by 
taking  service  under  the  Mahdi's  standard. 

The  news  of  the  fall  of  Obeid  reached  Egypt 
about  the  beginning  of  February.  The  insurrection 
was  sufficiently  serious  to  demand  the  attention  of 
the  khedive.  Lord  Dufferin,  however,  advised  let- 
ting the  Mahdi  alone  so  long  as  he  remained  In 
Kordofan.  But  the  Egyptian  government  de- 
termined upon  an  expedition,  and  entrusted  Its 
command  to  Colonel  Hicks,  a  retired  English 
officer.  It  was  Impossible,  so  soon  after  Arabi's 
rebellion,  to  send  as  strong  a  force  as  was  desirable. 
The  expedition  consisted  of  eight  English  officers, 
6,000  infantry,  1,000  Irregulars,  500  cavalry,  and  a 
small  force  of  artillery.     The  English  government 


144     THE  CONFLICT  OF  EAST  AND   WEST  IN  EGYPT. 

in  no  way  sanctioned  the  undertaking,  nor  did  they 
oppose  it.  Lord  Granville  gave  Sir  Edward  Malet, 
the  British  consul  at  Cairo,  positive  orders  not  to 
offer  any  advice  on  the  question.  After  the  first 
engagement  between  Hicks  and  the  rebels,  April  9, 
in  which  the  former  achieved  a  brilliant  success, 
Hicks  made  many  appeals  to  Malet  for  reinforce- 
ments ;  but  the  latter  merely  passed  them  on  to  the 
Egyptian  government  without  comment.  As  Mr. 
McCarthy  puts  it, 

Though  England  had  interfered  in  Egypt  by  force  of 
arms  to  keep  the  kh^dive  on  his  throne,  though  Cairo  was 
occupied  by  English  soldiers,  though  it  was  clearly  in 
England's  power,  and  in  her  right,  to  counsel  the  Egyp- 
tian ministry  as  to  the  course  they  should  pursue  in  the 
most  difficult  of  all  Egyptian  questions,  the  ministry  still 
affected  to  keep  up  the  absurd  pretense  of  exercising  no 
influence  upon  the  councils  of  Egypt.' 

England  could  not  shirk  her  responsibility  by  keep- 
ing silent.  She  was  bound  in  all  honor  to  give  her 
advice  at  least ;  and  refusing,  she  failed  of  her  just 
duty  and  obligations.^ 

The  summer  and  the  rainy  season  of  1883  were 
passed  by   Hicks  Pasha  in   Khartum  ;  but  on  the 

'  Justin  McCarthy,  England  Under  Gladstone,  ch.  xv. 

"^  "Why,  then,  it  may  be  asked,  did  not  the  Liberal  Government  use  its 
influence  to  prohibit  General  Hicks's  useless  expedition  ?  The  question  very 
plausibly  suggests  English  responsibility  for  the  expedition,  and  the  conse- 
quences, or  supposed  consequences  of  its  failure."     English  Policy  in  the  ' 
Sudan,  British  Quarterly  Review,  July,  1884. 


THE   SUDAN  AND  THE  MAHDI.  1 45 

9th  of  September  he  set  out  for  El  Obeid,  the 
stronghold  of  the  Mahdi.  The  story  of  his  march 
and  the  details  of  the  final  tragedy  will  probably 
never  be  authentically  told.  The  last  bits  of  news 
were  in  the  letters  of  Edmund  O' Donovan  to  a 
London  newspaper.  He  seems  to  have  appreciated 
the  dangers  of  the  expedition.  On  September  23, 
he  wrote  to  a  friend  : 

It  would  be  odd  if  the  next  intelligence  from  this  part 
of  the  world  told  that  I,  too,  had  gone  the  way  of  all  flesh. 
However,  to  die  even  out  here,  with  a  lance-head  as  big  as 
a  shovel  through  me,  will  meet  my  views  better  than  the 
slow,  gradual  sinking  into  the  grave  which  is  the  lot  of 
so  many.  .  .  .  You  know  I  am  by  this  time,  after  an 
experience  of  many  years,  pretty  well  accustomed  to  dan- 
gers of  most  kinds,  even  some  extra.  Yet  I  assure  you  I 
feel  it  terrible  to  face  deadly  peril  far  away  from  civilized 
ideas,  and  where  no  mercy  is  to  be  met  with,  in  company 
with  cravens  that  you  expect  to  see  run  at  every  moment, 
and  who  will  leave  you  behind  to  face  the  worst. 

When  this  friend  next  heard  of  O' Donovan,  he  had 
"  gone  the  way  of  all  flesh." 

The  accepted  account  of  the  slaughter  of  Hicks 
Pasha's  army  of  11,000  men  is  that,  having  been 
treacherously  led  into  an  ambuscade  on  the  ist  or 
2d  of  November,  they  fought  for  three  days  with 
the  courage  and  hopelessness  of  that  smaller  band 
under  Leonidas  at  Thermopylae  ;  then,  overcome 
with   heat,    thirst,    and    fatigue,    their   ammunition 


146     THE  CONFLICT  OF  EAST  AND   WEST  IN  EGYPT. 

gone,  they  fell  where  they  had  fought,  before  the 
fury  of  the  Mahdi's  hordes.  All  the  Egyptians 
were  massacred,  and  only  one  European  is  known 
to  have  escaped. 

It  was  more  than  two  weeks  before  the  terrible 
news  reached  Khartum  and  was  telegraphed  to 
Cairo.  It  would  be  difficult  to  say  whether  the 
panic  was  greater  in  Egypt  or  in  the  Sudan.  In 
the  Sudan,  governors  of  provinces,  at  the  report 
of  the  Mahdi's  victory,  declared  their  allegiance  to 
the  holy  cause,  and  flocked  to  his  capital  with 
troops  and  treasure.  Nothing  succeeds  like  suc- 
cess. The  vast  region  from  Kordofan  to  the 
equator  was  kindled  to  a  fanatical  zeal.  The 
route  from  Khartum  to  Suakim,  on  the  Red  Sea, 
was  intercepted  by  a  lieutenant  of  the  Mahdi's. 
The  grasp  of  the  Mahdi  seemed  to  be  closing 
about  Khartum.  Colonel  de  Coetlogen,  with  his 
slender  garrison  of  4,000,  could  not  hold  that  city 
before  the  sweep  of  the  rebel  forces.  In  Cairo  the 
consternation  was  no  greater  over  the  defeat  than 
over  England's  opposition  to  an  expedition  to  crush 
the  Mahdi.  Lord  Granville  telegraphed  to  Sir 
Evelyn  Baring,  who  was  now  the  British  repre- 
sentative in  Egypt,  that  the  government  would 
lend  neither  English  nor  Indian  troops  to  assist 
an  expedition.  He  advised  the  abandonment  of 
the  Sudan.      But  the  khedive's  ministers  said  that 


THE  SUDAN  AND  THE  MAHDI,  I47 

they  could  not  give  up  the  territory  that  belonged 
to  the  sultan,  and  of  which  Egypt  was  simply  the 
guardian.  While  negotiations  between  England 
and  Egypt  were  pending,  the  khedive's  government 
decided  to  send  a  force  to  SClakim  to  relieve  the  be- 
leaguered Egyptian  garrisons  at  Sinkat  and  Tokar, 
and  open  the  route  from  the  Red  Sea  to  Berber,  so 
as  to  allow  the  Egyptians  in  Khartum  a  way  of 
escape.  The  expedition  was  placed  under  the  com- 
mand of  Baker  Pasha. 

But  now,  January  4,  1884,  Mr.  Gladstone's  gov- 
ernment expressed  its  advice  more  forcibly  than  a 
month  before. 

It  is  indispensable  [wrote  Lord  Granville]  that  her 
Majesty's  Government  should,  as  long  as  the  provisional 
occupation  of  the  country  by  English  troops  continues, 
be  assured  that  the  advice  which,  after  full  consideration 
of  the  Egyptian  Government,  they  may  feel  it  their  duty 
to  tender  to  the  Khedive  should  be  followed.  It  should 
be  made  clear  to  the  Egyptian  ministers  and  governors  of 
the  provinces  that  the  responsibility  which,  for  the  time, 
rests  on  England,  obliges  her  Majesty's  Government  to 
insist  on  the  adoption  of  the  policy  which  they  recom- 
mend ;  and  that  it  will  be  necessary  that  those  ministers 
and  governors  who  do  not  follow  this  course  should  cease 
to  hold  their  offices. 

This  was  what  Mr.  McCarthy  calls  "  interference 
with  a  vengeance."  '     It  was  the  decisive,  if  tardy, 

'  England  Under  Gladstone,  ch.  xv. 


148    THE   CONFLICT  OF  EAST  AND  WEST  IN  EGYPT. 

assertion  of  authority.  The  note  was  equivalent  to 
saying  that,  in  future,  England's  will  was  to  be  the 
law  of  Egypt.  From  Downing  Street  the  order 
was  issued  that  the  Sudan  must  be  abandoned, 
whereupon  Sherif  s  ministry  resigned.  Nubar  Pasha 
was  called  to  his  place ;  and  he  telegraphed  at  once, 
of  course  at  England's  dictation,  to  Baker,  at  Suakim, 
that  he  must  prepare  for  evacuation. 

But  the  question  now  presented  itself  :  How 
should  the  evacuation  be  effected  ?  The  answer 
was  furnished  by  the  Pall  Mall  Gazette,  of  Lon- 
don. Its  issue  of  January  9  contained  the  following 
suggestion  : 

At  present  it  is  obviously  out  of  the  question  to  send 
an  army  of  relief  to  Colonel  Coetlogen.  Baker  Pasha's 
force  seems  inadequate  even  to  relieve  Sinkat.  In  com- 
mon with  the  ex-Kh^dive,  of  whom  he  speaks  with  re- 
markable cordiality,  General  Gordon  deprecates  the 
despatch  of  either  Indian  or  English  troops  to  the 
Sudan.  But  if  we  have  not  an  Egyptian  army  to  employ 
in  the  service,  and  if  we  must  not  send  an  English  force, 
what  are  we  to  do  ?  There  is  only  one  thing  that  we  can 
do.  We  cannot  send  a  regiment  to  Khartum,  but  we  can 
send  a  man  who,  on  more  than  one  occasion,  has  proved 
himself  more  valuable  in  similar  circumstances  than  an 
entire  army.  Why  not  send  Chinese  Gordon  with  full 
powers  to  Khartum,  to  assume  absolute  control  of  the 
territory,  to  treat  with  the  Mahdi,  to  relieve  the  garrisons, 
and  do  what  can  be  done  to  save  what  can  be  saved  from 


THE   SUDAN  AND  THE  MAHDE  149 

the  wreck  in  the  Sudan  ?  .  .  .  No  one  can  deny  the 
urgent  need  in  the  midst  of  that  hideous  welter  of  con- 
fusion for  the  presence  of  such  a  man,  with  a  born  genius 
for  command,  an  unexampled  capacity  in  organizing 
"  ever-victorious  armies,"  and  a  perfect  knowledge  of 
the  Sudan  and  its  people.  Why  not  send  him  out  with 
carte  blanche  to  do  the  best  that  can  be  done?  He  may 
not  be  able  single-handed  to  reduce  that  raging  chaos  to 
order,  but  the  attempt  is  worth  making,  and  if  it  is  to  be 
made,  it  will  have  to  be  made  at  once. 

The  popular  feeling  was  found  to  be  heartily  in 
accord  with  this  suggestion,  and  a  clamor  was  im- 
mediately raised  on  all  sides  for  the  dispatch  of 
Gordon  to  the  Sudan.  The  British  government, 
some  weeks  before,  had  offered  to  appoint  an  Eng- 
lish officer  to  go  to  Khartum  and  organize  the 
evacuation ;  but  the  Egyptian  ministry  had  not 
taken  up  the  offer.  Now,  however,  Nubar  informed 
Sir  Evelyn  Baring  that  such  an  appointment  would 
be  accepted.  The  British  government,  therefore, 
at  once  communicated  with  Gordon,  recalling  him 
from  Brussels  on  the  17th  of  January  where  he  had 
just  arrived  to  receive  the  last  instructions  of  the 
king  of  Belgium,  before  proceeding  on  an  anti- 
slavery  mission  to  the  Congo.  He  returned  to 
London  that  same  day,  and  on  the  morning  of  the 
1 8th  was  closeted  with  members  of  the  English 
cabinet.  On  Saturday,  the  19th  the  London  Times 
startled  the  world  with  the  following  announcement : 


I50    THE   CONFLICT  OF  EAST  AND   WEST  IN  EGYPT. 

It  will  be  a  welcome  surprise  to  the  country  to  learn 
that  General  Gordon  started  last  night,  not  for  the  Congo, 
but  for  Egypt.  .  .  .  He  takes  with  him,  as  his  mili- 
tary secretary,  Lieutenant-Colonel  Stewart,  who  was  on 
duty  at  Khartum  so  late  as  last  year,  and  whose  knowledge 
of  the  affairs  of  the  Sudan  is  second  only  to  that  of 
General  Gordon  himself.  The  immediate  purpose  of  the 
General's  mission  is,  we  understand,  to  report  on  the 
military  situation  in  the  Sudan,  to  provide  in  the  best 
manner  for  the  safety  of  the  European  population  of 
Khartum  and  of  the  Egyptian  garrisons  still  in  the  coun- 
tr>%  as  well  as  for  the  evacuation  of  the  Sudan  with  the 
exception  of  the  seaboard.  His  appointment  will  be  re- 
ceived by  the  country  with  a  certain  sense  of  relief,  as 
showing  that  the  Government  has  been  willing  to  seek 
the  best  advice  and  to  select  the  most  competent  agent  for 
the  development  of  its  policy  in  the  Sudan. 


VIII. 

THE     MISSION     OF     GORDON. OPERATIONS      IN     THE 

EASTERN    SUDAN. 

ENGLAND  had  now  taken  a  firm  stand.  She 
largely  increased  her  responsibilities  by  en- 
trusting Gordon  with  the  Sudanese  mission.  She 
had  been  niggardly  even  with  advice  in  the  case 
of  Hicks,  but  she  was  ready  to  hazard  all  with  Gor- 
don. Her  unquestionable  responsibility  will  be 
proved  by  the  following  documents.  The  day  that 
Gordon  left  London,  Lord  Granville  gave  him  this 
note  of  instruction  : 

'  Foreign  Office,  Jan,  i8th,  1884. 

Sir  : — Her  Majesty's  Government  are  desirous  that  you 
should  proceed  at  once  to  Egypt,  to  report  to  them  on 
the  military  situation  in  the  Sudan  and  on  the  measures 
which  it  may  be  advisable  to  take  for  the.  security  of  the 
Egyptian  garrisons  still  holding  possession  in  that  coun- 
try, and  for  the  safety  of  the  European  population  in 
Khartum.  You  are  also  desired  to  consider  and  report 
upon  the  best  mode  of  effecting  the  evacuation  of  the  in- 
terior of  the  Sudan,  and  upon  the  manner  in  which  the 
safety   and    the   good    administration   by   the    Egyptian 

151 


152      THE  CONFLICT  OF  EAST  AND   WEST  IN  EGYPT. 

Government  of  the  ports  on  the  seacoast  can  best  be  se- 
cured. In  connection  with  this  subject,  you  should  pay 
especial  consideration  to  the  question  of  the  steps  that 
may  usefully  be  taken  to  counteract  the  stimulus  which 
it  is  feared  may  possibly  be  given  to  the  slave  trade  by 
the  present  insurrectionary  movement  and  by  the  with- 
drawal of  the  Egyptian  authority  from  the  interior. 
You  will  be  under  the  instructions  of  her  Majesty's 
agent  and  Consul-General  at  Cairo,  through  whom  your 
reports  to  her  Majesty's  Government  should  be  sent 
under  flying  seal.  You  will  consider  yourself  authorized 
and  instructed  to  perform  such  other  duties  as  the 
Egyptian  Government  may  desire  to  entrust  to  you,  and 
as  may  be  communicated  to  you  by  Sir  E.  Baring.  You 
will  be  accompanied  by  Colonel  Stewart,  who  will  assist 
you  in  the  duties  thus  confided  to  you.  On  your  arrival 
in  Egypt  you  will  at  once  communicate  with  Sir  E.  Bar- 
ing, who  will  arrange  to  meet  you,  and  will  settle  with 
you  whether  you  should  proceed  direct  to  Suakim,  or 
should  go  yourself  or  despatch  Colonel  Stewart  to  Khar- 
tum, via  the  Nile. 

I  am,  etc.,  Granville. 

While  Gordon  was  on  his  way  to  Egypt  he 
wrote  the  following  notes,  explanatory  of  the  above 
instructions,  and  developed  in  accordance  with  the 
views  expressed  at  the  conference  on  January  i8. 
These  notes  were  forwarded  from  Cairo  to  the 
Foreign  Office  at  London. 

I.  I  understand  that  her  Majesty's  Government  have 
come  to  the  irrevocable  decision  not  to  incur  the  very 


THE  MISSION  OF  GORDON.  I  53 

onerous  duty  of  securing  to  the  peoples  of  the  Sudan 
a  just  future  government.  That,  as  a  consequence,  her 
Majesty's  Government  have  determined  to  restore  to 
these  peoples  their  independence,  and  will  no  longer 
suffer  the  Egyptian  Government  to  interfere  with  their 
affairs. 

2.  For  this  purpose  her  Majesty's  Government  have 
decided  to  send  me  to  the  Sudan  to  arrange  for  the 
evacuation  of  these  countries,  and  the  safe  removal  of 
the  Egyptian  employes  and  troops. 

3.  Keeping  paragraph  I  in  view,  viz.,  that  the  evacua- 
tion of  the  Sudan  is  irrevocably  decided  on,  it  will  depend 
on  circumstances  in  what  way  this  is  to  be  accomplished. 
My  idea  is  that  the  restoration  of  the  country  should  be 
made  to  the  different  petty  Sultans  who  existed  at  the 
time  of  Mehemet  All's  conquest,  and  whose  famihes  still 
exist ;  that  the  Mahdi  should  be  left  altogether  out  of 
the  calculation  as  regards  the  handing  over  the  country ; 
and  that  it  should  be  optional  with  the  Sultans  to  accept 
his  supremacy  or  not.  As  these  Sultans  would  probably 
not  be  likely  to  gain  by  accepting  the  Mahdi  as  their 
sovereign,  it  is  probable  that  they  will  hold  to  their  in- 
dependent positions.  Thus  we  should  have  two  factors 
to  deal  with  ;  namely,  the  petty  Sultans  asserting  their 
several  independence,  and  the  Mahdi's  party  aiming  at 
supremacy  over  them.  To  hand,  therefore,  over  to  the 
Mahdi  the  arsenals,  etc.,  would,  I  consider,  be  a  mistake. 
They  should  be  handed  over  to  the  Sultans  of  the  states 
in  which  they  are  placed.  The  most  difficult  question  is 
how  and  to  whom  to  hand  over  the  arsenals  of  Khartum, 
Dongola,  and  Kassala,  which  towns  have,  so  to  say,  no  old 
standing  famiHes,  Khartum  and  Kassala  having  sprung 


154    THE   CONFLICT  OF  EAST  AND  WEST  IN  EGYPT. 

up  since  Mehemet  Ali's  conquest.  Probably  it  would  be 
advisable  to  postpone  any  decision  as  to  these  towns  till 
such  time  as  the  inhabitants  have  made  known  their 
opinion. 

4.  I  have,  in  paragraph  3,  postponed  the  transfer  of 
the  lands  to  the  local  Sultans,  and  stated  my  opinion  that 
these  will  not  accept  the  supremacy  of  the  Mahdi.  If 
this  is  agreed  to  and  my  supposition  is  correct  as  to  their 
action,  there  can  be  but  little  doubt  that,  as  far  as  he  is 
able,  the  Mahdi  will  endeavor  to  assert  his  rule  over  them, 
and  will  be  opposed  to  any  evacuation  of  the  Government 
employes  and  troops.  My  opinion  of  the  Mahdi's  force 
is,  that  the  bulk  of  those  who  were  with  him  at  Obeid 
will  refuse  to  cross  the  Nile,  and  that  those  who  do  so 
will  not  exceed  3000  or  4000  men  ;  and  also,  that  these 
will  be  composed  principally  of  black  troops  who  have 
deserted,  and  who,  if  offered  fair  terms,  would  come  over 
to  the  Government  side.  In  such  a  case,  viz,^  "  Sultans 
accepting  transfer  of  territory  and  refusing  the  supremacy 
of  the  Mahdi,  and  Mahdi's  troops  coming  over  to  the 
Government,"  resulting  weakness  of  the  Mahdi,  what 
should  be  done  should  the  Mahdi's  adherents  attack 
the  evacuating  columns?  It  cannot  be  supposed  that 
these  are  to  offer  no  resistance,  and  if  in  resisting  they 
should  obtain  a  success,  it  would  be  but  reasonable  to 
allow  them  to  follow  up  the  Mahdi  to  such  a  position  as 
would  insure  their  future  safe  march.  This  is  one  of 
those  diflficult  questions  which  our  Government  can  hardly 
be  expected  to  answer,  but  which  may  arise,  and  to  which 
I  would  call  attention.  Paragraph  i  fixes  irrevocably  the 
decision  of  the  Government,  viz.,  to  evacuate  the  territory, 
and,  of  course,  as  far  as  possible,  involves  the  avoidance 


THE  MISSION  OF  GORDON,  155 

of  any  fighting.  I  can  therefore  only  say,  that  having  in 
view  paragraph  I,  and  seeing  the  difficulty  of  asking  her 
Majesty's  Government  to  give  a  decision  or  direction  as 
to  what  should  be  done  in  certain  cases,  that  I  will  carry 
out  the  evacuation  as  far  as  possible  according  to  their 
wish  to  the  best  of  my  ability,  and  with  avoidance,  as  far 
as  possible,  of  all  fighting.  I  would,  however,  hope  that 
her  Majesty's  Government  will  give  me  their  support  and 
consideration,  should  I  be  unable  to  fulfill  all  their  ex- 
pectations. 

5.  Though  it  is  out  of  my  province  to  give  any  opinion 
as  to  the  action  of  her  Majesty's  Government  in  leaving 
the  Stldan,  still,  I  must  say  it  would  be  an  iniquity  to  re- 
conquer these  peoples,  and  then  hand  them  back  to  the 
Egyptians  without  guaranties  of  future  good  government. 
It  is  evident  that  this  we  cannot  secure  without  an  in- 
ordinate expenditure  of  men  and  money.  The  Sudan  is 
a  useless  possession,  ever  was  so,  and  ever  will  be  so. 
Larger  than  Germany,  France,  and  Spain  together,  and 
mostly  barren,  it  cannot  be  governed  except  by  a  Dictator, 
who  may  be  good  or  bad.  If  bad,  he  will  cause  constant 
revolts.  No  one  who  has  ever  lived  in  the  Sudan  can 
escape  the  reflection  :  "  What  a  useless  possession  is  this 
land."  Few  men  can  stand  its  fearful  monotony  and 
deadly  climate. 

6.  Said  Pasha,  the  Viceroy  before  Ismail,  went  up  to 
the  Sudan  with  Count  F.  de  Lesseps.  He  was  so  dis- 
couraged and  horrified  at  the  misery  of  the  people,  that 
at  Berber  Count  de  Lesseps  saw  him  throw  his  gun  into 
the  river,  declaring  that  he  would  be  no  party  to  such  op- 
pression. It  was  only  after  the  urgent  solicitation  of 
European  consuls    that    he    reconsidered    his    decision. 


156     THE  CONFLICT  OF  EAST  AND   WEST  IN  EGYPT. 

Therefore,  I  think  her  Majesty's  Government  are  fully- 
justified  in  recommending  the  evacuation,  inasmuch  as 
the  sacrifice  necessary  toward  securing  a  good  government 
would  be  far  too  onerous  to  admit  of  such  an  attempt  be- 
ing made.  Indeed,  one  may  say  it  is  impracticable  at  any 
cost.  Her  Majesty's  Government  will  now  leave  them  as 
God  has  placed  them  ;  they  are  not  forced  to  fight  among 
themselves,  and  they  will  no  longer  be  oppressed  by 
men  coming  from  lands  so  remote  as  Circassia,  Kurdistan, 
and  Anatolia. 

Colonel  Stewart,  also,  while  on  the  way  to  Cairo, 
addressed  some  observations  to  the  Foreign  Office, 
of  which  the  following  is  of  some  importance  as 
showing  Gordon's  independence  of  Egypt  and 
direct  dependence  upon  England  as  the  authority 
of  his  actions  : 

I,  of  course,  understand  that  General  Gordon  is  going 
to  the  Sudan  with  full  powers  to  make  all  arrangements 
as  to  its  evacuation,  and  that  he  is  in  no  way  to  be  inter- 
fered with  by  the  Cairo  Ministers ;  also,  that  any  sugges- 
tions or  remarks  that  the  Cairo  Government  would  wish 
to  make  are  to  be  made  directly  to  him  and  her  Majesty's 
Minister  Plenipotentiary,  and  that  no  intrigues  are  to  be 
permitted  against  his  authority.  Any  other  course  would, 
I  am  persuaded,  make  his  mission  a  failure. 

While  Gordon  was  in  Cairo,  Sir  Evelyn  Baring 
communicated  to  him  the  following  additional  in- 
structions : 

Lord  Granville  ''  authorized  and  instructed  you  to  per- 


THE  MISSION  OF  GORDON.  1 57 

form  such  duties  as  the  Egyptian  Government  may  desire 
to  entrust  to  you,  and  as  may  be  communicated  to  you  by 
Sir  E.  Baring."  I  have  now  to  indicate  to  you  the  views 
of  the  Egyptian  Government  on  two  of  the  points  to 
which  your  special  attention  was  directed  by  Lord  Gran- 
ville. These  are,  (i)  the  measures  which  it  may  be  ad- 
visable to  take  for  the  security  of  the  Egyptian  garrisons 
still  holding  positions  in  the  Sudan,  and  for  the  safety  of 
the  European  population  in  Khartum  ;  (2)  the  best  mode 
of  effecting  the  evacuation  of  the  interior  of  the  Sudan. 
These  two  points  are  intimately  connected,  and  may  con- 
veniently be  considered  together.  It  is  believed  that  the 
number  of  Europeans  at  Khartum  is  very  small,  but  it  has 
been  estimated  by  the  local  authorities  that  some  10,000 
to  15,000  people  will  wish  to  move  northward  from  Khar- 
tum only  when  the  Egyptian  garrison  is  withdrawn.  These 
people  are  native  Christians,  Egyptian  employes,  their 
wives  and  children,  etc.  The  Government  of  his  High- 
ness the  Khedive  is  earnestly  solicitous  that  no  effort 
should  be  spared  to  insure  the  retreat  both  of  these 
people  and  of  the  Egyptian  garrison  without  loss  of  life. 
As  regards  the  most  opportune  time  and  the  best  method 
for  effecting  the  retreat,  whether  of  the  garrison  or  of  the 
civil  populations,  it  is  neither  necessary  nor  desirable  that 
you  should  receive  detailed  instructions.  A  short  time 
ago  the  local  authorities  pressed  strongly  on  the  Egyptian 
Government  the  necessity  for  giving  orders  for  an  imme- 
diate retreat.  Orders  were  accordingly  given  to  com- 
mence at  once  the  withdrawal  of  the  civil  population. 
No  sooner,  however,  had  these  orders  been  issued  than  a 
telegram  was  received  from  the  SOdan,  strongly  urging 
that   the   orders  for  commencing  the  retreat  should  be 


158     THE  CONFLICT  OF  EAST  AND   WEST  IN  EGYPT. 

delayed.  Under  these  circumstances,  and  in  view  of  the 
fact  that  the  position  at  Khartum  is  now  represented  as 
being  less  critical  for  the  moment  than  it  was  a  short  time 
ago,  it  was  thought  desirable  to  modify  the  orders  for  the 
immediate  retreat  of  the  civil  population,  and  to  await 
your  arrival.  You  will  bear  in  mind  that  the  main  end 
to  be  pursued  is  the  evacuation  of  the  Sudan.  This  policy 
was  adopted,  after  a  very  full  discussion,  by  the  Egyptian 
Government,  on  the  advice  of  her  Majesty's  Government. 
It  meets  with  the  full  approval  of  his  Highness  the  Khe- 
dive, and  of  the  present  Egyptian  Ministry.  I  understand, 
also,  that  you  entirely  concur  in  the  desirability  of  adopt- 
ing this  policy,  and  that  you  think  it  should  on  no  account 
be  changed.  You  consider  that  it  may  take  a  few  months 
to  carry  it  out  with  safety.  You  are  further  of  opinion 
that  "  the  restoration  of  the  country  should  be  made  to 
the  different  petty  Sultans  who  existed  at  the  time  of 
Mehemet  Ali's  conquest,  and  whose  families  still  exist  "  ; 
and  that  an  endeavor  should  be  made  to  form  a  confedera- 
tion of  those  Sultans.  In  this  view  the  Egyptian  Govern- 
ment entirely  concurs.  It  will,  of  course,  be  fully  under- 
stood that  the  Egyptian  troops  are  not  to  be  kept  in  the 
Sudan  merely  with  the  view  to  consolidating  the  power 
of  the  new  rulers  of  the  country.  But  the  Egyptian 
Government  has  the  fullest  confidence  in  your  judgment, 
your  knowledge  of  the  country,  and  of  your  comprehen- 
sion of  the  general  line  of  policy  to  be  pursued.  You  are, 
therefore,  given  full  discretionary  power  to  retain  the 
troops  for  such  reasonable  period  as  you  may  think 
necessary,  in  order  that  the  abandonment  of  the  country 
may  be  accomplished  with  the  least  possible  risk  of  life 
and  property.     A  credit  of  ;^  100,000  has  been  opened  for 


THE  MISSION  OF  GORDON.  1 59 

you  at  the  Finance  Department,  and  further  funds  will  be 
supplied  to  you  on  your  requisition  when  this  sum  is  ex- 
hausted. In  undertaking  the  difficult  task  which  now  lies 
before  you,  you  may  feel  assured  that  no  effort  will  be 
wanting-  on  the  part  of  the  Cairo  authorities,  whether 
English  or  Egyptians,  to  afford  you  all  the  co-operation 
and  support  in  their  power. 

On  the  26th  of  January,  General  Gordon,  Colonel 
Stewart,  and  the  newly-appointed  sultan  of  Darfur,' 
with  no  escort  beyond  their  personal  attendants,  left 
Cairo  for  Khartum,  by  way  of  Siut,  Assuan,  Wady 
Haifa,  Abu  Hamed,  and  Berber. 

While  this  daring  party  was  hastening  toward 
Khartum  as  swiftly  as  railway,  steamer,  and  camel 
could  carry  them,  events  of  a  portentous  nature 
were  occurring  elsewhere.  On  the  5th  of  February 
the  British  Parliament  was  opened,  and  on  the  same 
day  the  news  was  received  in  London  that  Baker 
Pasha  had  been  defeated  near  Tokar,  with  a  loss 
of  2,000  men,  and  had  fallen  back  with  the  remain- 
der of  his  army — some  1,200 — on  Trinkitat,  himself 
escaping  death  by  a  reckless  dash  through  the  Arab 
ranks.  Osman  Digna,  the  Mahdi's  lieutenant,  had 
carried  all  before  him.  Trinkitat  could  not  hold 
out  against  him,  and  fears  were  entertained  even 
for  Suakim,  although  Admiral  Hewett  had  just 
landed  a  force  there.     These  were  not  favorable 

'  The  khedive  had  reinstated  the  heir  to  the  sultanship,  who  was  a  cap- 
tive in  Cairo,  as  the  first  step  toward  carrying  out  Gordon's  policy. 


l6o     THE  CONFLICT  OF  EAST  AND   WEST  IN  EGYPT. 

auspices  for  the  opening  of  Parliament.  The  cus- 
tomary placid  language  of  the  Queen  s  speech  was 
strangely  at  variance  with  the  feelings  of  those  who 
listened  to  it.  A  vote  of  censure  upon  the  govern- 
ment was  at  once  moved,  but  it  was  rejectectin  the 
form  offered,  and  the  subject  was  postponed  for  a 
few  days.  In  the  meantime  public  opinion  on  the 
necessity  of  active  interference  and  responsibility 
had  strengthened  to  the  point  of  insistance.  The 
London  Times  voiced  the  widespread  sentiment  in 
saying  : 

This  fatuous  effort  to  evade  the  grasp  of  facts  must  now 
be  abandoned,  and  even  with  respect  to  the  past  the 
world  will  be  obstinately  incredulous.  Not  only  in  Eu- 
rope, as  may  be  seen  from  the  strong  language  used  by 
the  French  press,  but  among  the  Mohammedan  popula- 
tions of  the  East,  England  is  held  to  be  responsible  for 
the  expeditions  of  Hicks  Pasha  and  Baker  Pasha  not  less 
than  for  the  mission  of  General  Gordon.* 

The  excitement  caused  by  the  news  of  Baker's 
defeat  was  further  increased  by  the  report  of  the 
slaughter  of  the  Sinkat  garrison.  Baker's  expedi- 
tion had  utterly  failed  in  the  offensive.  The  vote 
of  censure  came  on  the  1 2th.  The  identical  motion 
was  offered  in  the  upper  House  by  Lord  Salisbury, 
and  in  the  lower  House  by  Sir  Stafford  Northcote  : 

That  this  House,  having  read  and  considered  the  cor- 
J  The  Times,  Feb.  7,  1884. 


THE  MISSION  OF  GORDON.  l6l 

respondence  relating  to  Egypt,  laid  on  the  table  by  her 
Majesty's  command,  is  of  opinion  that  the  recent  lamen- 
table events  in  the  Sudan  are  due,  in  a  great  measure,  to 
the  vacillating  and  inconsistent  policy  pursued  by  her 
Majesty's  Government. 

The  motion  was  carried  against  the  government 
by  one  hundred  majority  in  the  House  of  Lords, 
but  it  was  lost  in  the  House  of  Commons,  where 
Mr.  Gladstone  made  an  ingenious  defence  of  his 
policy  of  non-intervention,  and  of  his  claim  of  irre- 
sponsibility for  the  slaughter  of  the  Hicks  and  the 
defeat  of  the  Baker  expedition.  Relief  had  not  been 
sent  to  Sinkat,  because  it  was  believed  that  such  a 
move  would  endanger  the  lives  of  Gordon  and 
those  whom  he  had  been  sent  to  rescue,  and  the 
chief  desire  of  her  Majesty's  government  was  to 
secure  the  evacuation,  the  peaceful  evacuation,  of 
the  interior  of  the  Sudan.  England  was  the  guar- 
dian of  Egyptian  interests,  and  the  welfare  of  the 
land  demanded  that  Gordon's  mission  should  be 
successfully  executed.  '*  For,"  said  Mr.  Gladstone, 
"  I  look  upon  the  possession  of  the  Sudan — I  won't 
say  as  a  crime — that  would  be  going  a  great  deal 
too  far — but  I  look  upon  it  as  the  calamity  of 
Egypt.  It  has  been  a  drain  on'  her  treasury,  it  has 
been  a  drain  on  her  men."  The  government  was 
saved  in  the  Commons  by  a  majority  of  forty-nine. 

In  spite,   now,  of  the  reasons  assigned  for  not 


1 62    THE   CONFLICT  OF  EAST  AND   WEST  IN  EGYPT. 

having  rescued  the  garrison  of  Sinkat,  the  EngHsh 
government  authorized  the  dispatch  of  General 
Graham  for  the  reHef  of  Tokar,  Admiral  Hewett 
having  already,  with  English  sanction,  assumed  the 
general  command  of  forces  at  Suakim.  Before 
Graham  had  landed  his  force  at  Trinkitat,  however, 
Tokar  had  succumbed,  the  greater  part  of  the  gar- 
rison joining  the  standard  of  Osman  Digna.  On 
the  last  day  of  February,  Graham  marched  forth 
and  met  and  overcame  the  intrepid  lieutenant  of  the 
Mahdi  on  the  field  where  Baker's  force  had  been 
defeated.  This  success  was  followed  up  by  further 
advances,  and  on  March  13  a  decisive  victory  was 
won.  The  backbone  of  the  Mahdi's  power  in  the 
eastern  Sudan  seemed  broken.  But  at  this  juncture 
General  Graham  was  ordered  to  embark  his  troops 
and  leave  the  seat  of  war  at  once.  This  was  a  fatal 
order.  Then  was  the  time,  Osman' s  forces  having 
been  beaten  and  scattered,  to  open  the  route  from 
Suakim  to  Berber,  and  afford  an  egress  for  the  gar- 
risons of  the  interior.  The  opportunity  was  missed 
and  never  was  presented  again.  Osman  gathered 
together  his  forces,  strengthened  his  power  at  his 
leisure,  and  held  himself  in  readiness  to  carry  out 
his  old  threat  of  sweeping  Suakim  and  every  soul  it 
contained  into  the  Red  Sea. 


IX. 


GORDON     AT     KHARTUM,    AND     THE    GOVERNMENT     IN 

LONDON. 

WE  left  General  Gordon  on  his  way  to  Khar- 
tum. He  arrived  there  on  February  i8.  At 
Berber  he  had  issued  a  proclamation  declaring  the 
purpose  and  policy  of  his  mission.  He  had  come 
to  establish  tranquillity  and  prevent  the  shedding 
of  Moslem  blood  ;  to  secure  to  the  inhabitants 
their  rights  of  property,  and  to  put  an  end  to 
injustice  and  oppression.  He  reduced  the  taxes 
one-half,  and  wiped  off  all  arrearages.  He  con- 
ferred upon  the  people  the  right,  of  which  they 
had  been  deprived  at  the  expense  of  time,  treasure, 
and  blood,  to  hold  slaves  as  property,  with  full 
control  over  their  services.  He  guaranteed  them 
the  privileges  they  enjoyed  under  Said  Pasha,  and 
promised  prosperity  and  happiness.  In  consequence 
of  this  proclamation  Gordon's  journey  from  Berber 
to  Khartum  was  a  triumphal  march.  The  natives 
flocked  to  bless  him  as  their  king  and  deliverer,  and 
he  was  received  at  Khartum  with  cries  of  rejoicing. 

163 


164    THE   CONFLICT  OF  EAST  AND   WEST  IN  EGYPT, 

His  proclamation  had  a  very  different  effect  in  the 
outside  world.  European  nations  stood  aghast 
Gordon,  the  arch  enemy  of  the  slave-trade,  de- 
clared himself  its  friend  !  England  received  the 
news  with  consternation  and  horror.  Every  Wilber- 
force  of  the  nation  raised  his  voice  of  protest.  The 
clamor  precipitated  a  second  vote  of  censure,  which 
was  offered  by  M.  Labouchere  on  March  15,  the 
ground  of  censure,  however,  being  nominally  the 
useless  waste  of  life  in  the  operations  about  Suakim. 
The  government  barely  escaped  defeat,  the  majority 
being  only  seventeen.  The  criticism  on  General 
Gordon  for  his  slave-trade  proclamation  was  as 
blind  as  his  policy  was  far-sighted.  He  had  been 
sent  to  secure  the  evacuation  of  the  Sudan,  after 
which  every  sane  man  knew  the  country  would 
return  to  its  old  traffic  ;  for  Gordon  could  scarcely 
be  expected  to  say  :  We  are  to  withdraw,  but  you 
are  to  frown  upon  the  slave-trade  just  as  though  we 
were  here  to  compel  you.  The  peaceful  evacuation, 
Gordon  well  knew,  could  only  be  secured  by  con- 
ciliation, and  the  best  favors  to  grant  were  those 
the  people  were  bound  to  gain.  The  wisdom  of 
his  proclamation  needed  no  further  proof  than  the 
excessive  friendliness  of  the  greetings  along  his 
march  and  of  his  reception  at  Khartum. 

Gordon  devoted  his  first  day  in  Khartum  to  acts 
of  mercy.     He  said  to  the  people  :  "  I  come  with- 


GORDON  AND  THE    GOVERNMENT,  1 65 

out  soldiers,  but  with  God  on  my  side,  to  redress 
the  evils  of  this  land.  I  will  not  fight  with  any 
weapons  but  justice."  He  won  the  hearts  of  all  at 
once  by  burning  the  government  books  and  all  in- 
struments of  torment  and  torture,  by  releasing  the 
unjustly  imprisoned,  and  by  devoting  himself  per- 
sonally to  the  sick  and  the  wronged.  That  first 
day,  also,  he  sent  a  dispatch  to  Sir  Evelyn  Baring, 
saying  that  it  would  be  folly  to  leave  the  Sudan 
unless  some  one  were  to  take  his  place  as  governor- 
general.  Anarchy  and  misery  would  surely  ensue. 
He  named  Zubair  Pasha '  as  the  one  above  all 
others  to  select  for  the  position.  ''  He  alone,"  he 
wrote,  ''  has  the  ability  to  rule  the  Sudan,  and 
would  be  universally  accepted  by  the  Sudan."  Sir 
Evelyn  Baring  forwarded  the  suggestion  the  next 
day  to  Earl  Granville,  and  heartily  urged  its  adop- 
tion, believing,  as  he  said,  that  Zubair  was  the  only 
possible  man. 

It  had  been  supposed,  and,  in  fact.  General  Gor- 
don himself  had  so  understood  it,  that  he  was  to 
have  the  dictatorial  power  in  the  Sudan  that  the 
crisis  demanded.  The  English  government,  how- 
ever, immediately  repelled  the  notion  of  appointing 

^  Zubair  had  had  great  power  in  the  Sudan,  where  he  was  king  of  the 
slave-traders.  He  was,  at  this  time,  confined  in  Cairo,  his  captivity  being 
lightened  by  a  liberal  allowance.  Zubair  was  supposed  to  bear  an  undying 
grudge  against  Gordon,  because  Gordon  had  killed  his  (Zubair's)  son  in  the 
Sudan  during  a  previous  campaign. 


l66    THE    CONFLICT  OF  EAST  AND   WEST  IN  EGYPT. 

old  slave-trading  Zubair  governor-general.  A  long 
series  of  telegrams  passed  between  Gordon,  Baring, 
and  Granville  on  the  subject.  Gordon  besought 
and  Baring  expostulated  ;  but  the  government  was 
blind  to  all  reason — to  everything  but  the  fear  of  a 
renewal  of  the  slave-trade,  which,  in  point  of  fact, 
was  assured  the  day  the  evacuation  of  the  Sudan 
was  decided  upon.  General  Gordon  afterward  re- 
duced the  government's  reasoning  on  this  point  to 
a  simple  form  :^  ''  I  will  not  send  up  A.,  because  he 
will  do  this  ;  but  I  will  leave  the  country  to  B.,  who 
will  do  exactly  the  same."  Baring  telegraphed  to 
Granville  (March  9)  : 

As  regards  slavery,  it  may  certainly  receive  a  stimulus 
from  the  abandonment  of  the  Sudan  by  Egypt ;  but  the 
despatch  of  Zubair  Pasha  to  Khartum  will  not  affect  the 
question  one  way  or  the  other.  No  middle  course  is 
possible  so  far  as  the  Sudan  is  concerned.  We  must 
either  virtually  annex  the  country,  which  is  out  of  the 
question,  or  else  we  must  accept  the  inevitable  conse- 
quences of  abandoment. 

But  the  British  government  wished  to  abandon 
the  Sudan,  and  yet  avoid  the  ''  inevitable  con- 
sequences." Gordon  maintained  that  to  prevent 
anarchy  it  was  necessary  to  ''smash  up"  the  Mahdi, 
and  that  Zubair  was  the  only  one  who  had  enough 
influence  and  prestige  of  family  to  do  it.     Gordon 

*  General  Gordon's  Journal,  p.  42.     (September  17.) 


GORDON-  AND  THE   GOVERNMENT.  1 67 

could  not  bear  the  thought  of  leaving  the  Sudan  to 
ruin.  He  sent,  March  8,  a  further  argument,  that 
should  have  had  some  weight  with  the  government : 
''If  you  do  not  send  Zubair,  you  have  no  chance  of 
getting  the  garrisons  away ;  this  is  a  heavy  argu- 
ment in  favor  of  sending  him." 

But  it  was  of  no  use.  On  March  28,  Earl  Granville 
sent  a  long  note  to  Sir  Evelyn  Baring,  in  which  he 
reviewed  the  discussion  at  length,  and  even  re- 
hearsed the  slavery  antecedents  of  Zubair.  It  is 
impossible,  after  all  the  months  that  have  intervened 
since  that  note  was  written,  to  read  it  dispassion- 
ately.    Granville  wrote  : 

Her  Majesty's  Government,  on  the  perusal  of  General 
Gordon's  advice,  were  under  the  impression  that  he  gave 
undue  weight  to  the  assumed  necessity  of  an  immediate 
evacuation  of  Khartum,  and  they  inquired  whether  it  was 
urgent  to  make  an  arrangement  at  once  to  provide  for  his 
successor,  expressing  a  hope  that  General  Gordon  would 
remain  for  some  time. 

In  other  words,  her  Majesty's  government  thought 
that  the  ''  necessity  of  an  immediate  evacuation  " 
could  be  more  judiciously  determined  in  Downing 
Street  than  in  Khartum.  The  question  could  be 
decided  certainly  more  safely.  It  is  not  necessary 
to  go  through  Lord  Granville's  note  in  detail.  The 
vain  desire  is  clearly  manifest  throughout,  that 
Gordon  should  not  abandon  the  Sudan  in  evacuating. 


1 68    THE   CONFLICT  OF  EAST  AND   WEST  IN  EGYPT. 

Gordon  said  that  he  could  pursue  but  one  course ; 
Granville  denied  him  that,  but  suggested  no  alterna- 
tive. *'  Let  Gordon  stay  a  while  :  the  government 
will  deliberate.  So  far  as  is  known,  he  is  not  in  any- 
immediate  danger  at  Khartum.  We  will  not  let 
Zubair  leave  Cairo."  That  was  the  gist  of  the  note. 
A  week  later,  Mr  Gladstone  naively  remarked  that 
General  Gordon  could  leave  Khartum  ''  at  any  time 
if  he  felt  so  disposed."  Little  did  he  know  the  fibre 
of  the  man's  honor  if  he  thought  he  could,  under 
any  conditions,  ''  feel  disposed  "  to  desert  the  gar- 
risons he  had  been  sent  to  rescue.  He  felt  that  the 
lives  of  some  29,000  persons,  composing  the  gar- 
risons at  Bahr  Ghazelle,  Sennar,  Kassala,  Khartum, 
Shendy,  Berber,  Abti  Hamed,  and  Dongola  were  In 
his  hands.     He  would  not  be  false  to  his  trust. 

The  story  of  Gordon's  government  at  Khartum, 
of  his  dealings  with  the  people,  of  his  sorties  against 
the  threatening  forces  of  the  Mahdi,  and  of  his  un- 
tiring zeal  and  dauntless  personal  courage,  is  told  in 
his  own  journals '  and  dispatches  to  Sir  Evelyn 
Baring,  and  in  the  letters  of  Mr.  Power,  the  cor- 
respondent of  the  London  Times.  Our  concern  is 
less  with  those  details  than  with  the  relations  exist- 

'  A  large  and  very  valuable  part  of  Gordon's  journals  was  lost  when 
Colonel  Stewart's  party  was  massacred,  in  September,  1884.  Gordon  had 
entrusted  them  to  that  officer,  believing  that  they  would  be  safer  than  if 
kept  by  himself,  in  Khartum.  Stewart's  journals,  which  Gordon  con- 
sidered very  valuable,  were  lost  at  the  same  time.  Vide  seq. 


GORDON-  AND  THE   GOVERNMENT.  169 

ing  between  Gordon  and  the  British  government. 
The  Egyptian  government  quite  drops  out  of  notice, 
all  negotiations  proceeding  independently  of  the 
khedive. 

From  first  to  last,  so  long  as  communication  was 
kept  up  with  Gordon,  the  British  government  pur- 
sued a  policy  of  opposition  to  his  proposals.  His 
long-continued  and  persistent  calls  for  Zubair  were 
disregarded.  He  desired  permission  to  proceed  to 
El  Obeid  for  a  peaceful  negotiation  with  the  Mahdi, 
whom  he  appointed  sultan '  of  Kordofan  ;  but  he 
was  told  to  remain  at  Khartum.  He  said  that  Ber- 
ber should  be  relieved,  and  that  the  route  from 
Suakim  to  Berber  should  be  kept  open  ;  instead  of 
this,  the  British  troops  were  withdrawn  from  the 
Red  Sea  littoral.  He  desired  that  Turkish  troops 
should  be  sent  there ;  but  this  proposal  was  vetoed, 
presumably  on  diplomatic  grounds.  He  wished  to 
go  from  Khartum  to  Bahr  Ghazelle  and  the  Equa- 
torial Provinces  ;  but  he  was  told  again  not  to  pro- 
ceed beyond  Khartum.  He  begged  that  troops  be 
sent  to  Wady  Haifa  and  Assuan ;  but  the  request 
was  refused.  Later  he  oarged  the  necessity  of  a 
British  diversion  at  Berber ;  but  his  plea  was  not 
heeded.  Was  it  not  strange  that  the  English  gov- 
ernment should  have  sent   Gordon  to  the  Sudan 

'  The  appointment  was  scornfully  rejected  by  the  Mahdi,  who  sent  der- 
vishes to  Gordon,  ordering  him  to  embrace  the  Moslem  faith. 


I/O    THE   CONFLICT  OF  EAST  AND   WEST  IN  EGYPT. 

with  the  explicit  understanding  that  his  judgment 
should  determine  the  means  and  methods  of  evacua- 
tion, and  then  never,  in  any  essential  particular, 
follow  his  advice  ?  The  world  called  it  almost  a 
crime.  Early  In  April,  Gordon  sent  an  undated 
message  to  Sir  Evelyn  Baring,  containing  the  follow- 
ing words : 

As  far  as  I  can  understand,  the  situation  is  this:  You 
state  your  intention  of  not  sending  any  relief  up  here  or 
to  Berber,  and  you  refuse  me  Zubair.  I  consider  myself 
free  to  act  according  to  circumstances.  I  shall  hold  on 
here  as  long  as  I  can  ;  and  if  I  can  suppress  the  rebellion, 
I  shall  do  so.  If  I  cannot,  I  shall  retire  to  the  Equator  ; 
and  leave  you  the  indelible  disgrace  of  abandoning  the 
garrisons  of  Sennar,  Kassala,  Berber,  and  Dongola,  with 
the  certainty  that  you  will,  eventually,  be  forced  to  smash 
up  the  Mahdi  under  great  difficulties,  if  you  would  retain 
peace  in  Egypt. 

As  Mr.   Hake  says  :    ''The  breach  was  complete 
The  great  soldier  declined  to  serve  as  an  instrument 
of  dishonor."  ' 

In  England  the  bitterest  criticism  was  heaped 
on  Mr.  Gladstone.  The  liberals  In  Parliament  be- 
came hostile  to  their  own  government.  On  the 
1 2th  of  May  a  third  vote  of  censure  was  proposed, 
in  which  the  government  was  charged  with  Indiffer- 
ence to  the  success  of  Gordon's  mission  and  the 

*  The  Story  of  Chinese  Gordon,  vol.  ii.,  p.  i66. 


GORDON  AND  THE   GOVERNMENT.  17I 

safety  of  his  person.  Again  the  government  es- 
caped, but  with  the  small  majority  of  28  in  578 
votes  cast.  The  result  would  probably  have  been 
fatal  to  Mr.  Gladstone,  if  the  vote  had  been  post- 
poned for  a  month.  Then  his  government  would 
have  been  held  responsible  for  the  fall  of  Berber 
and  the  terrible  massacre  that  occurred  there  on 
June  2.  A  fourth  vote  might  have  been  proposed, 
had  not  a  different  phase  of  the  Egyptian  trouble 
been  forced  upon  Parliament  for  consideration  be- 
fore the  news  was  received. 

As  always,  the  finances  of  Egypt  were  in  a  bad 
way.  For  three  years  the  deficits  of  the  treasury 
had  been  accumulating,  till  they  amounted  to  some- 
thing over  ^8,000,000.  The  indemnities  for  losses 
sustained  in  the  bombardment,  burning,  and  pillage 
of  Alexandria  made  about  half  of  this  sum  ;  and  the 
expenditures  for  the  military  constituted  the  chief 
item  in  the  remaining  half.  The  British  govern- 
ment desired  to  meet  the  deficit  by  a  new  loan  ;  but 
as  this  could  not  be  done  without  conflicting  with 
the  law  of  liquidation,  it  was  decided  to  sum- 
mon to  a  conference  those  Powers  that  had 
agreed  to  the  establishment  of  the  law.  Accord- 
ingly, on  the  19th  of  April,  Lord  Granville  sent  an 
identical  note  to  the  great  Powers,  inviting  them  to 
a  conference  in  London,  to  consider  whether  a 
modification  of  the  laws  of  liquidation  would  not  be 


1/2    THE   CONFLICT  OF  EAST  AND  WEST  IN  EGYPT, 

for  the  financial  interest  of  Egypt.  Germany,  Aus- 
tria, Russia,  and  Italy  accepted  the  invitation  at 
once  ;  but  France,  with  something  of  her  old-time 
jealousy,  objected  to  a  conference  that  could  not 
consider  the  political  as  well  as  the  financial  question. 
Lord  Granville,  however,  was  firm  in  his  insistance 
upon  the  limitation,  so  far  as  the  conference  was 
concerned ;  but  he  entered  into  a  diplomatic  corre- 
spondence with  M.  Waddington.  The  result  of  the 
exchange  of  views,  or,  as  it  was  called,  ''  the  Anglo- 
French  agreement,"  was  submitted  to  Parliament  by 
Mr.  Gladstone  before  the  conference  met.  France 
resigned  all  claim  of  control  in  Egypt,  and  agreed 
never  to  land  troops  in  the  Delta  without  the  consent 
of  England.  On  the  other  hand,  England  agreed 
to  withdraw  her  military  forces  from  Egypt  before 
the  first  day  of  January,  1888,  unless  the  Powers 
should  request  the  contrary.  In  the  meantime  she 
was  to  prepare  a  scheme  for  the  neutralization  of 
Egypt,  which  should  be  submitted  to  the  Powers. 
The  Caisse  de  la  Dette  Publiqtie,  it  was  agreed, 
should  be  placed  under  the  multiple  direction  of  the 
Powers.  But  all  these  arrangements,  as  Mr.  Glad- 
stone said,  were  dependent  upon  the  will  of  the 
conference,  which,  in  turn,  should  be  binding  upon 
England,  according  as  Parliament,  by  its  votes,  de- 
termined. 

England  being  thus  carefully  guarded  behind  two 


GORDON  AND  THE   GOVERNMENT.  ly^ 

big-  zfsy  the  Conference  met  in  London  on  June  28. 
Its  progress  was  slow,  and  as  it  failed  of  its  pur- 
pose ultimately,  its  details  need  not  be  given.  The 
Powers  so  hopelessly  disagreed  that  the  Conference 
was  dissolved  on  the  2d  of  August.  France,  the 
leader  of  the  opposition  to  England,  could  not 
secure  the  formulation  of  a  future  policy.  As  a 
last  straw  she  endeavored  to  obtain  an  adjournment 
of  the  Conference  till  October,  but,  instead,  it  w^as 
adjourned  sine  die ;  and  thus,  all  participation  in 
the  affairs  of  Egypt  was  lost  to  her.  This  was 
practically  accomplished  by  her  withdrawal  from  a 
joint  supervision  at  the  time  of  Arabi's  rebellion ; 
but  now,  for  the  first  time,  her  position  of  looker-on 
was  determined.  Germany  seemed  satisfied  with 
having  egged  on  France  to  a  point  where  the  re- 
fusal of  her  demands  would  only  increase  the  grow- 
ing coolness  between  the  British  and  French  gov- 
ernments. Turkey,  of  course,  had  found  no  following 
in  urging  her  rights  and  ability  to  control  Egypt 
without  the  help  of  Eastern  Powers.  Italy,  the 
only  pronounced  ally  of  England  in  the  Conference, 
retired  with  the  distinction  that  this  alliance  had 
brought  upon  her,  and  accepted,  as  her  share  of 
the  ''  spoils,"  the  thanks  which  Sir  John  Saville 
Lumley,  British  Minister  to  Italy,  was  instructed 
to  bestow  upon  her  for  the  support  which  she  gave 
to  the  British  proposals  in  the  Conference. 


174    ^'^^^    CONFLICT  OF  FAST  AND   WEST  IN  EGYPT. 

The  glory  of  the  collapse  of  the  Conference,  if 
there  were  any,  fell  to  England.  It  was  demon- 
strated that  the  Powers  could  not  control  Egypt  in 
unison  ;  it  was  left  to  England  to  do  the  work  alone 
and  to  earn  the  praise  or  the  blame.  The  financial 
question  remaining  still  unsettled,  the  government 
commissioned  Lord  Northbrook  to  go  to  Egypt 
and  investigate  the  ''  condition  of  affairs  so  as  to 
advise  the  English  government  as  to  what  counsel 
should  be  given  to  the  Egyptian  government  in  the 
present  circumstances."  Of  course  it  was  under- 
stood that  the  '*  counsel  "  would  be  of  a  more 
peremptory  character  than  advice  usually  is  ;  for 
counsel  and  command  to  the  khedive  have  long 
been  regarded  in  England  as  one  and  the  same 
thing.  The  High  Commission  found  the  finances 
of  Egypt  in  such  a  muddle  that  one  of  two  courses 
seemed  inevitable  :  to  make  a  declaration  of  bank- 
ruptcy with  a  reduction  of  the  coupons,  or  to  turn 
the  revenues  temporarily  from  the  sinking  fund  for 
the  redemption  of  the  certified  debt  into  the  Egyp- 
tian treasury.  The  latter  alternative  was  chosen, 
and  wisely,  as  it  seems,  although  it  was  a  breach  of 
the  law  of  liquidation.  Lord  Northbrook  held  that, 
if  the  tribute  to  Turkey  and  the  expenses  of  the 
government  could  be  met  for  a  time,  and  if  the 
revenues  should  afterward  revert  to  the  sinking 
fund,  the  coupon-holders  would  lose  less  than  by 


GORDON  AND  THE   GOVERNMENT.  1 75 

a  declaration  of  bankruptcy.  By  a  decree  of  the 
khedive,  September  i8,  the  law  of  liquidation  was 
suspended  for  six  weeks.  This  called  forth  the 
united  remonstrance  of  the  Powers.  The  plan, 
however,  was  persisted  in. 

General  Gordon,  meanwhile,  seemed  to  have 
dropped  completely  out  of  mind.  No  word  had 
been  received  from  him  since  May.  By  the  fall 
of  Berber  telegraphic  communications  had  been  cut 
off,  and  only  the  vaguest  rumors  from  any  point 
south  of  Dongola  made  their  way  to  Cairo.  At  the 
eleventh  hour  there  had  been  a  pretence  of  opening 
the  route  from  Suakim  to  Berber  by  sending  a  rail- 
way plant  to  Suakim.  Desultory  dispatches  of  the 
progress  in  its  construction  and  of  skirmishes  with 
Osman  Digna  were  received  during  the  summer ; 
but  no  one  was  surprised  that  the  work  was  discon- 
tinued before  autumn.  This  railway  scheme  was 
perhaps  less  of  a  farce  than  the  Khedive  Ismail's 
projected  railway  from  Wady  Haifa  south  to  Han- 
neck  ;  for  Ismail  left  his  plant  to  be  covered  by  the 
sweeping  sands  of  the  Nubian  desert,  while  the 
English  carried  theirs  off  to  India.  In  order  to 
divert  attention  from  the  Berber  massacre,  the  suc- 
cess of  Admiral  Hewett's  mission  to  King  John  of 
Abyssinia,  the  news  of  which  had  been  received 
at  about  the  same  time,  was  somewhat  magni- 
fied.      He   secured,    by   treaty,    access  to   a   third 


1/6    THE    CONFLICT  OF  EAST  AND   WEST  IN  EGYPT. 

route  to  Khartum  from  Massowah  through  Abys- 
sinia. The  sequel  has  shown  how  valueless  the 
concession  was.  But  the  attention  of  England  had 
been  very  generally  diverted  from  Egypt  altogether. 
The  Franchise  Bill  at  home  had  been  the  absorbing 
topic  during  the  early  summer.  There  had,  how- 
ever, been  many  rumors  afloat  of  an  expedition  to 
be  sent  to  the  relief  of  General  Gordon.  But  the 
weeks  had  drifted  by,  and  July,  the  month  first 
named  for  the  dispatch  of  the  expedition,  was  past 
before  any  active  preparations  were  made.  These 
were  begun  in  August  by  the  vote  of  a  credit  of 
;^300,ooo  to  defray  expenses.  It  seemed,  finally,  as 
if  the  conscience  of  the  government  were  quickened. 


X. 


WOLSELEY's    expedition. — CONCLUSION. 

THE  command  of  the  relief  expedition  was  en- 
trusted to  Lord  Wolseley,  the  Sir  Garnet 
Wolseley  who  had  suppressed  Arabi's  rebelHon,  and 
thereby  won  for  himself  elevation  to  the  peerage.  At 
first  Lord  Wolseley  had  been  asked  simply  to  draw 
up  the  plans  of  the  expedition  ;  but  as  General 
Stephenson,  the  commander  of  the  forces  in  Egypt, 
had  not  approved  the  scheme,  Wolseley  was  called 
upon  to  assume  the  command  himself.  At  his  sug- 
gestion the  government  had  decided  upon  the  Nile 
route  in  opposition  to  the  very  generally  expressed 
advice  of  the  most  competent  authorities,  among 
whom  was  General  Stephenson.  The  latter  favored 
the  route  from  Suakim  to  Berber  as  the  most  direct 
and  the  shortest.  If  an  advance  of  only  ten  miles  a 
day  were  made,  this  journey  could  be  accomplished 
within  a  month.  The  objections  to  this  route  were 
the  lack  of  water,  and  the  certainty  that  Osman  Digna 
would  dispute  every  inch  of  the  way.  They  were 
formidable  objections  certainly,  but  not  insuperable. 

177 


1/8    THE   CONFLICT  OF  EAST  AND  WEST  IN  EGYPT. 

The  route  would  have  been  far  preferable  to  the  one 
decided  upon,  on  account  of  the  great  saving  in 
time. 

There  was  still  another  route  than  the  one  chosen 
that  seems  never  to  have  been  considered,  although 
it  has  always  been  the  beaten  way  from  Cairo  to 
Khartnm.  It  coincides  with  the  route  Wolseley 
preferred,  except  that  instead  of  making  the  long 
journey  through  the  horse-shoe  bend  of  the  Nile, 
south  of  Wady  Haifa,  where  the  river  is  impassable 
to  large  craft  on  account  of  the  cataracts,  it  strikes 
off  across  the  Nubian  desert  from  Korosko  to  Abn 
Hamed,  the  points  that  represent  the  heel  of  the 
shoe.  The  desert  journey  is  accomplished  in  about 
six  days,  the  distance  being  two  hundred  and  thirty 
miles,  or  somewhat  less  than  the  distance  from 
Snakim  to  Berber.  The  route  is  not  altoo^ether 
pleasant,  as  the  line  of  skeletons  of  men  and  beasts 
who  have  perished  on  the  way  testifies  ;  but  there  is 
a  well  at  the  midway  station,  and  a  flying  column 
could  have  carried  enough  water  along  with  it.  In 
spite,  however,  of  the  greater  disadvantages  of  the 
circuitous  route,  Wolseley  decided  to  stick  to  the 
river. 

The  commander  arrived  in  Egypt  on  the  8th  of 
September,  and  began  to  make  elaborate  and 
tedious  preparations.  His  force  was  to  consist  of 
ten  thousand  men.     To  transport  them  he  had  de- 


WOLSELEY'S  EXPEDITION.  1 79 

termined  to  employ  Canadian  boatmen,  and  to  use 
small  boats  similar  to  those  he  had  used  in  a  Cana- 
dian expedition  which  he  had  commanded  on  the 
Red  River  some  years  before.  The  boats  and 
boatmen  were  not  ready  before  the  end  of  Septem- 
ber, when  more  than  a  month  of  high  water  had 
already  been  lost.  If  the  expedition  had  started  in 
July,  as  originally  suggested,  even  steamers  of  light 
draft  might  have  been  towed  up  the  cataracts,  which, 
it  must  be  remembered,  are  nothing  more  than  long 
stretches  of  whirlpools  and  eddies  that  scarcely  roar 
or  rush  as  they  wind  in  and  out  and  around  the 
thousand  and  one  rocky  islets.  After  the  middle  of 
August,  when  the  Nile  began  to  fall,  every  day 
passed  was  a  precious  day  lost. 

An  impulse  was  given  to  the  work  at  the  end  of 
September.  A  voice  from  the  desert  was  heard  that 
had  been  stilled  for  months.  It  had  all  of  its  old 
ring.  ''I  am  awaiting  the  British  •  forces,"  wrote 
Gordon,  ''  in  order  to  evacuate  the  Egyptian  garri- 
sons." His  purpose  had  not  changed  since  the  day 
he  started  for  the  Sudan.  On  the  29th  of  Septem- 
ber, Mr.  Power's  journal  of  events  in  Khartum, 
from  the  ist  of  May  to  the  end  of  July,  was  given 
in  the  London  Times,  It  was  a  thrilling  story. 
The  indignation  that  the  following  extract  aroused 
was  intense  : 

Since  the  despatch  which  arrived  the  day  before  yester- 


l8o    THE   CONFLICT  OF  EAST  AND   WEST  IN  EGYPT. 

day  [July  29],  all  hope  of  relief  by  our  government  is 
at  an  end ;  so  when  our  provisions,  which  we  have  at  a 
stretch  for  two  months,  are  eaten,  we  must  fall ;  nor  is 
there  any  chance,  with  the  so-ldiers  we  have,  and  the  great 
crowd  of  women,  children,  etc.,  of  our  being  able  to  cut 
our  way  through  the  Arabs.  We  have  not  steamers  for 
all,  and  it  is  only  from  the  steamers  we  can  meet  the 
rebels. 

The  tw^o  months  were  past :  had  the  garrison  al- 
ready fallen  ?  Early  in  October  further  news  was 
received  contained  in  a  series  of  dispatches  sent  by 
General  Gordon  to  Massowah.  None  of  them, 
however,  bore  a  later  date  than  Power's  message  to 
the  Times,  In  one  of  them  (July  31)  Gordon 
writes : 

Reading  over  your  telegram  of  the  5th  May,  1884,  you 
ask  me  to  state  cause  and  intention  in  staying  at  Khar- 
tum, knowing  Government  means  to  abandon  Sudan,  and 
in  answer  I  say,  I  stay  at  Khartum  because  Arabs  have 
shut  us  up,  and  will  not  let  us  out. 

Again  and  again  Gordon  referred  in  his  journal  to 
the  impertinence  of  the  above  request :  State  your 
reasons  !  '*  The  ' reasons'  are  those  horribly  plucky 
Arabs."  ^ 

The  immediate  result  of  these  dispatches  was 
that  all  eyes  were  turned  upon  Lord  Wolseley. 
The  criticism  of  his  movements  was  less  than  the 

*Jouraal,  p.  53.     (September  19.) 


WOLSELEY'S  EXPEDITION.  l8l 

impatience  at  his  delays.  In  the  government's  let- 
ter of  instructions,  dated  October  8,  he  was  in- 
formed that  the  primary  object  of  his  expedition 
was  the  rescue  of  General  Gordon '  and  Colonel 
Stewart.  He  was  not  to  go  farther  south  than 
Dongola,  unless  it  became  actually  necessary ;  and, 
in  no  case,  was  he  to  proceed  beyond  Khartum, 
not  even  to  relieve  the  garrison  at  Sennar.  Such 
instructions  were  scarcely  calculated  to  arouse  Lord 
Wolseley  to  the  activity  that  the  purpose  of  his  ex- 
pedition required.  Gordon  had  said  that  he  could 
not  leave  Khartum,  and  yet  the  government  talked 
about  rescuing  him  at  a  point  midway  between  that 
city  and  Wady  Haifa.  The  general  who  had  stilled 
the  cry  of  ''Egypt  for  the  Egyptians"  with  a  skill 
and  promptness  that  called  forth  the  applause  of  the 
world,  seemed  to  have  assumed  now  a  character 
quite  in  keeping  with  the  desires  of  his  government. 
They  had  been  slow  and  irresolute  in  all  their  re- 
lations with  the  Sudan.  Each  step  was  taken  only 
when  the  irresistible  force  of  public  opinion  com- 
pelled. By  keeping  just  behind  the  public  demand 
and  the  necessities  of  the  moment,  the  government 

^  Gordon's  view  of  the  relief  expedition  is  interesting  in  this  connection. 
He  wrote  in  his  journals  (September  24) :  "I  altogether  decline  the  imputa- 
tion that  the  projected  expedition  has  come  to  relieve  me.  It  has  come  to 
SAVE  OUR  NATIONAL  HONOR  in  extricating  the  garrisons,  etc.,  from  a  posi- 
tion in  which  our  action  in  Egypt  has  placed  these  garrisons.  I  was  relief 
expedition  No  i.  They  are  relief  expedition  No.  2.  .  .  .  I  am  not 
the  rescued  lamb,  and  I  will  not  be."     The  italics  are  his. 


1 82    THE   CONFLICT  OF  EAST  AND  WEST  IN  EGYPT. 

had  acted  always  just  too  late.     General  Gordon 
gives  a  good  instance  of  this  failing  in  his  journals : 

Take  the  Tokar  business :  had  Baker  been  supported, 
say,  by  500  men,  he  would  not  have  been  defeated  ;  yet, 
after  he  was  defeated,  you  go  and  send  a  force  to  reheve 
the  town.  Had  Baker  been  supported  by  these  500  men, 
he  would,  in  all  probability,  have  been  victorious,  and 
would  have  pushed  on  to  Berber ;  and,  once  there,  Berber 
would  not  have  fallen.  What  was  right  to  do  in  Alarch, 
was  right  to  do  in  February.  We  sent  an  expedition  in 
March,  so  we  ought  to  have  sent  it  in  February  ;  and  then 
the  worst  of  it  was  that.  Baker  having  been  defeated, 
when  you  did  send  your  expedition  to  Zb^'^r,  Baker's  force 
no  longer  existed,  and  his  guns  resist  me  at  Berber.  It  is 
truly  deplorable,  the  waste  of  men  and  money,  on  account 
of  our  indecision.* 

The  advance  of  the  Nile  force  was  lamentably 
slow.  By  the  20th  of  November  there  were  only 
3,000  troops,  out  of  some  16,000  in  Egypt,  that  had 
passed  Wady  Haifa.  Within  the  next  three  weeks, 
however,  the  10,000  troops  composing  the  ex- 
peditionary force  were  all  south  of  Korosko.  It 
seemed  as  though  Lord  Wolseley  were  preparing 
to  write  a  book  on  ''  My  Winter  on  the  Nile."  He 
would  have  had  the  advantage  of  the  thousand 
and  one  tourists  who  have  written  under  the 
above  title,  in  that  he  pushed  beyond  the  usual  limit 
at  the  first  cataract,  and  maintained  a  progress  that 

^  Gordon's  Journals,  p.  151.     (October  8.) 


WOLSELEY'S  EXPEDITION.  1 83 

all  might  envy,  who  have  enjoyed  the  motionless- 
ness  of  the  dahabieh.  A  description  of  a  Nile 
journey  is  nothing  unless  it  dwells  upon  the  lazi- 
ness, the  idleness,  the  donothingness  of  the  life. 

In  the  meantime  the  news  of  another  horror  had 
been  received  from  the  Sudan.  On  the  loth  of 
September,  General  Gordon  had  sent  Colonel 
Stewart  down  the  Nile  in  command  of  an  expedi- 
tion against  Berber.  He  considered  it  important 
that  the  rebel  fortifications  there  should  be  de- 
stroyed, thus  enabling  Stewart  to  open  communica- 
tion with  the  expedition  of  relief,  concerning  whose 
movements  Gordon  was  very  much  in  the  dark.  It 
is  also  hinted  that  Gordon  wished,  by  this  method, 
to  save  the  life  of  his  brave  lieutenant'  Before  the 
fall  of  Berber  he  had  sent  down  into  Egypt  more 
than  six  hundred  soldiers  and  two  thousand  people  ; 
but  this  was  the  first  attempt  since  then  to  add  to 
the  number.  Stewart  succeeded  in  demolishing  the 
Berber  fortifications,  and  then,  with  Power,  the 
Times  correspondent,  and  about  forty  others,  he 
parted  from  the  main  force,  which  returned  to 
Khartum,  and  steamed  on  toward  Dongola.  After 
passing  Abu  Hamed — where  he  might  have  met  a 
flying  column  from  Korosko  if  that  route  had  only 
been  selected — his  steamer  struck  a  rock  and  could 
not  be  shoved  off.     He  and  his  companions  were 

*  A.  Egmont  Hake,  The  Story  of  Chinese  Gordon,  p.  180. 


1 84    THE   CONFLICT  OF  EAST  AND  WEST  IN  EGYPT. 

now  induced  by  promises  of  peace  to  accept  the 
hospitality  of  Suleiman  Wad  Gamr,  in  whose 
country  they  were.  Unarmed,  they  met  him  at 
the  house  of  a  blind  man  to  negotiate  for  the  pur- 
chase of  camels  to  take  them  to  Dongola  ;  but, 
while  there,  they  were  basely  set  upon  and  mur- 
dered. The  bodies  of  Stewart  and  Power,  the  only 
Englishmen  besides  Gordon  south  of  Dongola,  were 
thrown  into  the  river  as  food  for  the  crocodiles. 
The  valuable  journals  of  Gordon  and  Stewart  fell 
Into  the  hands  of  the  rebels.  Hussein,  the  stoker 
of  the  steamer,  escaped  death,  and  after  a  servitude 
of  four  months  gave  the  first  authoritative  report  of 
the  massacre.  Undoubted  rumors,  however,  had 
reached  the  force  advancing  up  the  Nile  early  in 
October.  The  news  added  fresh  fuel  to  the  fire  of 
English  indignation.  The  government  that  had 
shielded  itself  from  the  responsibility  of  Hicks s 
death  could  find  no  way  of  escape  from  the  blame 
that  now  attached  to  it.  Stewart  had  been  appoint- 
ed Gordon's  first  lieutenant,  had  been  sent  to  the 
Sudan  for  a  specific  purpose,  and  had  then  been 
abandoned  to  the  fate  that  befell  him.  Those  who 
had  been  wondering  If  the  last  act  of  the  play  were 
to  be  comedy  or  tragedy,  questioned  no  longer. 
Alarming  rumors  were  now  circulated  regarding 
Gordon.  It  was  said  that  he  had  been  captured 
by  the  Mahdi  ;  then  that  Khartum  had  fallen  ;  and 


WOLSELEY'S  EXPEDITION.  185 

again  that  the  mines  had  been  exploded  and  had 
blown  Gordon  into  the  air.  On  the  14th  of  No- 
vember, however,  Wolseley  received  from  Gordon 
a  set  of  cipher  dispatches,  dated  November  4. 
Gordon  lived  ;  but  he  was  in  imminent  danger. 
The  Mahdi  was  within  eight  hours  of  Khartum, 
which  had  provisions  for  about  forty  days.  Five 
steamers  had  gone  from  Khartum  to  Metemneh  to 
await  the  expected  relief.  These  facts  were  kept 
from  the  public,  which  only  knew  that  Gordon  was 
alive. 

The  beginning  of  the  new  year  found  Lord 
Wolseley  still  working  his  tedious  way  up  the 
Nile.  The  apathy  that  had  followed  long-con- 
tinued impatience  in  England  was  dispelled,  early 
in  January,  by  a  very  explicit  telegram  from  Lord 
Wolseley  to  the  Prince  of  Wales.  His  lordship 
announced,  with  something  of  a  theatrical  air,  that 
he  would  enter  Khartum  on  the  24th  of  January. 
The  public  confidence  in  Wolseley's  promises  was 
great ;  for  he  had  always  had  a  way  of  announcing 
what  he  proposed  to  accomplish  on  a  certain  day, 
and  of  proceeding  forthwith  to  carry  out  his  under- 
taking to  the  letter.  Since  the  battle  of  Tel-el- 
Kebir,  however,  the  public  had  been  deluded  by 
so  many  vain  plans,  never  carried  to  their  execution, 
that  almost  any  promise  must  need  go  begging  for 
confidence.     Still  the  general  public  was  willing  to 


1 86    THE   CONFLICT  OF  EAST  AND  WEST  IN  EGYPT. 

trust  for  a  last  time,  and  the  recent  article  in  the 
London  Times  was  forgotten,  that  called  upon  Mr. 
Gladstone  to  resign  ''  in  order  to  enable  a  new 
ministry,  not  crippled  by  personal  engagements  in- 
jurious to  the  true  interests  of  England,  to  adopt  a 
vigorous  policy  in  Egypt,  the  colonies,  and  foreign 
affairs  generally."  ' 

While  Wolseley  was  hurrying  his  troops  forward 
to  Korti,  which  he  had  determined  to  make  his  base 
of  operations,  there  were  perplexing  rumors  afloat 
concerning  the  re-entrance  of  the  Sublime  Porte  as 
an  active  factor  in  the  Egyptian  question.  The  an- 
nouncement soon  followed  that  the  sultan  was  pre- 
paring to  dispatch  troops  to  Suakim  in  order  to 
overcome  Osman  Digna,  who  was  still  zealously 
serving  the  Mahdi  in  that  locality.  Her  Majesty's 
government  at  once  resolved  that  Turkish  troops 
should  not  be  landed  on  the  Red  Sea  littoral.  But 
on  what  ground  could  England  prevent  it  ?  It  had 
never  claimed  the  power  of  a  protectorate  ;  how, 
then,  could  it  exercise  such  power  ?  The  answer 
was  easily  found  in  the  history  of  the  preceding 
years.  The  British  government  had  never  hesitated 
to  act  as  the  dominant  power ;  it  had  only  hesitated 
to  assume  the  responsibility  that  must  necessarily 
be  associated  with  that  power.  It  seemed  now  as  if 
England  would  be  forced  finally  to  acknowledge 

'^The  Times,  January  5,  1885. 


WOLSELEY'S  EXPEDITION.  1 87 

herself  the  positive  protector  of  Egypt,  when  sud- 
denly the  attention  of  the  government  and  the 
people  was  diverted  from  diplomacy  to  the  war 
operations  in  the  Sudan. 

Having  concentrated  his  forces  at  Korti,  Lord 
Wolseley,  on  the  4th  of  January,  ordered  General 
Earle,  with  a  force  of  about  2,500  men,  to  proceed 
to  Berber,  by  way  of  the  long  bend  in  the  Nile. 
He  was  to  get  possession  of  Abu  Hamed  and  Ber- 
ber, in  order  that  the  desert  routes  from  those  points 
might  be  made  use  of  in  case  of  evacuation.  On 
the  8th  of  January,  General  Stewart,  with  a  picked 
force  of  about  1,500  men,  was  dispatched  from 
Korti  straight  across  the  desert  to  Metemneh,  there 
to  meet  the  steamers  that  General  Gordon  had  sent 
out  from  Khartum.  This  desert  route  was  only 
about  thirty  miles  shorter  than  the  one  from  Ko- 
rosko  to  Abu  Hamed,  which  might  have  been  taken 
in  September.  Four  precious  months  would  thus 
have  been  saved.  All  went  well  with  General 
Stewart's  desert  journey,  till  he  neared  the  wells  of 
Abu  Klea,  less  than  twenty-five  miles  from  Metem- 
neh. He  encamped  near  them  on  the  i6th  of 
January,  and  on  the  17th  his  force  was  attacked  by 
10,000  rebels.  His  troops  fought  as  Englishmen 
always  fight ;  and  the  rebels,  with  all  their  superior- 
ity of  numbers,  were  repulsed.  The  English  loss 
was  sixty-five  killed  and  nearly  a  hundred  wounded. 


1 88    THE   CONFLICT  OF  EAST  AND   WEST  IN  EGYPT. 

Among  the  former  was  the  famous  Colonel  Burnaby, 
who  made  the  wonderful  ''  Ride  to  Khiva."  He  is 
said  to  have  died  ''  like  a  true  British  bull-dog,  with 
his  right  hand  clenched  in  death  about  the  throat 
of  the  Arab  whose  spear  was  thrust  through  the 
Colonel's  neck."  On  the  19th,  a  still  more  formi- 
dable force  was  encountered  ;  but  again  the  rebels 
were  repulsed.  General  Stewart  had  received  a 
wound  which  he  would  not  admit  was  serious,  but 
pushed  on  to  Gubat  on  the  Nile,  not  attempting  to 
force  Metemneh,  which  was  in  the  hands  of  the 
rebels.  At  Gubat  were  Gordon's  steamers  and  the 
inspiring  message  :  '  All  right  at  Khartum.  Can 
hold  out  for  years."  It  seemed  as  if  fortune  served 
the  will  of  England.  The  enthusiasm  that  greeted 
the  news  of  Stewart's  victories  and  of  Gordon's 
message  was  boundless.  A  confidence  was  begot- 
ten that  made  final  success  seem  already  within 
England's  grasp.  The  world  did  not  know  then,  as 
we  do  now,  that  the  message  was  written  for  the 
enemy,'  and  that  Gordon  had  sent  word  to  Wolseley, 
nearly  two  months  before,  that  he  had  provisions 
enough  for  about  forty  days.  The  Commander-in- 
Chief  had  received  a  later  dispatch,  dated  Decem- 
ber 14,  in  which  Gordon  said:  ''Our  troops  in 
Khartum  are  suffering  from  lack  of  provisions  .  .  . 
We  want  you  to  come  quickly."    But  Wolseley  had 

'  A.  Egmont  Hake,  Story  of  Chinese  Gordon,  p.  600. 


WOLSELEY'S  EXPEDITION'.  1 89 

kept  Gordon's  peril  a  secret,  only  using  the  utmost 
haste — at  the  eleventh  hour — to  secure  his  release. 
The  world,  therefore,  rejoiced  at  the  news. 

Several  days  were  now  fatally  misspent.  It  was 
not  till  the  24th  of  January  that  Sir  Charles  Wilson 
started  on  Gordon's  steamers  for  Khartum.  On 
the  28th,  after  having  been  assailed  all  along  his 
journey  by  armed  Arabs  on  the  banks  of  the  river, 
Colonel  Wilson  appeared  in  sight  of  Khartum.  In- 
stead of  the  eager  welcome  he  expected,  he  was  met 
with  a  furious  fusilade  from  all  sides,  and  before 
him  on  the  government  house  floated  the  Mahdi's 
colors.  Khartum  had  fallen,  and  Gordon  was  cap- 
tured or  killed.  Assured  of  the  terrible  disaster, 
Wilson  hastily  beat  a  retreat.  He  lost  both  his 
steamers  at  the  sixth  cataract,  and  only  reached 
Gubat  after  a  most  perilous  adventure,  being  res- 
cued from  his  dangerous  situation  by  Lord  Charles 
Beresford.  But  on  the  way  down  he  had  learned 
from  the  natives  that  Khartum  had  fallen  on  the 
the  26th.  Gordon  had  been  lost  by  two  days. 
With  fateful  instinct  he  had  written,  October  13  : 
"  It  is,  of  course,  on  the  cards  that  Khartum  is 
taken  under  the  nose  of  the  expeditionary  force, 
which  will  h^  just  too  late'' '  It  probably  never  will 
be  known  just  how  he  died  ;  and  it  matters  little 
which   story   we   believe.       All   agree   that    Faraz 

'  Journals,  p.  178. 


190    THE   CONFLICT  OF  EAST  AND   WEST  IN  EGYPT. 

Pasha  treacherously  betrayed  the  city,  and  that  the 
martyr  died  Hke  a  hero. 

To  the  western  world  the  news  of  the  fall  of 
Khartum  was  like  a  thunderbolt  from  a  clear  sky. 
At  the  very  moment  of  rejoicing,  fortune  and  faith 
were  crushed.  The  calamity  marked  an  epoch. 
The  press  and  the  people  demanded  that  from  that 
day  the  great  statesman,  whose  policy  had  always 
been  peace,  should  bear  the  arms  he  was  loath  to 
assume  and  slow  to  use  in  a  strong  and  swift  cam- 
paign of  revenge,  or  make  way  for  a  ministry  of 
war.  The  public  patience  and  forbearance  were 
strained  beyond  their  utmost  tension.  The  final 
catastrophe  was  the  natural  outcome  of  all  the  mis- 
takes of  England  in  Egypt.  Since  the  suppression 
of  Arabi's  rebellion  there  had  been  little  to  admire 
in  the  British  policy.  Forced  to  remain  and  protect 
her  own  interests,  and  guard  with  jealous  care  the 
water-way  to  India,  England  hesitated  to  accept, 
and  endeavored  to  shirk  at  every  step,  the  responsi- 
bility that  her  power  and  position  had  forced  upon 
her.  It  may  be  true  that  the  British  interference  in 
Egypt  was  not  of  Mr.  Gladstone's  choosing ;  but, 
when  he  accepted  the  control  of  the  government,  he 
accepted  the  situation  in  Egypt  as  it  was,  and  not 
as  he  might  wish  it  to  be.  Since  his  accession,  in 
1880,  it  had  never  been  possible  or  desirable  for 
England  to  withdraw  her  influence  from  Egypt ; 


WOLSELEY'S  EXPEDITION.  19 1 

but  Mr.  Gladstone  could  not  look  that  fact  in  the 
face.  After  Arabi's  downfall,  in  1882,  the  British 
Parliament,  press,  and  public  uFged  their  govern- 
ment to  declare  its  policy  or  intentions  in  Egypt ; 
but  they  urged  in  vain.  Nothing  was  ever  decided 
till  the  exigencies  or  the  disasters  of  the  moment 
rendered  action  absolutely  imperative.  This  halting 
policy  resulted  in  disaster,  slaughter,  and  the  final 
tragedy. 

Scarcely  had  the  world  recovered  from  the  first 
great  shock  of  Gordon's  death,  when  it  was  an- 
nounced that  General  Earle  had  been  killed  in  an 
engagement  with  the  rebels,  February  9,  while 
pressing  toward  Abu  Hamed ;  and  then  came  the 
sad  news  that  General  Stewart's  wound  had  proved 
fatal,  February  16.  Perhaps  Wolseley  began  to 
nave  some  concern  for  his  own  life.  At  all  events, 
he  lost  no  time  in  gathering  together  the  outlying 
portions  of  his  army.  The  perilous  desert  journey 
from  Gubat  to  Korti  was  safely  made ;  and  the 
river  expedition  that  General  Earle  had  commanded 
was  recalled.  With  all  possible  expedition  the  army 
retreated  to  Dongola,  where  it  took  up  its  quarters 
for  the  summer.  Such  was  the  end  of  the  lamenta- 
ble failure  to  rescue  Gordon. 

The  cry  for  vengeance  with  which  England  was 
still  ringing  had  to  be  recognized  in  some  way.  To 
counteract   the   humiliation  of  Wolseley's  retreat, 


192    THE   CONFLICT  OF  EAST  AND   WEST  IN  EGYPT. 

active  operations  had  been  undertaken  on  the  Red 
Sea  littoral.  Troops  were  personally  reviewed  by 
the  queen,  and  then  ordered  to  the  seat  of  war  In 
the  eastern  Sudan.  It  was  declared  that  the  gov- 
ernment had  determined  to  open  the  route  to  Berber 
and  then  to  "  smash ''  the  Mahdi.  But  the  most 
barren,  desolate,  and  difficult  of  desert  routes  was 
still  guarded  by  Osman  Digna,  the  lieutenant  of  the 
Mahdl,  whose  forces  had  more  than  once  carried 
destruction  Into  the  English  camp.  It  was  a  dlfifi- 
cult  task  the  government  set  the  English  soldiers, 
to  accomplish  that  journey  of  two  hundred  and  fifty 
miles  amid  all  the  natural  perils  of  the  desert  and 
with  hostile  hordes  ready  to  swoop  down  upon 
them  from  every  mountain  along  the  way.  But 
the  accomplishment  was  beyond  the  intention  of 
the  government.  A  show  of  activity  was  made  at 
Snakim  with  soldiers  and  railway  plant,  until  Mr. 
Gladstone  had  recovered  from  the  effect  of  the  vote 
of  censure  that  so  nearly  ^  cost  him  his  government 
when  Parliament  reassembled  at  the  end  of  Febru- 
ary. The  beleaguered  garrison  of  Kassala  was 
sending  piteous  appeals  for  help  that  were  like  the 
old  cries  from  Khartum.  But  aside  from  this  the 
call  for  war  was  still  Inspired  of  vengeance  only. 
Vengeance,  however.  Is  a  quality  that   Mr.   Glad- 

'  The  vote  was  carried  in  the  upper  House  by  a  large  majority,  but  lost 
in  the  lower  House  by  the  narrow  majority  of  fourteen. 


WOLSELEY'S  EXPEDITION,  1 93 

Stone's  character — to  his  honor  be  It  said — has 
never  known.  Supported  by  a  narrow  majority,  he 
turned  his  thoughts  from  the  stinging  failures  of  his 
poHcy  abroad  to  the  grand  purposes  of  his  Hfe-work 
at  home.  The  cry  for  vengeance  never  found  an 
echo  in  the  sand  hills  of  the  desert,  while  at  home 
it  had  dwindled,  within  two  months,  to  the  murmur 
of  a  jeering  and  deriding  opposition. 

The  epilogue  of  the  tragedy,  however,  might  bet- 
ter have  been  spoken  after  a  farce.  All  the  irony 
of  an  eighteenth  century  comedy  was  contained  in 
Lord  Wolseley's  farewell  address,  in  which  he  an- 
nounced the  withdrawal  of  the  British  troops  from 
the  Sudan  and  highly  praised  ''  the  conduct  of  all 
the  departments  of  the  service  during  the  cam- 
paign." One  asks  to  whom  and  to  what  he  issued 
the  farewell.  Was  it  to  the  shades  of  Hicks  Pasha, 
of  the  Stewarts,  of  Earle,  of  Gordon,  and  of  the 
brave  British  soldiers  whose  whitening  bones  would 
make  the  desert  paths  plainer  to  the  caravans  of  war 
or  peace  that  should  thereafter  wind  across  the  sands 
of  the  Sudan  ?  Or  was  it  to  the  rival  Mahdis — for 
since  the  death  of  Gordon  the  glory  of  Mehemet 
Ahmed  had  been  dimmed  by  the  claims  of  a  Falser 
Prophet  than  himself  —  who  were  threatening  a 
greater  destruction  among  believers  than  had  been 
accomplished  by  the  trained  troops  of  a  superior 
civilization  ?     Perhaps  Osman  Digna  heard  the  ad- 


194    "^HE   CONFLICT  OF  EAST  AND  WEST  IN  EGYPT, 

dress,  or  from  the  hills  about  Suakim,  where  he  and 
his  band  had  so  successfully  harassed  and  hindered 
the  invaders,  watched  the  withdrawal.  He  must 
have  smiled — for  he  was  a  European,  and  cannot  be 
supposed  to  have  acquired  the  disposition  of  the 
Mussulmans  with  their  faith — as  he  looked  down 
upon  the  few  miles  of  the  incomplete  and  deserted 
railway. 

And  yet  the  withdrawal  from  the  Sudan  in  May, 
1885,  was  the  wisest  act  of  Mr.  Gladstone's  Su- 
danese policy.  Gordon  himself  had  said  :  ''  If 
Khartum  falls,  then  go  quietly  back  to  Cairo,  for 
you  will  only  lose  men  and  spend  money  uselessly 
in  carrying  on  the  campaign."  '  The  troops  could 
not  go  as  far  as  Cairo,  however,  for  the  Egyptian 
boundary  needed  to  be  guarded.  The  frontier  gar- 
rison was  placed  at  Wady  Haifa.  This  was  the 
proper  limit  ;  for  it  brought  Korosko,  the  terminus 
of  the  desert  route,  under  the  protection  of  the  Nile 
patrol  of  steamers,  and  was  itself  within  easy  reach 
of  reinforcements  from  Assuan.  The  natural  bar- 
riers of  protection,  the  long  cataract  south  of  Wady 
Haifa,  and  the  six  days'  desert  guarding  Korosko, 
make  the  present  Egyptian  garrisons  practically  im- 
pregnable. And  so  the  Sudan  was  left  to  its  inher- 
ent anarchy.  But  first  England  offered  naively  to 
let  Turkey  set  up   a  government  there.     Turkey 

^  Journals,  p,  179.     (October  13.) 


WOLSELEY'S  EXPEDITION.  I95 

declined  with  thanks.  The  Sudan  pays  no  tribute. 
The  Porte  cares  Httle  for  the  mere  honor  of  being 
acknowledged  suzerain  ;  its  solicitude  is  for  some- 
thing more  tangible.  So  long  as  there  is  no  inter- 
ference with  her  tribute  prerogatives,  Turkey  will 
make  no  attempts  to  establish  her  claim  of  authority, 
by  sending  troops  or  treasure  to  Egypt  or  the  Sudan. 
After  Turkey  refused  to  act  the  part  of  what  seemed 
cat's  paw  to  England,  Italy  became  clamorous  for 
the  distinction.  But  her  ambition  never  has  ex- 
tended beyond  the  Red  Sea  littoral.  The  Sudanese 
have  thus  been  left  practically  to  themselves  since 
May,  1885.  They  have  begun  to  prepare  their 
country  for  the  ultimate  reception  of  civilization 
much  more  effectually  than  an  external  force  could 
have  done.  The  Mahdi  and  Osman  Digna  are 
dead.  Intestine  strifes  among  different  factions 
have  so  wasted  the  resources  of  the  land  that  the 
misery  of  the  people  is  as  great,  probably,  or  greater 
than  in  the  days  when  an  Egyptian  pasha  was  gov- 
ernor-general. Perhaps  the  people  already  look 
back  upon  the  time  when  Gordon  first  ruled  them, 
as  the  period  of  their  happiest  prosperity.  It  is  not 
an  impossibility  that  the  dreams  of  Sir  Samuel  Ba- 
ker may  yet  come  true,  in  which  he  pictures  to  him- 
self the  upper  Nile  region  as  freed  from  the  curse 
of  the  slave-traffic,  as  accessible  to  the  outer  world, 
and  as  bringing  forth  the  bounties  of  tropical  ia- 


196    THE   CONFLICT  OF  EAST  AND    WEST  IN  EGYPT. 

crease.  Before  this  Utopian  result  is  secured,  how- 
ever, the  influence  of  the  Anglo-Saxon  will  again 
be  needed. 

We  must  now  take  a  final  look  at  Egypt  proper. 
The  khedive's  government  played  a  small  part  in 
the  game  that  cost  England  so  dearly.  Their  chief 
concern  was  to  keep  their  head  above  the  ever-flow- 
ing, never-ebbing  tide  of  debts.  It  cannot  be  said 
that  they  succeeded.  It  has  been  seen  to  what  ex- 
tremities Lord  Northbrook  was  obliged  to  go  in 
order  to  relieve  the  financial  embarrassments  of 
1884,  and  how  the  Powers  were  incensed  at  his 
action.  By  way  of  conciliation,  a  financial  scheme 
was  drawn  up  to  which  the  Powers,  in  International 
Convention,  agreed,  and  which  was  presented  to 
Parliament  in  March,  1885.  The  agreement  guar- 
anteed a  loan  of  ^9,000,000,  to  be  used  in  lifting 
the  Egyptian  debt,  the  loan  to  be  liquidated  by  the 
repayment  of  ^325,000  annually,  and  this  sum  to 
be  considered  the  first  charge  against  the  Egyptian 
revenues  until  the  entire  loan  is  lifted.  The  admin- 
istrative expenditure  of  the  khedive's  government 
was  limited  to  the  sum  of  ^5,237,000.  Any  surplus 
over  the  year's  receipts  was  to  be  paid  over  to  the 
Commissioners  of  the  Public  Debt  for  the  purpose 
of  making  good  an  imposed  deduction  of  five  per 
cent,  from  the  interest  on  the  loan  and  an  imposed 
reduction  of  one-half  per  cent  from  the  interest  on 


WOLSELEY'S  EXPEDITION.  I97 

the  Suez  canal  shares  held  by  England.  The  cus- 
tomary provision  was  included  in  the  agreement, 
that  extends  taxation  to  all  foreigners  resident  in 
Egypt.  This  provision  had  often  enough  been  en- 
dorsed ;  it  must  now  be  executed.  The  Egyptians 
would  then  believe  that  the  Giaours  were  not  with- 
out a  sense  of  honor.  The  agreement  further  pro- 
vided, as  always,  for  an  ''  exhaustive  investigation 
into  the  revenue-earning  capacity  of  Egypt."  The 
final  provision  of  importance  was  that  if  at  the  end 
of  two  years  it  should  be  found  that  a  continued 
deduction  from  interest  on  the  coupons  is  necessary, 
the  khedive  should  summon  an  international  com- 
mission like  that  of  1880,  to  make  general  inquiry 
into  Egyptian  finances.  The  agreement  seemed  to 
have  been  drawn  up  in  the  interest  of  Egypt. 

The  two  years  of  probation  are  nearly  ended.  In 
the  interval  Egypt  has  prospered  and  the  financial 
scheme  has  worked  well.  The  Commissioners  of 
the  Public  Debt  now  announce  '  that  the  surplus 
after  the  payment  of  the  November  coupon  of  the 
unified  debt  ''  will  suffice  to  make  good  any  de- 
ficiency in  the  unassigned  revenues  and  to  reimburse 
the  five  per  cent,  coupon  tax  levied  during  the  last 
two  years,  besides  leaving  a  balance,  which  under 
the  convention  will  be  equally  divided  between  the 
Caisse  and  the  Ministry  of  Finance."     There  will 

^  The  London  Times^  October  26,  1886. 


198    THE   CONFLICT  OF  EAST  AND  WEST  IN  EGYPT, 

thus  be  no  occasion  for  the  khedlve  to  summon  an 
international  commission.  The  comparative  pros- 
perity that  has  secured  this  result  is  due  to  the 
peaceful  state  of  affairs  in  Egypt  and  to  the  more 
than  ordinarily  productive  yield  of  the  soil.  The 
cotton  crop  has  of  late  recalled  the  days  when 
Ismail  was  khedive.  Then,  too,  there  has  been  a 
discovery  within  the  boundaries  of  Egypt  that  may 
afford  a  better  solution  of  the  financial  problem 
than  all  the  agreements  and  investigations  of  Euro- 
pean Powers  can  ever  secure.  Egypt  has  been  ab- 
solutely unproductive  of  fuel  ;  but  there  is  a  promise 
that  the  newly  found  petroleum  will  be  made  to 
answer  the  purpose  of  the  imported  coal.  The  new 
fuel  has  already  been  introduced  by  way  of  experi- 
ment on  the  Alexandria  and  Cairo  railway. 

There  is  one  step  remaining  to  be  taken  in  Egypt 
that  will  do  more  than  anything  else  toward  securing 
the  final  settlement  of  the  conflict  between  East 
and  West.  England  must  assume  the  burdens  of 
her  authority.  She  can  never  loose  her  hold  of  the 
country  that  guards  the  water-way  to  India.  She  is 
jealous  of  her  power.  When  her  attention  was  con- 
centrated on  the  Afghan  imbroglio  in  May,  1885, 
France  thought  it  an  opportune  moment  to  regain 
her  lost  prestige  in  Egypt.  But  if  England's  atten- 
tion was  diverted  for  the  moment,  her  representa- 
tives were  not  without  power  in   Egypt.      M.   de 


WOLSELEY'S  EXPEDITION.  1 99 

Freycinet  failed  as  utterly  then  as  he  did  in  the  day 
of  Arabi.  The  complications  that  have  arisen 
lately  over  the  Bulgarian  troubles  have  again 
pushed  France  to  the  front  as  the  opponent  of 
English  domination  in  Egypt.  Russia,  of  course, 
with  her  grasp  upon  Bulgaria  and  her  eye  ever  on 
the  Bosphorus,  is  inciting  France  to  this  opposition. 
The  French  press  is  filled  with  stories  of  the  mis- 
rule that  is  prevalent  in  Egypt.  But  France  will 
circulate  stories  reflecting  on  the  policy  of  England 
in  Egypt  until  she  forgets  the  circumstances  of  her 
own  retirement  from  responsibility.  England  has 
the  single-handed  control,  and  she  means  to  main- 
tain it.  The  welfare  of  Egypt  rests  on  this  resolu- 
tion. Many  people,  who  claim  the  divine  right  of 
judging  the  motives  of  an  action  and  who  fail  to  see 
so  far  as  its  results,  urge  that  England  is  actuated 
solely  by  selfishness  and  the  greed  of  power  in 
asserting  her  control  in  Egypt,  and  that  she  is 
merely  fortifying  herself  against  that  certain  day 
when  some  protruding  arm  of  Russian  territory 
shall  reach  a  southern  sea.  They  say  she  makes 
the  interest  of  Egypt  secondary  to  her  own  ;  there- 
fore, the  power  of  England  in  Egypt  must  be 
resisted.  Granting  even  that  these  are  England's 
motives,  cannot  the  same  wind  blow  good  to  both 
countries  ?  Is  it  a  sound  principle  that  what  bene- 
fits one  country  must  injure  another  ?     The  fact  is, 


200    THE   CONFLICT  OF  EAST  AND  WEST  IN  EGYPT 

that  the  extension  of  the  dominion  of  Great  Britain, 
while  bringing  glory  to  the  nation  itself,  is  for  the 
interest  of  the  civilized  world  The  Anglo-Saxon 
influences  of  Christianity  and  civilization  are  the 
best  known.  As  opposed  to  Russian  influences 
they  are  both  iconoclastic  and  creative.  The  Rus- 
sian  empire  extends  its  dominion,  and  there  appears 
no  sign  of  assimilation  ;  the  subjugated  people  pays 
its  tribute  and  its  homage,  but  retains  its  language, 
its  religion,  and  its  customs.  England,  on  the  other 
hand,  makes  her  furthermost  territory  British  in 
reality  as  well  as  in  name  ;  ignorance,  superstition, 
and  savagery  melt  away  under  contact  with  the 
Anglo-Saxon  influence.  That  England,  in  spite  of 
all  her  mistakes,  has  had  a  beneficent  influence  upon 
Egypt,  no  one  can  doubt  who  compares  the  civili- 
zation under  Mehemet  AH  with  that  of  to-day.  This 
would  be  the  trite  assertion  of  an  accepted  fact,  were 
it  not  for  the  stupendous  financial  follies  of  Ismail. 
The  storm  raged  in  his  day  ;  and  the  gloom  still 
hangs  over  Egypt.  It  can  only  be  swept  away  by 
the  protecting  arm  of  England.  She  has  shrunk  all 
along  from  the  final  step  of  annexation  ;  but  she 
remains  the  virtual  suzerain  of  Egypt.  A  truly 
anomalous  condition  of  affairs  is  presented  to  view. 
England  has  the  control  ;  Egypt  bears  the  burdens  ; 
and  Turkey  reaps  the  profit.  The  role  of  Turkey 
is  quite   superfluous.      She   has   never   yielded   to 


WOLSELEY'S  EXPEDITION.  20I 

Egypt  the  slightest  return  for  the  tribute  she  has 
regularly  exacted  and  the  troops  she  has  occa- 
sionally employed.  It  is  true  that  she  granted 
Ismail  the  title  of  khedive  for  an  enormous  consid- 
eration ;  but  if  Mehemet  AH  had  been  supported  in 
his  just  struggle  for  independence  in  1842,  the  ruler 
in  Egypt  might  call  himself  khedive,  emperor,  or 
mikado,  without  the  expenditure  of  a  single  piaster. 
It  is  not  yet  too  late  for  severance.  The  vast  sum 
of  money  paid  by  way  of  tribute  to  the  Porte  may 
be  considered  duly  to  have  purchased  for  Egypt  her 
independence  of  Turkey.  This  violation  of  con- 
tract could  not  be  effected  without  a  struggle.  But 
with  England's  support  it  could  result  only  in  one 
way.  Once  accomplished,  Egypt  might  yet  shake 
off  the  shackles  of  debt,  and  the  relations  of  the 
great  Power  of  the  West  to  Egypt  in  the  East 
might  be  settled  without  conflict. 


BOOKS  AND  PERIODICALS  CONSULTED. 


About,  Edmond.     The  Fellah. 

Allen,  Charles  H.,  F.R.G.S.     The  Life  of  Chinese  Gordon. 

Baker,  Sir  Samuel  W.     Ismailia. 

Broadley,  C.  M.     How  We  Defended  Arabi. 

Dicey,  Edward.     The  Morning  Land. 

Forbes,  Archibald.     Chinese  Gordon.     Succinct  Record  of  his  Life. 

Goodrich,  Lieutenant-Commander  Casper  F.     (U.  S.  Navy.)     Report  of 

the  British  Naval  and  Military  Operations  in  Egypt,  1882. 
Gordon,  General  C.  G.     Journals  at  Khartum. 
Grant,  Robert.     History  of  the  East  India  Company 
Hake,  A.  Egmont.     The  Story  of  Chinese  Gordon. 
Jerrold,  Blanchard.     Egypt  under  Ismail  Pasha. 

The  Belgium  of  the  East. 

Keay,  J.  Seymour.     Spoiling  the  Egyptians.     A  Tale  of  Shame  told  from 

the  British  Blue  Books. 
Leon,  Edward  de.     The  Khedive's  Egypt. 

Lesseps,  Ferdinand  de.     The  Suez  Canal.     Letters  and  Documents  De- 
scriptive of  its  Rise  and  Progress,  1854  to  1856. 
Long,  Colonel  C.  Chaille.     The  Three  Prophets  :  Chinese  Gordon,  Me- 

hemet  Ahmed,  Arabi  Pasha. 
LORING,  W.  W.     A  Confederate  Soldier  in  Egypt. 
McCarthy,  Justin  H.,  M.P.     England  under  Gladstone,  1880-1885. 
McCoAN,  J.  C.     Egypt  As  It  Is. 
Patton,  a.  a.,  F.R.G.S.     A  History  of  the   Egyptian   Revolution   to  the 

Death  of  Mehemet  Ali. 
Pepper,  J.   H.     The  Suez  Canal.     Published  in  Routledge's  Discoveries 

and  Inventions  of  the  Nineteenth  Century. 
Stone,  Fanny.     Diary  of  an  American  Girl  in  Cairo  during  the  War  of 

1882.      The  Century,  June,  1884. 
Stone,  William,  M.A.,  F.L.S.     Shall  We  Annex  Egypt? 

203 


204       THE  CONFLICT  OF  EAST  AND   WEST  IN  EGYPT. 

TowLE,  George  Makepeace.     England  in  Egypt. 
Wallace,  D.  Mackenzie.     Egypt  and  the  Egyptian  Question. 
Wilson,  C.  T.,  and  Felkin,  R.  W.     Uganda  and  the   Egyptian  Sudan. 
Yates,  William  Holt,  M.D.     The  Modern  History  and  Condition  of 

Egypt,  1801  to  1843. 
Anonymous.     Egypt  for  the  Egyptians  :  a  Retrospect  and  a  Prospect. 
Plain  Words  on  the  Egyptian  Question. 

Appleton's  Annual  Cyclopaedia  has  been  of  use,  and  files  of  the  following 
journals  have  been  consulted  : 

The  British  Quarterly  Review.  The  Independent. 

The  Contemporary  Review.  The  London  Times. 

The  Edinburgh  Review.  The  Nineteenth  Century. 

The  Fortnightly  Review.  The  Quarterly  Review. 


14  DAY  USE 

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